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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Most states, including New York State,1 have adopted a major re-
vision of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Revised Article 
8), along with related amendments to Article 9 (Revised Article 9).2 
The Department of the Treasury has also adopted Revised Article 8 
for the market in Treasury securities, preempting certain provisions 
of the laws of any state that has not adopted Revised Article 8.3 In 
1994, the adoption of Revised Article 8 by both the American Law In-
stitute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uni-
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Uniform Commercial Code-Investment Securities, 1997 N.Y. LAWS 566. Gov-
ernor Pataki signed New Yorks version of Revised Article 8, A. 6619-C, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 
1996), on September 10, 1997. See Pataki Signs Bill Clarifying N.Y. Law Dealing with 
Transfer of Securities, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1302 (Sept. 19, 1997). New Yorks 
version of Revised Article 8 took effect on October 10, 1997. See 1997 N.Y. LAWS 566, § 29. 
 2. As of June 1999, Revised Article 8 had been adopted by forty-eight states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See State U.C.C. Variations, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 
xxi-xxii. A handful of states have enacted Revised Article 8 with material modifications, 
notably Connecticut and Delaware. Connecticut omitted revised section 8-511(b). See id. at 
4. For further discussion of revised section 8-511(b) see infra text accompanying notes 277-
86 for a discussion of revised section 8-511(b). 
 Delaware has carved out of revised sections 8-112(a) and (b) its fictitious situs [in Dela-
ware] of the ownership of the capital stock of all Delaware corporations, DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 169 (Supp. 1991), and its attachment provisions for shares and options or a right 
or interest therein, id. § 324; see also State U.C.C. Variations, supra, at 4.  
 Revised Sections 8-112(a) and (b) are meant to restrict legal process on certificated secu-
rities to actual seizure of the security certificate, and on uncertificated securities to legal 
process upon the issuer at its chief executive office in the United States. A.L.I. & 
NCCUSL, 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS [hereinafter 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT] §§ 8-
112(a), (b) (1994). When a secured party has a certificated security in its possession, reg-
istration of an uncertificated security registered to it in or a security entitlement main-
tained in its name, then legal process may be on the secured party. Id. § 8-112(d). Dela-
ware does not require seizure of certificated securities or legal process upon the issuer of 
uncertificated securities for an effective attachment. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 324(a) 
(Supp. 1991). 
 In addition, California enacted the text of Revised Article 8 without material modifica-
tions although the Consumers Union had sought changes. See Letter from Gail Hillebrand 
to Bion Gregory, Legislative Counsel (Nov. 25, 1996) (on file with author). The Consumers 
Union withdrew its opposition when changes were made to the Official Comments to re-
vised sections 8-101, 8-504 and 8-509. See CAL. COM. CODE §§ 8101 cmt., 8504 cmt. 4, 8509 
cmt. (West 1997). Particularly important were the changes to the Official Comments to re-
vised section 8-504, which seek to clarify what constitutes a securities intermediarys obli-
gation of good faith performance. Id. § 8504 cmt. 4. In addition, section 1799.103 was 
added to the California Civil Code to protect individual investors by providing that a con-
sumer credit contract or guarantee of a consumer credit contract cannot create a security 
interest in any investment property . . . unless (a) the contract either specifically identifies 
the investment properly as collateral or (b) the secured party is a securities intermediary. 
Id. § 1799.103. 
 3. See Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury Bonds, Notes and Bills (Aug. 23, 
1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 43,626 (1996) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 357). Similar rules have been 
adopted by the other government sponsored enterprises that issue securities maintained 
on the Federal Reserve Bank . . . System. Robert A. Wittie, Review of Recent Developments 
in U.C.C. Article 8 and Investment Securities, 52 BUS. LAW. 1575, 1576 (1997) (listing the 
enterprises and their regulations). This Article will not discuss any of these regulations in 
any detail. 
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form State Laws (NCCUSL)4 was the culmination of a process that 
began in 1988.5 Although the supporters of Revised Article 8 have 
stoutly maintained that it is primarily a clarification of 1977 Article 
8 and that the proposed changes are insignificant, Revised Article 8 
actually includes major changes that should be of concern to all indi-
vidual investors in Americas securities markets. Without significant 
amendments to certain sections of Revised Article 8, individual in-
vestors will be profoundly disadvantaged. 
 This Article uses New York State6 to test the validity of the argu-
ments made for Revised Article 8, in part, because New York City is 
the national center of the securities industry. Revised Article 8 clari-
fies the conflict of laws rules as compared to those in 1977 Articles 8 
and 9.7 When dealing with securities entitlements, which are de-
scribed below, New York law would be relevant either because choice 
of law provisions in contracts drafted by securities intermediaries 
normally specify New York law8 or because the chief executive office 
of most major securities intermediaries is located in New York.9 The 
amount of written material generated in support of adopting Revised 
Article 8 in New York, which is greater than in other states, also 
makes New York a useful test case.10 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See Revised Article 8: Investment Securities, in 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2. 
 Article 8 has undergone a number of revisions since it was first adopted in 1952. This Ar-
ticle refers primarily to two official texts other than the 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT: Revised 
(1977) Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2C U.L.A. 267-511 (1997) [hereinafter 
1977 OFFICIAL TEXT]; and Article 8 [Pre-1977 Version], 2C U.L.A. 513-579 (1997) [herein-
after 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT]. The versions of Article 8 embodied in the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT 
and the 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT will be referred to in this Article as 1962 Article 8 and 1977 
Article 8, respectively. 
 5. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENT OF MARKET 
TRANSACTIONS: EXPOSURE DRAFT FOR COMMENT, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. BUS. L. 1 [hereinafter 
1991 ABA REPORT]. 
 6. In New York State, the Article 8 in force until October 9, 1997 (1977 New York 
Article 8), was based on the ALIs April 1977 version rather than the final official text 
adopted by the ALI and NCCUSL. This history means that there are a number of inadver-
tent, nonuniform provisions in 1977 New York Article 8. See COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS AND THE BANKING LAW COMMITTEE, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF 
N.Y., REPORT ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO ARTICLE 8 OF THE NEW YORK UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, WITH CONFORMING AND MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES 1, 
5, 9 AND 13 THEREOF AS WELL AS CONFORMING AND MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS TO 
OTHER STATUTES 66 (Feb. 21, 1996) [hereinafter ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT]. 
 This Article also refers to the 1962 version of Article 8, as adopted in New York State. 
See U.C.C., 1962 N.Y. LAWS 553 [hereinafter 1962 New York Article 8]. 
 7. For a discussion of the conflict of law problems that Revised Article 8 attempts to 
solve, see James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised UCC Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
1431, 1457-60 (1996).  
 8. See 71 A.L.I. PROC. 224 (1994). 
 9. Section 8-110(e)(4), 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, provides that the default 
rule for determining a securities intermediarys jurisdiction is to use the jurisdiction in 
which is located the chief executive office of the securities intermediary. 
 10. See, e.g., ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6; Randall D. Guynn, Revised Article 
8 of the UCC: Preserving New York as a Leading International Financial Center, N.Y. ST. 
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 In addition, this Article functions as a case study of the relative 
impact of industry groups and consumers, referred to in this article 
as individual investors, on the UCC revision process. Recently, a 
great deal has been written criticizing the revision process both for 
its procedures11 and for the substantive proposals generated by these 
procedures.12 Professor Edward L. Rubin has been one of the most 
eloquent of these critics, combining a mastery of UCC Articles 3 and 
with an insiders view of what occurred during the recent revision 
process of these two Articles.13 The revision process, however, has 
also attracted its defenders.14 This is, of course, not a new debate.15 
                                                                                                                      
B.J., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 8; Richard B. Smith & Paul M. Shupack, New York Needs a Re-
vised Article 8, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1996, at 1. 
 11. Most written work touches on both procedural and substantive aspects. Some 
work, however, is more concerned with the process of revision than with the content of the 
actual proposals. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the 
Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 
83 (1993); Donald J. Rapson, Who Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About 
the U.C.C. Revision Process in the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubins Observations, 
28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1994); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy 
of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Harry C. Sigman, Improving the 
U.C.C. Revision Process: Two Specific Proposals, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325 (1994); Norman 
I. Silber, Substance Abuse at U.C.C. Drafting Sessions, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 225 (1997). For a 
neutral set of proposals concerning the revision process, see Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fun-
damental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. 
REV. 909 (1995). 
 12. For those written works more concerned with content, see, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, 
The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and Four: A Process Which Excluded Consumer Pro-
tection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REV. 827 (1992); Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. 
Dow, Banks and Their Customers Under the Revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Arti-
cles 3 and 4: Allocation of Losses Resulting From Forged Drawers Signatures, 25 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 57 (1991); Gail Hillebrand, The Redrafting of U.C.C. Articles 2 and 9: Model Codes 
or Model Dinosaurs?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 191 (1994); Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 69 (1997) [hereinafter Hillebrand, The Uniform Code Drafting Process]; Cem 
Kaner, Proposed Article 2B; Problems from the Customers View (pts. 1 & 2), U.C.C. 
BULLETIN, Jan. 1997, at 1, U.C.C. BULLETIN, Feb. 1997, at 1. Cf. Margaret L. Moses, Look 
Before Leaping to Adopt Revised Article 5, N.J. L.J., Jan. 1, 1996, at 12 (describing the det-
rimental impact of certain provisions of revised Article 5 on New Jersey companies that 
use letters of credit). 
 13. For Professor Rubins comments on the revision process, see Edward L. Rubin, 
Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising 
U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993) [hereinafter Rubin, Thinking Like 
a Lawyer]. For his more general comments on consumers abilities to enforce their rights 
under the UCC, see Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional 
Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11 (1997) [hereinafter Rubin, The Code, 
the Consumer]. For his often critical comments on revised Article 3 and 4, see Edward L. 
Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 
551 (1991). See generally Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of 
Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C., 43 BUS. LAW. 621 (1988) (attempting to describe policy 
choices made by early drafts of revised Articles 3 and 4 without taking a position on these 
choices). 
 14. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private 
Law Area, 79 MINN. L. REV. 861 (1995); A. Brooke Overby, Modeling U.C.C. Drafting, 29 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645 (1996); Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The U.C.C. Process-Consensus and Bal-
ance, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 287 (1994). 
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 Practicing attorneys from major law firms dominated the revision 
process that led to Revised Article 8. These law firms, in turn, have 
major clients in the broker-dealer and banking industries.16 The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Reserve 
Board also played major roles. These federal agencies, however, are 
not satisfactory surrogate representatives of individual investors. 
This Article focuses on the SEC in examining whether the history of 
the relationships between these federal agencies and their regulated 
industries supports the view that individual investors, in fact, were 
adequately represented.17  
 A handful of academics, most notably Professor James S. Rogers, 
the reporter for Revised Article 8, played a role in the revision proc-
ess.18 Professor Rogers has claimed that there was no need for desig-
nated representatives of individual investors because many lawyers 
involved were generalists who studied and commented upon 
drafts and whose natural inclination was to examine each issue 
from the perspective of any possible impact on their own interests as 
investors.19 As this Author does not share Professor Rogers further 
conclusion that there is nothing in Revised Article 8 that is adverse 
to the interests of individual investors,20 this Author takes little 
comfort from the fact that attorneys, who did not see their role as one 
of representing individual investors and who often lacked the exper-
tise to properly evaluate Revised Article 8, commented on the pro-
posal. 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See, e.g., Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Commercial Code Should 
Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952). Although he wrote an influential article in re-
sponse to Professor Beutel defending many provisions of the UCC, Professor Grant Gil-
more did not defend Article 4. See Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply 
to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 377 (1952). 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 473-80. 
 17. See infra Part X. 
 18. Lest the reader think that academics can substitute for committed consumer rep-
resentatives, the following commentary on the value that the legal academy places on UCC 
scholarship should be heeded: 
[S]ome of Does [a mythical-professors] friends warned him that colleagues do 
not consider prodigious efforts on bar committees or at drafting sessions to be 
much of an indication of professional accomplishment for the purposes of 
evaluating his qualifications for tenure or for merit pay increases. They also 
cautioned him that publications in this area were likely to be treated as nar-
row, no matter how broad their significance; and that in all probability, writ-
ings about the Code would be harder to place in the major journals; more likely 
to go unread; and in general, be more easily dismissed and misunderstood by 
those who do not teach in closely related fields 
Silber, supra note 11, at 225 n.3. Accord Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precau-
tions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 198 (1996). 
 19. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1544-45. 
 20. Id. at 1545. 
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 This Article suggests that consumer representatives need to be 
involved in the UCC revision process in a meaningful way.21 Writing 
to groups that represent consumers22 is a necessary, but insufficient, 
measure to encourage consumer involvement. As this Author is well 
aware from having written on Revised Article 8, an understanding of 
the issues raised by revisions involves studying a number of complex 
and interrelated areas of law. For example, to make an assessment of 
Revised Article 8, one must, at a minimum, evaluate economic stud-
ies of systemic risk in general and of clearance and settlement of se-
curities trades in particular;23 the Securities Investor Protection Act, 
the federal scheme that provides some protection resembling insur-
ance to individual investors;24 and the SECs regulatory regime to 
protect individual investors, particularly the net capital, hypotheca-
tion and segregation (of customers securities and cash) rules.25 Fur-
thermore, Revised Article 8 itself, although much more clearly con-
ceptualized and drafted than prior versions, is hardly a relaxing 
read. Faced with such recondite and complex issues, what consumer 
representative will invest the hundreds, if not thousands, of hours 
necessary to understanding these disparate but related areas of law? 
Many other legal battlefields exist where the legal issues facing con-
sumers are most familiar to lawyers, and where there is a history of 
pro-consumer commentary and activism.26 Given the limited finan-
cial and human resources of legal groups representing consumers,27 it 
is not surprising that Revised Article 8 attracted little commentary. 
 Funding is needed for consumer representatives to participate in 
the revision process.28 These consumer representatives must partici-
                                                                                                                      
 21. Cf. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, supra note 13, at 13 (asserting that consum-
ers have been effectively excluded from the development of the UCC). 
 22. Professor Rogers reports that this was done during the revision process that led to 
Revised Article 8. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1545 n.166. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part IX. 
 25. See infra Part VIII. 
 26. The issues involving the checking system, for example, although hardly simple 
ones, have generated a significant body of commentary, much of it from a consumerist 
viewpoint. See generally Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 13 (citing numerous 
articles on the checking system). [C]onsumer dissatisfaction with the bankers practice of 
holding deposited checks for fairly lengthy periods before allowing customers to withdraw 
their funds has led to significant federalization of the rules governing the checking sys-
tem. Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some 
Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1252 (1989). 
 27. See Hillebrand, The Uniform Code Drafting Process, supra note 12, at 82-83 (out-
lining the various barriers hindering the participation of consumer protection groups in the 
revision process). 
 28. See Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., The U.C.C. Thrives in the Law of Commercial Pay-
ment, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 113, 129 (1994) (To the extent that consumer groups can be 
more effectively incorporated into the process, and this probably requires some mechanism 
for funding their participation, then some of the problems of the past can be avoided.). As 
Professor Rubin notes: 
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pate from the very beginning, rather than being invited to comment 
at a later point in the drafting process. This proposal is hardly revo-
lutionary. Beyond the time and resources that major law firms de-
voted to the Revised Article 8 revision process, the SEC and the Fed-
eral Reserve devoted considerable resources to studying problems in 
the settlement and clearance of securities.29 At no time, however, did 
anyone publicly suggest that individuals other than representatives 
of the regulated industries, their attorneys or their regulators, might 
appropriately be involved in framing the issues. And, as every good 
attorney knows, framing the issues is more than half the battle.30 
II.   RECONCEPTUALIZING SECURITIES OWNERSHIP 
A.   Revised Article 8 and the Indirect Holding System 
 Although this Article is not meant as a guide to Revised Article 8 
and all of its various provisions,31 mention should be made of the 
separate legal regimes created by Revised Article 8 for directly and 
indirectly held securities. This is the single largest change wrought 
by Revised Article 8, and one with which the Author has no general 
quarrel. Currently, most owners of publicly traded securities do not 
physically hold these securities. The beneficial interests of those 
owners who are not participants in the securities depository are rep-
resented by a book entry at a participant broker-dealer or bank. In 
turn, these broker-dealers and banks do not usually physically hold 
these securities. The actual certificates are immobilized at a single 
depository institution: the Depository Trust Company (DTC) for pub-
licly traded corporate equity and debt securities, municipal debt se-
curities and commercial paper; Participants Trust Company for 
mortgage-backed securities; and the Federal Reserve System for U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
In order to secure adequate representation of consumer interests on the com-
mittee [studying revisions to Articles 3 and 4], the ABA would have needed to 
pay the expenses of several consumer representatives, committing the funds in 
a sufficiently definitive manner so that the organizations would be willing to 
assign significant staff time to the project. The ALI and NCCUSL would have 
needed to do the same thing for their drafting committee.  
Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 13, at 762. 
 29. See infra Part X. 
 30. See FRANCIS BERGAN, OPINIONS AND BRIEFSLESSONS FROM LOUGHRAN 6 (1970) 
(The way an issue gets to be stated can have fateful consequences. . . . In law, as in diplo-
macy, the merits of a point in issue are affected by the way they emerge in language.). 
 31. Professor James S. Rogers has prepared a section-by-section analysis for the 
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & JAMES S. 
ROGERS, REVISED ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES, 7A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
SERIES (1996). The Anderson treatise also has been revised to address Revised Article 8. 
See 8 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (3d ed. 
1996). For an academic discussion of many of these provisions, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is 
Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 
1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291.  
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Treasury Securities. The interests of each depository participant in a 
particular security immobilized in that depository are memorialized 
in book entries by the depository. There can be many levels to this 
indirect holding system between the pertinent depository and the 
beneficial owner, with an entity at each level creating a book entry 
memorializing securities ownership by an entity on the next level 
down.32 
 This is characterized as an indirect holding system because the 
beneficial ownership of most securities is not reflected in the books of 
the pertinent issuer. Rather, the issuers books usually reflect only 
the name of a nominee. In the case of most shares of publicly traded 
companies, this is Cede & Co., the nominee DTC uses.33 The histori-
cal rules for transfers of securities reflected in 1977 Article 8 are 
based on the physical delivery of actual certificates. In contrast, the 
indirect holding system relies on each entity on each level of this sys-
tem netting out sales and purchases of each immediately lower level 
entity for which the higher level entity is acting and making only 
those net transfers of securities or funds necessary to balance that 
lower level entitys account. This netting occurs not only on a deposi-
torys books for participants in the depository, but also on a broker-
dealer or banks books for its customers. The basic problem ad-
dressed by Revised Article 8 is the discrepancy between the legal 
rules for physical delivery of actual certificates incorporated in 1977 
Article 8 and the realities of netting and book entries that occur in 
the indirect holding system.34 
B.   Securities Entitlements 
 To deal with this discrepancy, Part 5 has been added to Revised 
Article 8. Part 5 is based upon the newly created concept of a securi-
ties entitlement. A securities entitlement is not an interest in any 
particular security; rather, it is the rights and property interest of 
an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset specified in 
Part 5.35 
 Part 5 of Revised Article 8 deals with financial asset[s], a cate-
gory including, but not limited to, securities.36 Parts 2, 3 and 4 are 
limited to the narrower category of securities.37 The definition of se-
curity in Revised Article 8 combines and tracks the definitions of 
                                                                                                                      
 32. For a general description of the indirect holding system, see 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, 
supra note 2, at 2-4. 
 33. See MARCIA STIGUM, AFTER THE TRADE: DEALER AND CLEARING BANK OPERATIONS 
IN MONEY MARKET AND GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 249 (1988).  
 34. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, at 5. 
 35. Id. § 8-102(a)(17) (emphasis added). 
 36. See id. § 8-102 cmt. 9. 
 37. See id. at 8. 
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certificated security and uncertificated security in 1977 Article 
8.38 Financial assets embrace a broader category of obligations, 
shares, participations, and interests.39 Money market instruments, 
for example, may be financial assets but not securit[ies].40 
 An entitlement holder is a person identified in the records of a 
securities intermediary as the person having a security entitlement 
against the securities intermediary,41 i.e., any person whose interest 
in a financial asset is not registered on the books of the pertinent is-
suer. Most fundamentally, Revised Article 8 expressly abandons all 
tracing rules.42 An entitlement holder has a pro rata property inter-
est in all interests in that financial asset held by the securities in-
termediary, without regard to the time the entitlement holder ac-
quired the security entitlement or the time the securities intermedi-
ary acquired the interest in that financial asset.43 Revised Article 8 
requires that four separate conditions be met before an entitlement 
holder may attempt to assert his or her property rights against the 
purchaser of a financial asset.44 One of the these four conditions is 
analogous to 1977 Article 8s bona fide purchaser rule and will be 
                                                                                                                      
 38. Compare 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-102(a)(15), with 1977 OFFICIAL 
TEXT, supra note 4, §§ 8-102(a), (b). 
 39. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-102 cmt. 9. 
 40. Id. at 22. The Prefatory Note discusses relatively common products and ar-
rangements and their treatment under Revised Articles 8 and 9, id. at 15-27, while re-
vised section 8-103 deals with whether certain specific investment products (including 
equity shares, investment company securities interests in partnerships or limited liability 
companies, options issued by a clearing corporation and commodity contracts) are finan-
cial assets or securities or neither, id. 
 41. Id. § 8-102(a)(7). 
 42. 1977 Article 8 implicitly rejected tracing by its concepts of a fungible bulk and a 
customers proportionate property interest in the fungible bulk. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, su-
pra note 4, §§ 8-313(2), 8-313 cmt. 4. See also Schroeder, supra note 31, at 332-34 (describ-
ing netting of trades as leading to impossibility of tracing, both as related to section 8-
313(2)). There is nothing implicit in Revised Article 8s rejection of tracing. See 1994 
OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-502 cmt. 2. 
 43. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503(b). 
 44. Revised section 8-503(d) provides, in part: 
An entitlement holders property interest with respect to a particular financial 
asset under subsection (a) may be enforced against a purchaser of the financial 
asset or interest therein only if: 
(1) insolvency proceedings have been initiated by or against the securities in-
termediary; 
(2) the securities intermediary does not have sufficient interests in the finan-
cial asset to satisfy the security entitlements of all of its entitlement holders to 
that financial asset; 
(3) the securities intermediary violated its obligations under Section 8-504 by 
transferring the financial asset or interest therein to the purchaser; and 
(4) the purchaser is not protected under subsection (e). 
1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503(d). Subsection (a) provides that a financial asset 
is held by a securities intermediary for the benefit of entitlement holders to the extent nec-
essary to meet the pertinent security entitlements. See id. § 8-503(a). Subsection (e) pro-
tects transferees and is discussed infra Part VI.A.1. 
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discussed below.45 These conditions are intended to restrict entitle-
ment holders in most situations to a cause of action against the secu-
rities intermediary.46 The policy behind creating such a high barrier 
to an entitlement holders assertion against a purchaser of property 
rights in any financial asset is that normally an entitlement holder 
should look only to his or her securities intermediary for performance 
of the obligations that give content to a securities entitlement.47 After 
all, in contrast to the common law concepts underlying 1977 Article 8 
that are based on claims to specific physical certificates, Revised Ar-
ticle 8 creates a new type of property interest that is not a claim to a 
specific identifiable thing; [rather] it is a package of rights and inter-
ests that a person has against the persons securities intermediary 
and the property held by the intermediary.48 
III.   SYSTEMIC RISK 
 Revised Article 8 includes little explanation to justify its adoption. 
The Prefatory Note to Revised Article 8 briefly mentions the legal 
uncertainties created by the prior version of Article 8 and the ad-
verse effects of these uncertainties on all participants in securities 
trading.49 Professor Rogers has provided a much fuller rationale. He 
has identified concerns with systemic risk in the financial markets as 
the impetus for Revised Article 8.50 Systemic risk is [t]he risk that 
inability of one [financial] institution to meet its obligations [to pay 
funds or transfer securities] when due will cause other [financial] in-
stitutions to be unable to meet their obligations [to pay funds or 
transfer securities] when due.51 It can arise from any cause that 
would lead a financial institution to fail, possibly triggering a domino 
effect. Trading in over-the-counter derivatives, for example, is one 
area of current concern.52 The particular systemic risks to which Re-
vised Article 8 is addressed are those arising from clearance and set-
tlement of securities trades. 
                                                                                                                      
 45. See infra Part V.B. 
 46. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503(d) cmts. 2, 3.  
 47. See id. § 8-503(d) cmt. 2. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1. 
 50. For a recent overview of systemic risk in financial services in general, see 
RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (1995), and, in banking in particular, see The Domino Effect: A Survey of Inter-
national Banking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter The Domino Effect]. 
 51 . BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, CROSS-BORDER SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENTS 40 (1995) [hereinafter BIS 1995]. 
 52. See The Domino Effect, supra note 50, at 9-10 (discussing systemic risk concerns 
in commercial banking arising from OTC derivatives). 
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A.   The Bogeyman 
 Professor Rogers has justified Revised Article 8 as one part of 
worldwide efforts to assure that the clearance and settlement system 
for securities trading functions in a way that avoids the creation of 
systemic risk.53 One should remember that systemic risk is not a the-
ory that explains the onset of financial crises or provides a full ex-
planation of the development of financial crises.54 Rather, it should 
be thought of as the danger that a financial crisis will lead to a con-
tagious spread of losses across financial institutions that threatens to 
harm the real economy (the production of goods and services).55 An-
other way of defining systemic risk is to say that it is the risk that a 
financial market will fail due to its structural reaction to a macro-
economic crisis, which failure, in turn, will be transmitted to other 
financial markets.56 
 Professor Rogers starts his defense of Revised Article 8 with an 
eleven-page discussion of systemic risk.57 Nowhere in these eleven 
pages or in the balance of his article does Professor Rogers explain 
the particular aspects of systemic risk that would be alleviated by 
Revised Article 8. Furthermore, Professor Rogers fails to provide any 
convincing examples of systemic risk that have arisen from the prior 
versions of Article 8.58 In fact, Professor Rogers himself reports that 
[s]omewhat to my surprise, I found that, although there were many 
general expressions to the effect that prior law did not provide a suf-
ficiently certain legal framework for transactions implemented 
through the modern securities holding system, there was relatively 
very little specific description of problems.59 
 Systemic risk is a very serious concern, one that causes reputable 
commentators to use phrases like doomsday scenario and the stuff 
of which nightmares . . . are made.60 In its simplest form, systemic 
risk in securities clearance and settlement arises from the possibility 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1435. 
 54. For a description of current theories, see E.P. DAVIS, INSTABILITY IN THE 
EUROMARKETS AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF FINANCIAL CRISIS (Bank of England Discus-
sion Paper No. 43, Oct. 1989) at 4-16. 
 55. HERRING & LITAN, supra note 50, at 50. 
 56. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, SYSTEMIC 
RISKS IN SECURITIES MARKETS 8, 18 (1991) [hereinafter OECD]. 
 57. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1431-42. 
 58. The only example that Professor Rogers provides is the mid-1980s collapse of sev-
eral government securities dealers and the effects that this had on the mortgage-backed 
securities market. See id. at 1545 n.98. Although there was an initial disruption of the 
market for mortgage-backed securities because dealers did not know which of the mort-
gage-backed securities they were trading was the object an adverse claim, this disruption 
was substantially alleviated by publication of a daily list of securities subject to adverse 
claims. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & Ernest T. Patrikis, Article 8s Adverse Claim Procedures: 
The Uncharted Hazards of a Safe Harbor, 20 UCC L.J. 327, 348 (1988). 
 59. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1447. 
 60. The Domino Effect, supra note 50, at 12-13. 
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that one financial institution will fail to meet its obligation to deliver 
securities or to make a payment to a counterparty. Because of the fi-
nancial institutions failure, the counterparty in turn may default on 
its obligations to a third party. Like dominoes, these defaults may 
ultimately jeopardi[ze] the stability of payment systems and of fi-
nancial markets, i.e., produce systemic risk.61 Faced with such an 
awesome prospect, who would not agree to whatever measures were 
reasonably required to lessen the likelihood of a worldwide financial 
panic and crisis? 
 The problem with this systemic risk argument, as applied to Re-
vised Article 8, is the one that Professor Rogers article exemplifies. 
No one has identified exactly how Revised Article 8 alleviates sys-
temic risk. Some proponents of Revised Article 8 are more blunt than 
Professor Rogers: The conclusion that current law creates serious 
risk of systemic market failure is the SECs, not mine. I have no ba-
sis independent of the SEC studies upon which to form a judgment 
about the empirical claim that drastic reform of Prior Article 8 is 
needed.62 
B.   The Reality 
 This section briefly explores those factual circumstances believed 
to create systemic risk in the clearance and settlement of securities 
according to various studies, including those studies upon which Pro-
fessor Rogers relies. Before describing this particular type of sys-
temic risk, it should be noted that not all writers on financial matters 
agree that our current financial system, if not reformed, engenders 
significant systemic risks63 or, more narrowly, that the failure of a 
major securities firm would create systemic risk.64 This Article, how-
ever, taking the many systemic risk studies cited by Professor Rogers 
at their word, assumes that significant risks are contained within the 
clearance and settlement systems for securities. Once the concerns of 
the studies are examined, it becomes clear that, in most respects, Re-
vised Article 8 is unrelated to these concerns. 
                                                                                                                      
 61. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN 
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 1 (1992) [hereinafter BIS 1992]. 
 62. Memorandum from Paul M. Shupack, Chair of Working Group, Article 8 Bar Re-
port, to Members of the Uniform State Laws Committee of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York 1 (June 6, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shupack Memoran-
dum]. Professor Shupack never discusses the SEC reports on which he is relying or what 
empirical support these reports provide. This Author does not believe that there is a sub-
stantial empirical basis for Revised Article 8. 
 63. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 133 (1990); Ethan B. Kapstein, Shockproof: The End of the Financial Crisis, 75 
FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1996). 
 64. See, e.g., HERRING & LITAN, supra note 50, at 72-73. 
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 The studies of systemic risk in the banking industry created the 
conceptual framework that has been carried over to studies of the se-
curities industry.65 In 1989, a group of banking experts on payment 
systems issued a report on financial netting arrangements.66 This re-
port discussed the risks present in a payment netting system. Two 
basic risks exist: credit risk and liquidity risk.67 Credit risk is the 
risk that a counterparty will not meet an obligation when due, and 
will never be able to meet that obligation for full value.68 Liquidity 
risk is the risk that clearing, or settlement, payments will not be 
made when due, even though one or more counterparties do have suf-
ficient assets and net worth ultimately to make them.69 
 These two concepts have been applied in a multitude of studies to 
clearance and settlement in the securities, options and futures mar-
kets to flesh out possible systemic risks and possible solutions. 
Clearance is the process by which counterparties in the securities, 
options and futures markets compare buy-and-sell orders to confirm 
that both sides to a transaction agree to its terms. Settlement is the 
process by which both counterparties fulfill their obligations, which 
in a traditional stock trade means payment to the seller and deliv-
ery of the stock . . . certificate[ ] or transferring its ownership to the 
                                                                                                                      
 65. See BIS 1992, supra note 61, at 2-3 (In general, the types and sources of financial 
risk in the clearance and settlement of contracts for the purchase and sale of securities are 
the same as those that arise in the clearance and settlement of foreign exchange contracts, 
which were analyzed in considerable detail in the Angell Report [infra note 66] and the 
Lamfalussy Report [infra note 75].). 
 66. See GROUP OF EXPERTS ON PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE 
GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, REPORT ON NETTING SCHEMES (1989) [hereinafter ANGELL 
REPORT]. This report is often called the Angell Report after Warren D. Angell, who was a 
member of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Board and Chairman of the group 
of experts. 
 67. See id. at 9-10. 
 68. Id. at 9. Credit risk is often, but not always, a result of the bankruptcy of a coun-
terparty. The nature of a netting system will determine how the loss is measured: 
In a payment netting system, losses from defaults due to the bankruptcy of 
counterparties can be measured as the principal amount due less recoveries 
from defaulting parties. Forgone interest can also be an important loss. In an 
obligations netting system, losses from the default of a counterparty would 
typically be calculated from the replacement costs of one or more contracts that 
are not settled. If, however, one party to a contract defaults after having re-
ceived settlement payments from another party, but before making required 
counter-payments (in the same or another currency), the loss would again be 
for a principal amount (less recoveries). 
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. at 10. Operational risk, a third type of risk that this Article does not discuss, 
is the risk of a breakdown of some component of the hardware, software, or communica-
tions systems that are critical to settlement of financial transactions. PATRICK PARKINSON 
ET AL., CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT IN U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS 7 (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System Staff Study No. 163, Mar. 1992) [hereinafter FEDERAL 
RESERVE STUDY 1992]. 
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buyer.70 Although different markets have different clearance and 
settlement procedures, this Article will not explore the nuances cre-
ated by these differences for systemic risk analysis. 
 The financial market studies have looked at the risks that arise 
both before and during the settlement process. Prior to settlement, 
credit risk can be measured by the cost of replacing the original con-
tract at current market prices (replacement cost risk).71 Replace-
ment cost risk is a factor of the volatility of the securities price and 
the amount of time that elapses between the trade date and the set-
tlement date.72 One recent step to lessen replacement cost risk has 
been the SECs shortening of settlement for most publicly traded cor-
porate equity and debt securities from the fifth business day after the 
trade date to the third business day after the trade date (T + 3).73 
This, of course, is not a regulatory initiative that implicates Revised 
Article 8. Creation of legally binding trade netting systems is the 
other recommended general means of reducing replacement cost 
risk.74 This is primarily a matter of contract law involving such is-
sues as whether netting arrangements are purely bookkeeping ar-
rangements in which the underlying obligations remain outstanding, 
or rather true novations in which only a single new, net obligation 
remains outstanding.75 Revised Article 8 is relevant to netting 
                                                                                                                      
 70. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND 
BEARS 107 (1990). For overviews and further descriptions of clearing and settlement in the 
United States, see id. at 181-93; STIGUM, supra note 33, at 278. In addition, there are a 
number of useful papers and memoranda in the contractor report prepared by the Bankers 
Trust Company for the Office of Technology Assessment. See 1-5 BANKERS TRUST 
COMPANY, STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT (Oct. 1989). Volume 1 of 
the Bankers Trust Company study provides an executive summary of the United States 
material at pages 34-69. 
 71. BIS 1992, supra note 61, at 3. Of course, if the price of the pertinent contract has 
declined, there would be no additional cost. Some studies use the term market risk to de-
scribe what this article calls replacement cost risk. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 56, at 31. 
 72. BIS 1992, supra note 61, at 3. 
 73. See Securities Transaction Settlement, Release No. 33-7022 (Oct. 12, 1993), 58 
Fed. Reg. 52,891 (1993). Commercial paper, commercial bills, bankers acceptances, limited 
partnership interests that are not publicly traded, and certain securities sold pursuant to 
a firm commitment underwritten offering registered under the Securities Act of 1933 are 
excluded. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1(c) (1998). The SEC currently is considering mandating 
same-day settlement. See Arthur Levitt, Remarks at Speeding Up Settlement: The Next 
Frontier, SEC Symposium on Risk Reduction in Payments, Clearance and Settlement 
Systems 6 (Jan. 26, 1996), available in 1996 WL 29441 (S.E.C.) at *3. The largest securi-
ties market in the United States, both in dollar amount and in average daily volume, is the 
United States government securities market. See FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY 1992, supra 
note 69, at 5 chart 2. Most trades in this market are settled on the day of trade or the next 
day. See id. at 22-23. 
 74. BIS 1992, supra note 61, at 3. 
 75. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 
16 (1990) [hereinafter BIS 1990] ([O]nly if the net amounts are legally binding in the 
event of a counterpartys closure will the participants experience reductions in their true 
credit and liquidity exposures.). This report is often called the Lamfalussy Report after 
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schemes insofar as clearing organizations become counterparties in 
netting arrangements.76 Clearing organizations and Revised Article 8 
are discussed in Part VI.C. of this Article. 
 The primary focus of Revised Article 8, and the area about which 
the most concern with regard to securities markets has been ex-
pressed,77 is the settlement of securities transactions. The scenario 
prompting the concerns with systemic risk starts with a sharp and 
sudden fall in prices of securities or derivatives in a single market.78 
This fall then is transmitted to other financial markets.79 The recent 
example of market contagion cited by most studies is the October 
1987 market crash in the United States that spread to the related fu-
tures and options markets and overseas equity markets.80 The final 
step is the failure of one or more major intermediaries, which fi-
nally generates a crisis in the core banking and payments system.81 
Settlement procedures play a role in systemic risk analysis primarily 
as transmitters of financial failure and secondarily as independent 
sources of systemic risk.82 The possible transmission risk can arise 
directly from the failure of a counterparty, usually from bankruptcy, 
or indirectly from the failure of a clearing organization that became 
the counterparty to its members transactions.83 The possible inde-
pendent risks can arise from operational failures such as computer 
breakdowns84 or from problems arising from the interaction of differ-
ent settlement systems.85 The latter independent risk can arise, for 
example, from different settlement times in different systems. If 
buyer A is purchasing securities X in market B and simultaneously 
selling the same securities X in market A and if market B settles at 3 
p.m. and market A at 2 p.m., it will be difficult for buyer A to execute 
both the purchase and the sale in the same day. These difficulties 
can be overcome by any number of techniques. For example, cash and 
securities can be pre-positioned in the relevant markets or borrowed. 
                                                                                                                      
M. A. Lamfalussy, the chairman of the committee. For a description of the possible legal 
forms of netting and the risks created by various institutional netting arrangement, see 
ANGELL REPORT, supra note 66, at 11-26. 
 76. See BIS 1990, supra note 75, at 17-19; ANGELL REPORT, supra note 66, at 18-21. 
 77. See BIS 1992, supra note 61, at 3 (By far the largest financial risks in securities 
clearance and settlement occur during the settlement process . . . .). 
 78. OECD, supra note 56, at 17. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See, e.g., id. at 13, 17. Luckily, not all financial markets were affected, see id. at 
13, which is another way of saying that a systemic crisis was not triggered. 
 81. Id. at 17. 
 82. See id. at 35. 
 83. See id. at 36. 
 84. See FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY 1992, supra note 69, at 16-17. 
 85. See BIS 1995, supra note 51, at 3. Although this report is concerned with cross-
border settlements, most of its discussion of basic risks would apply to a domestic market 
where settlements with respect to a particular security were not made through a single 
central clearing organization. 
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But any such technique raises liquidity issues that, if large enough, 
may themselves create potential systemic risk.86 
C.   Reducing Systemic Risks 
 A variety of recommendations have been made for reducing sys-
temic risk in the clearing and settlement of securities. The template 
against which all these recommendations are measured is a 1989 re-
port by the Group of Thirty.87 The Group of Thirty made nine recom-
mendations, of which the most relevant to Revised Article 8 is that 
[d]elivery versus payment (DVP) should be employed as the method 
for settling all securities transactions. A DVP system should be in 
place by 1992.88 On its face, this recommendation does not seem di-
                                                                                                                      
 86. One study labels this as a type of pipeline liquidity cost that creates pipeline li-
quidity risk. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF N.Y. AS OPERATOR OF THE EUROCLEAR 
SYSTEM, CROSS-BORDER CLEARANCE, SETTLEMENT, AND CUSTODY: BEYOND THE G30 
RECOMMENDATIONS 9, 11 (1993). In most domestic clearing arrangements, the banking 
sector typically absorbs these costs by providing uncompensated intra-day credit to bridge 
the gaps in time during which assets are in fact blocked in a settlement pipeline. Id. at 9. 
If no intra-day credit is available, the market participants bear the pipeline liquidity risk 
through pre-funding their accounts. See id. at 14. 
 87. See GROUP OF THIRTY, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE WORLDS 
SECURITIES MARKETS (1989). 
 88. Id. at 11 (Recommendation 5). The other eight recommendations are: 
Recommendation 1: 
 By 1990, all comparisons of trades between direct market participants (i.e., 
brokers, broker/dealers and other exchange members) should be accomplished 
by T+1. 
Recommendation 2: 
 Indirect market participants (such as institutional investors, or any trading 
counterparties which are not broker/dealers) should, by 1992, be members of a 
trade comparison system which achieves positive affirmation of trade details. 
Recommendation 3: 
 Each country should have an effective and fully developed central securities 
depository, organi[z]ed and managed to encourage the broadest possible indus-
try participation (directly and indirectly), in place by 1992. 
Recommendation 4: 
 Each country should study its market volumes and participation to determine 
whether a trade netting system would be beneficial in terms of reducing risk 
and promoting efficiency. If a netting system would be appropriate, it should be 
implemented by 1992. 
. . . . 
Recommendation 6: 
 Payments associated with the settlement of securities transactions and the 
servicing of securities portfolios should be made consistent across all instru-
ments and markets by adopting the same day funds convention. 
Recommendation 7: 
 A Rolling Settlement system should be adopted by all markets. Final set-
tlement should occur on T+3 by 1992. As an interim target, final settlement 
should occur on T+5 by 1990 at the latest, save only where it hinders the 
achievement of T+3 by 1992. 
Recommendation 8: 
 Securities lending and borrowing should be encouraged as a method of expe-
diting the settlement of securities transactions. Existing regulatory and taxa-
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rectly relevant to Revised Article 8; however, supporters of Revised 
Article 8 have focused on finality, the policy behind this recommen-
dation, for support.89 The supporters of Revised Article 8 maintain 
that finality in securities transactions should mean that a third 
party could challenge a securities transfer only in the most unusual 
circumstances. Professor Rogers labels this as post-settlement final-
ity.90 By post-settlement finality, Professor Rogers means the situa-
tion where, subsequent to the settlement between Firm A and Firm 
B, 
[A] third party (Claimant) appears and asserts that the securi-
ties that Firm A transferred to Firm B really belonged to or other-
wise were subject to a property interest in favor of Claimant and 
should not have been transferred by Firm A to Firm B. To the ex-
tent that the applicable legal rules permit the Claimant to recover 
the securities from Firm B on such grounds, Firm B faces a form of 
settlement risk that continues even beyond the point at which it 
appeared that the transaction had settled.91 
 Post-settlement finality concern has such a tenuous connection to 
the numerous studies of settlement and clearance that Professor 
Rogers is only able to find one study that even discusses it.92 This is 
not surprising as the experience under 1977 Article 8 lends no em-
pirical support to the concern that Professor Rogers raises.93 
                                                                                                                      
tion barriers that inhibit the practice of lending securities should be removed 
by 1990. 
Recommendation 9: 
 Each country should adopt the standard for securities messages developed by 
the International Organi[z]ation for Standardi[z]ation [ISO Standard 7775]. In 
particular, countries should adopt the ISIN numbering system for securities is-
sues as defined in the ISO Standard 6166, at least for cross border transac-
tions. These standards should be universally applied by 1992. 
Id. at 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18. 
 89. Recommendation 8 is also relevant in evaluating Revised Article 8. This recom-
mendation is meant to address the problem of a failure to deliver securities by a counter-
party. If the party that has not received securities has delivery obligations to another coun-
terparty with respect to these securities, the party can meet these delivery obligations by 
borrowing replacement securities. See id. at 47-48. As with Recommendation 5, finality is 
one of the policies underlying Recommendation 8. In other words, no party will borrow se-
curities and no counterparty will accept borrowed securities unless each can be sure that it 
has received a transfer that cannot be unwound. 
 90. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1461. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 1461 n.42 (citing BIS 1995, supra note 51, at 53-54). This 1995 study 
notes that some legal systems have developed the concept of negotiability to deal with 
this problem. BIS 1995, supra note 51, at 54. Nowhere does the Bank for International Set-
tlements indicate that negotiability does not do its job and that it needs the radical reform 
provided by Revised Article 8. 
 93. The one empirical example that Professor Rogers cites to support his concerns is 
discussed supra note 58. 
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1.   Orange County Bankruptcy 
 Professor Rogers uses a hypothetical involving securities held as 
collateral for Orange Countys debt to illustrate potential post-
settlement finality issues. If the sale of the collateral securities was 
not structured properly, the purchasers would not enjoy bona fide 
purchaser protection under 1977 Article 8.94 An examination of the 
actual events in the Orange County bankruptcy95 establishes that 
there were no adverse claims problems that would have been ad-
dressed or alleviated by Revised Article 8. Although this Author has 
no quarrel with Professor Rogers description of what is possible, this 
Author is skeptical that, as a practical matter, securities held as col-
lateral for a bankrupt debtor as notorious as Orange County96 and 
that were of a material amount in value could be transferred without 
knowledgeable commercial lawyers being involved on both the sale 
and purchase sides.97 Even if the lawyers had only represented the 
selling collateral holders and not the ultimate purchasers, the law-
yers presumably would have advised their clients that, under 1977 
Article 8, the collateral holder would have made a warranty that the 
transfer was effective and rightful98 and, therefore, should not 
transfer securities as to which there were probable adverse claims. 
                                                                                                                      
 94. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1466-67. Professor Rogers contrasts a hypothetical 
settlement through entries on the books of a clearing corporation, which can lead to bona 
fide purchaser status under 1977 Article 8, to settlement through an entry on the books of 
a securities intermediary, which cannot lead to bona fide purchaser status, relying pre-
sumably on sections 8-313(1)(g) and (2) of the 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, id. at 1466. 
 95. Professor Rogers has avoided any such examination. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 
1466 n.51 (No inference is intended concerning any issues that may actually have arisen 
out of the Orange County matter itselfa matter on which the Author is wholly igno-
rant.). 
 96. Orange Countys potential financial difficulties were known to Wall Street as 
early as August 1994. See Laura Jereski et al., Bitter Fruit: Orange County, Mired in In-
vestment Mess, Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at A1 (reporting that Or-
ange County filed a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition, and the county had over $7 billion in 
outstanding public debt). And, when the collateral sales were made, they were large 
enough relative to the market to lead to fire-sale prices. Laura Jereski, Orange County 
Fund Losses Put at $2.5 Billion: Bond Price Drop, Streets Rush to Sell Are Cited as Portfo-
lio Weakens, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at A3 (reporting that the Orange County fund con-
sisted of investments by more than 180 California local governments and agencies, worth 
over $7.5 billion); Michael Siconolfi & Anita Raghavan, Orange County Crisis: The Fallout, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at A13 (discussing whether the fund could sell securities held as 
loan collateral). 
 97. The collateral holders in the Orange County Bankruptcy consulted their attorneys 
before disposing of their collateral. See Stephen J. Sansweet & Rhonda L. Rundle, Orange 
County Hires Financial Experts, Says It Will Sue Some Wall Street Firms, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 9, 1994, at A3. One might expect purchasers of any sophistication to also seek legal 
counsel as the combination of publicly available information about Orange County plus the 
discount prices would have alerted such purchasers to the possibility they might be pur-
chasing Orange County collateral. 
 98. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, §§ 8-306(2)(a) (certificated securities), 8-
306(9)(a) (uncertificated securities). 
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 Orange County officials filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code on December 6, 1994, after Or-
ange Countys investment portfolio plummeted in value.99 The county 
had purchased inverse floaters100high-risk derivativesfrom vari-
ous Wall Street firms using the cash proceeds from repurchase 
agreements. The county, as the seller in the repurchase agreements, 
agreed to repurchase the securities that were sold pursuant to the 
repurchase agreements and gave the purchasing Wall Street firms 
collateral for these repurchase obligations.101 As interest rates rose 
during 1994, the value of both the collateral securities and the in-
verse floaters declined.102 
 When Orange County defaulted under one repurchase agreement, 
CS First Boston sold $2.6 billion in securities held as collateral.103 
This precipitated the bankruptcy filing, which was intended to pre-
vent other firms from selling their collateral.104 Despite Orange 
Countys intention, other firms that held securities as collateral were 
quick to sell these securities; by Friday, December 9, 1994 they had 
collectively sold nearly $11.4 billion out of a total of $15 billion in col-
lateral.105 
 Instead of seeking to enjoin the sale of securities held as collat-
eral, Orange County chose to sue for damages, arguing that the 
automatic stay provision under Chapter 9 prohibited such sales.106 
The Wall Street firms contended that the automatic stay provision 
did not apply to repurchase agreements.107 By early 1995, Orange 
County decided to bring only one test case against Merrill Lynch & 
Co. and voluntarily dropped a suit against one of the other firms.108 
Although some secured lenders hesitated in liquidating their collat-
                                                                                                                      
 99. See Jereski et al., supra note 96, at A3. 
 100. The yield on inverse floaters increases as market interest rates decline and de-
creases as market interest rates rise. Robert C. Downs & Lenora J. Fowler, Derivative Se-
curities: Governmental Entities as End Users, Bankrupts and Other Big Losers, 65 UMKC 
L. REV. 483, 493 (1997). Orange County used the inverse floaters to hedge a portfolio of se-
curities issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System against declines in interest rates. William K. Maready, Jr., Regulating for 
Disaster: Federal Attempts to Control the Derivatives Market, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 
887-88 (1996). 
 101. See Siconolfi & Raghavan, supra note 96, at A13. Presumably this collateral con-
sisted of the securities that were the subject of the repurchase agreement. See Public Secu-
rities Association, Master Repurchase Agreement § 6, reprinted in MARCIA STIGUM, THE 
REPO AND REVERSE MARKETS 236, 238 (1989) [hereinafter STIGUM, REPO]. 
 102. See Jereski et al., supra note 96, at A1. 
 103. See Sansweet & Rundle, supra note 97, at A3. 
 104. See Jereski et al., supra note 96, at A1. 
 105. See id. at A3. 
 106. Andy Pasztor, Orange County Has No Choice But to Sue Over Sold Collateral, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1994, at B11. 
 107. See Siconolfi & Raghavan, supra note 96, at A13. 
 108. See Andy Pasztor, Orange County Suit Against Nomura Is Dropped for Now, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at B10. 
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eral,109 most positions were liquidated quickly and easily. None of the 
problems predicted by supporters of Revised Article 8 occurred. The 
securities markets functioned effectively and without evident prob-
lems in absorbing the collateral. No concerns over adverse claims or 
finality materially hindered this process. 
2.   Transaction Costs 
 Other commentators on international clearance and settlement 
have been motivated as much, if not more, by a desire to reduce fric-
tion or transaction costs as by a desire to preclude systemic risk.110 
To these commentators, the legal uncertainties and friction costs in 
obtaining valid transfers and pledges of interests in securities cur-
rently may be preventing a large portion of the worlds stock of secu-
rities from being put to one of its highest and best uses when oppor-
tunities for such use arise.111 These problems may lead to a higher 
cost of credit and lower the value of securities. These economic effi-
ciency issues, though of concern, do not provide the compelling sense 
of urgency that Professor Rogers systemic risk argument provides. 
This Article will not examine the ecnomic efficiency issue because 
very little of the literature on clearance and settlement addresses it 
and because it is not the primary argument made in favor of Revised 
Article 8. 
 A focus on economic efficiency would shift the discussion from sys-
temic risk to one of the relative costs of tradeoffs between protection 
for individual investors and reduced costs for institutions that carry 
out clearance and settlement, which presumably are ultimately re-
flected through competition in reduced costs for investors. In addi-
tion, certain measures advocated by supporters of Revised Article 8, 
such as the super-priority of control lenders to clearing corpora-
tions,112 can lead to their own increased transaction costs;113 there-
                                                                                                                      
 109. Siconolfi & Raghavan, supra note 96, at A13. Smith Barney, Inc. circulated a bid 
list for the $800 million of collateral bonds it held and then withdrew the list. Prudential 
Securities, Inc. sold some of the $1 billion in securities it held as collateral and then bought 
these securities back. See id. Nothing in the publicly available literature gives any insight 
into why these steps were taken. Whatever concerns Smith Barney and Prudential had, 
other repo purchasers and the market in general did not share these same concerns. 
 110. See, e.g., MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK AS OPERATOR OF THE 
EUROCLEAR SYSTEM, supra note 86; RANDALL D. GUYNN, MODERNIZING SECURITIES 
OWNERSHIP, TRANSFER AND PLEDGING LAWS (1996) [hereinafter GUYNN, MODERNIZING]. 
 111. GUYNN, MODERNIZING, supra note 110, at 6. 
 112. See infra Part VI.B. for a discussion of this superpriority issue. 
 113. See ANGELL REPORT, supra note 66, at 19. As the chance of clearing corporation 
failure is reduced in Revised Article 8 by using participants assets as collateral, one would 
expect that unsecured creditors would raise the cost of credit to the participants. See id. 
However, it is not clear that such market mechanisms would work adequately, 
particularly if the amounts of collateral posted were not disclosed to creditors; 
and in any case it could be harder for participants to assess the creditworthi-
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fore, the goal of reducing transaction costs in the clearing and set-
tlement system as a whole might not be met. 
3.   October 1987 Market Crash 
 Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., the legal academic whose ideas 
form the intellectual underpinnings of Revised Article 8,114 is no more 
convincing on the empirical issues. In discussing the potentially se-
vere consequences of prevailing uncertainties in the legal regime,115 
he cites to the October 1987 market crash and the 1990 bankruptcy 
of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (DBL Group).116 
 This Article does not purport to make a detailed survey of the 
sources concerning the October 1987 Market Crash. Instead, it as-
sumes that the supporters of Revised Article 8 have found the most 
relevant support for their position. When these sources are exam-
ined, the argument that 1977 Article 8 had to be thoroughly revised 
because of a general reluctance by bank lenders . . . to extend credit 
necessary to provide vital liquidity because of uncertainty as to per-
fection and priority of security interests in collateral117 turns out to 
be a vast overgeneralization.  
 Professor Mooney cites a 1988 study by the SEC as support for 
this generalization.118 When looking at the study, one finds that the 
SEC was not discussing general problems in perfecting security in-
terests but rather problems identified by the Options Clearing Cor-
poration (OCC) with respect to perfecting security interests in op-
tions.119 As options exist exclusively as book entries, methods for per-
fection differed between 1962 and 1977 Article 8. There were also dif-
ferent choice of law provisions under these two versions of Article 8, 
which could lead to different results. The study concluded that 
[a]lthough it is possible to perfect security interests using both 
methods, doing so is both cumbersome and error-prone.120 While 
these problems can be generalized to cover all securities that exist 
                                                                                                                      
ness of the clearing house than that of their individual counterparties in the 
markets. 
Id. This lack of certainty can be its own independent source of systemic risk. 
 114. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and 
Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305 
(1990). 
 115. Id. at 315. 
 116. See id. at 315 n.13. 
 117. Mooney, supra note 114, at 315 n.13. 
 118. See id. (citing DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SEC, THE OCTOBER 1987 
MARKET BREAK (1988), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., 2 THE STOCK MARKET CRASH 
OF OCTOBER 1987: FEDERAL DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS ON THE VOLATILITY OF THE STOCK 
MARKET AND STOCK INDEX FUTURES MARKETS 10-56 (1988) [hereinafter OCTOBER 1987 
MARKET BREAK]. 
 119. See OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 118, at 10-56. 
 120. Id. 
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solely as book entries, the solution does not necessarily implicate the 
upper tier priority and finality policies for which Professors Mooney 
and Rogers,121 respectively, are the chief spokespersons. Nor do they 
necessarily lead to the choice to favor control lenders over individual 
investors. 
 Later academic studies have not been any kinder to Revised Arti-
cle 8 supporters. The few studies that have examined clearing and 
settlement during the October 1987 crash have not even mentioned 
problems in perfecting security interests as something of concern.122 
Also, there are no contemporaneous or subsequent articles in the 
business press that report on problems in perfecting security inter-
ests.123 
4.   DBL Groups Bankruptcy 
 The evidence from DBL Groups bankruptcy similarly does not 
support the notion that problems in perfecting security interests in 
securities present a serious danger to Americas financial markets.124 
Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman at the time of the bankruptcy, 
                                                                                                                      
 121. Professor Rogers citation to a source studying the October 1987 crash is even 
more general and vague than Professor Mooneys. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1446 n.23. 
Professor Rogers cited to the INTERIM REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
MARKETS, reprinted in REAMS, supra note 118, app. D at 15-16. In a single paragraph, the 
Interim Report advocates uniform transfer, delivery and pledge requirements for options 
and uncertificated securities so that there is no uncertainty in what law to apply and so 
that all states laws recognize uncertificated securities. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 63. 
 123. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, The Day the Nations Cash Pipeline Almost Ran Dry, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988, § 3 at 11; James B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, Terrible Tues-
day: How the Stock Market Almost Disintegrated a Day After the Crash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
20, 1987, at 1. Stewart & Hertzberg do report a number of instances where banks refused 
to extend credit to securities firms. On October 19, Bankers Trust Co., for example, refused 
to extend any unsecured credit to broker-dealers. Other banks called in loans to broker-
dealers. Id. These problems are more likely the result of standard commercial considera-
tions than of concerns over legal rights. Unclear, however, is why any prudent lender 
would extend credit, secured by assets declining in value, as did securities on Black Mon-
day. The Federal Reserve Board resolved this crisis by pressuring banks to resume lending 
and by injecting liquidity into the banking system. Id. However, these actions did not bear 
fruit until there were independent signs that a rally was starting in the markets. Id. 
 124. There was no risk of a run on the bank, with most retail customers attempting to 
close with their accounts from DBL Groups broker-dealer subsidiary, as the retail sales 
operation had been shut down in spring 1989. See Steve Swartz & David J. Jefferson, 
Drexel Will Sell Brokerage Unit, Make Cutbacks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1989, at B1. Over 
300,000 customer accounts were transferred in 1989; only 30,000 customer accounts had to 
be transferred after the bankruptcy. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-92-70, SECURITIES FIRMS: ASSESSING THE NEED TO REGULATE ADDITIONAL 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 76, 77 n.4 (1992) [hereinafter GAO, SECURITIES FIRMS]; see also 
DAN G. STONE, APRIL FOOLS: AN INSIDERS ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND COLLAPSE OF 
DREXEL BURNHAM (1990) (describing the impact of the layoffs occasioned by the shutdown 
of the retail sales and other departments on Drexel employees). Such a run, of course, 
could have been a separate source of systemic risk. 
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gave a detailed report on the bankruptcy to a Senate committee.125 
Mr. Breeden summarized his conclusion about the DBL Groups fail-
ure in the following words: In a sense, this is an old and all too fa-
miliar story: Drexels [the broker-dealers] parent borrowed billions 
short in order to lend long. Such a strategy inevitably exposes the 
firm to failure if total confidence in the firm is not continuously 
maintained.126 
 The bankruptcy was of the holding company, DBL Group. The 
broker-dealer (DBL) and government bond dealer (GSI) subsidiaries 
did not become insolvent.127 Although DBL Group and DBL had set-
tled felony charges of insider trading with the SEC in March 1989 for 
$650 million, $500 million of which had been paid when the bank-
ruptcy had been filed, DBL remained among the highest capitalized 
broker-dealers in the United States.128 But, during 1989, the decline 
of the junk bond market had a negative impact on the profitability of 
both DBL Group and DBL.129 A growing number of junk bond issuer 
defaults led to increased illiquidity in the junk bond market130 and a 
decrease in the number of new junk bond issues.131 In addition, DBLs 
share of new junk bond underwritings fell significantly in 1989.132 
DBL found itself with declining trading and underwriting income.133 
In addition, the junk bond inventory held by DBL Group and its af-
filiates had become more difficult to sell.134 
                                                                                                                      
 125. See Lessons to Be Learned from the Drexel Failure and Possible Regulatory 
Changes: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st 
Cong. 5-60 (1990) [hereinafter Drexel Hearings]. 
 126. Id. at 12 (statement of SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden). 
 127. See id. at 45. 
 128. Id. at 29-30. 
 129. For an overview of these and other factors leading to the Drexel entities bank-
ruptcy filings, see Debtors Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code at 27-34, In re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., Chapter 11 Case 
No. 90 B 10421 (FGC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Debtors Disclosure 
Statement]. 
 130. By late Fall 1989, DBL and other broker-dealers were no longer making markets 
in many junk bonds. Without a dealers market to trade junk bonds, there was no easy way 
to trade many of them. Leah J. Nathans, The Junk Markets Black Hole, BUS. WK., Nov. 
27, 1989, at 56. 
 131. See Roger E. Alcaly, The Golden Age of Junk, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 26, 1994, at 
34 chart 2 (in 1989 high yield bonds comprised 20.14% of the total principal amount of new 
corporate issues and 1.28% in 1990). 
 132. See Michael Siconolfi, Drexel Collapse Makes Orphans of $4 Billion in Junk Offer-
ings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1990, at C1. DBL did approximately 50% of the new underwrit-
ings of junk bonds in 1988 and approximately 33% in 1989. See id. 
 133. See Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 32-33. Before October 1989, DBLs aver-
age daily volume of junk bond trading was $400 million per day. By December 1989, this 
had become $150 million per day. See id. at 32. Although not explicitly emphasized by Mr. 
Breeden, such a decline should have materially impacted DBLs trading revenues. 
 134. Id. at 33. This inventory totaled approximately $1 billion as of December 29, 1989. 
See Id. at 33-34. Many of the securities and other financial assets held by the Drexel enti-
ties were obligations of companies in severe financial difficulty themselves, sometimes 
even in bankruptcy. DBL Group held a significant portion of two debenture offerings in 
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 DBL Groups reliance on an unsecured commercial paper program 
of over $1 billion to finance its operations was the immediate cause of 
its bankruptcy. The programs proceeds were used to fund illiquid 
privately placed investments in DBL Groups unregulated subsidiar-
ies.135 DBL Group had no backup collateral pool that would support 
secured bank loans, which became necessary when, in December 
1989, DBL Groups credit rating was reduced by Standard & Poors 
from A-2 to A-3.136 On February 12, 1990, DBL Group lost all access 
to the commercial paper market when Standard & Poors down-
graded DBL Groups commercial paper to speculative grade.137 In 
addition, in early February 1989, both the SEC and the NYSE had 
advised DBL that DBL could no longer make any loans to DBL 
Group or its affiliates without prior consultations with the SEC or 
prior written consent of the NYSE, respectively.138 The only remain-
ing hope for DBL Group was to secure a collateralized bank loan or a 
substantial equity investment, neither of which could be arranged.139 
Given Drexels ongoing significant contingent liabilities, this result 
was not surprising.140 
 In Mr. Breedens account, the reluctance of banks to make a se-
cured loan to DBL Group was due to standard commercial considera-
tions. DBL Group was a holding company whose major subsidiary, 
DBL, was a leading player in a precipitously declining market. In 
addition, the assets that DBL Group could pledge to lenders con-
sisted of only illiquid privately placed investments in the unregu-
lated subsidiaries and the excess uncollateralized securities inven-
tory of DBL, its regulated broker-dealer.141 Why would any lender 
                                                                                                                      
the aggregate principal amount of $450,000,000 (Australian) of an Australian company in 
receivership. Debtors Disclosure Statement, supra note 129, at 28. DBL Group and certain 
of its subsidiaries had provided a bridge loan facility and certain other financings for an 
acquisition vehicle that was negotiating an out-of-court restructuring. Id. at 29. Also, 
DBL had been unable to sell a significant portion of two of the three securities offerings 
in an aggregate principal amount of $385,000,000 for an issuer that went through a pre-
packaged Chapter 11 case.  Id. at 30. 
 135. Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 34 (statement of SEC Chairman, Richard C. 
Breeden). This mismatch between short-term funds and the long term illiquid assets fi-
nanced by such funds dramatically increased the risk of failure for DBL Group. Id. at 134 
(Richard C. Breeden, Response to Written Questions). 
 136. See id. at 34. This downgrading meant that the DBL Groups commercial paper 
could no longer be purchased by money market funds, shrinking the number of potential 
lenders to DBL Group. The remaining lenders began to withdraw financing from DBL 
Group during January 1990. See id. at 35. 
 137. Id. at 41. 
 138. See id. at 37. 
 139. See id. at 41-42. 
 140. Id. at 42. 
 141. Id. at 34. In part, DBL had excess securities in its inventories because, since 
spring 1989, there had been no retail sales force that could help sell these securities and 
syndicating deals to other Wall Street broker-dealers was not feasible. See STONE, supra 
note 124, at 184. 
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want to make a loan secured by such illiquid assets with question-
able value to a borrower whose survival was also in question?142 
 Professor Mooney cites this history to support the proposition that 
bank lenders were reluctant to extend credit necessary to provide vi-
tal liquidity because of uncertainty as to perfection and priority of se-
curity interests in collateral.143 The lessons to be drawn from DBL 
Groups bankruptcy have been mischaracterized in two different 
ways. First, the pages he cites from Mr. Breedens prepared state-
ment do not concern the causes of the bankruptcy. Rather, these 
pages discuss the subsidiary issue of what occurred in the phased-
windup of DBLs activities subsequent to the bankruptcy.144 Second, 
Mr. Breedens statement identifies a number of problems arising 
from the windup, only one of which was a legal problem that Revised 
Article 8 addresses, the problem of the effectiveness of agreements 
to pledge.145 And even this problem is not one that requires even a 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Why would we lend money to the holding company? one money-center executive 
asked. It has no cash-generating capability. Lisabeth Weiner & Jed Horowitz, Bank 
Squeeze Forced Hand of Faltering Drexel Parent, AM. BANKER, Feb. 14, 1990, at 1. See gen-
erally ARNOLD B. COHEN, GUIDE TO SECURED LENDING TRANSACTIONS § 2.04 (1988) (de-
scribing factors that secured lenders consider in making loans); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & 
INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING 10-15 
(1992). 
 143. Mooney, supra note 114, at 315 n.13. 
 144. Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 49. Eighty-two percent of DBLs securities 
holdings were sold between February 9 and 21, 1990. See Michael Siconolfi, Drexel Has 
Sold 82% of Its Stock, Bonds Since Feb. 9, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1990, at C13. 
 145. See Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 49-50. Mr. Breeden identified two other 
problems. The first arose from uncertainty of DBLs lenders about whether DBL had seg-
regated on its books the securities it proposed to pledge. See id. at 50. Presumably the 
lenders were afraid that they would acquire only the rights in the security which [DBL] 
had or had actual authority to convey. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-301(1). The 
lenders solution was to require the recording of their interests in the collateral through 
DTCs pledge program, Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 50 (statement of SEC Chair-
man Richard C. Breeden), presumably to ensure that the lenders were bona fide purchas-
ers that took free of adverse claims, see 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-313 (2). The 
result of this hard pledge was to take control of DBLs inventory away from DBL and [to 
impede] DBLs ability to settle liquidation trades. Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 50 
(statement of SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden). 
 Although Revised Article 8 would make it easier for a lender to achieve a status equiva-
lent to that of a bona fide purchaser, a prudent lender in a situation similar to the one in-
volving DBL would still seek to protect itself by achieving control over the pledged securi-
ties. See infra Part VI. Although control under Revised Article 8 does not necessarily in-
volve a transfer to the pledgees account, as contemplated by section 8-320(1) of 1977 Arti-
cle 8, similar delays to those that occurred in the DBL windup could be expected whenever 
a pledgee insisted on controlling the disposition of collateral. 
 The second additional problem identified by Mr. Breeden is a purely commercial one to 
which no version of Article 8 is addressed: 
[M]any banks became concerned over the valuation and liquidity of DBLs junk 
bond portfolio, which was one portion of the collateral securing their loans. This 
led many of the banks to be unwilling to release any collateral to complete DBL 
liquidating transactions for fear that the replacement collateral would have an 
increasing concentration of junk bonds.  
Drexel Hearings, supra note 125, at 50. 
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major revision to 1977 Article 8 to accomplish, much less the funda-
mental changes contained in Revised Article 8. 
 Finally, Mr. Breeden did identify the windup as posing systemic 
risks, which created threats to the securities clearance and settle-
ment system or the interbank payment systems.146 But even this ex-
plicit discussion of systemic risks, which occurred in a written re-
sponse to questions posed by certain Senators, was only a reprise of 
Mr. Breedens earlier prepared statement. Nothing is added by the 
written response to make more convincing the argument that Re-
vised Article 8 is necessary to forestall systemic risk.147 
D.   The Market Reform Act of 1990 
 Supporters of Revised Article 8 also often cite to the congressional 
reports on the Market Reform Act of 1990 as evidence that the prob-
lem of potential and actual nonuniformity among the states . . . [is] 
the major problem with the commercial law foundation of the securi-
ties clearance and settlement system.148 The main legal problem ac-
tually identified in these reports was an inconsistency in state 
treatment of options as collateral, which makes the financing proc-
ess more burdensome for prospective lenders and may create enough 
                                                                                                                      
 Mr. Breeden also discussed problems arising from settlements of mortgage-backed secu-
rities. See id. at 51-53. But the problems arose from commercial concerns of DBLs coun-
terparties that DBL might go bankrupt after receiving securities and prior to paying for 
them. See id. at 52. These are normal commercial concerns that would arise with respect to 
any potentially bankrupt counterparty and would not be alleviated by Revised Article 8. 
 146. Id. at 133 (Richard C. Breeden, Response to Written Questions). 
 147. In his written response, Mr. Breeden identified three systemic risks arising from 
the impact that the bankruptcy of DBL Group, the holding company parent, had on DBL, 
the broker-dealer subsidiary. The first risk was that DBL might have faced a liquidity cri-
sis, which arose from normal commercial concerns on the part of DBLs lenders, creditors, 
and counterparties, not from concerns about legal issues arising from Article 8. DBLs 
lenders, creditors, and counterparties . . . might insist on settling transactions [with DBL] 
only on a fully-collateralized basis, might accelerate open contractual commitments, and 
might refuse to deliver securities or funds in an orderly manner . . . . Id. These risks arose 
out of concerns that DBL might become insolvent before it met its obligations. In the mar-
ket for GNMA mortgage-backed securities, for example, forward trades in coupons on 
GNMA securities settled in 1990 by the seller delivering negotiable certificates to the 
buyer against payment of funds over Fedwire later that day. Id. at 52. On February 14, 
1990, DBL had net settlement obligations of $346 million. See id. Not surprisingly, as Feb-
ruary 14, 1990, was the day after DBL Groups bankruptcy filing, DBLs counterparties 
were not willing to take the risk that DBL might declare insolvency before making pay-
ment, see id., and almost none of their trades settled. 
 This run on DBLs assets in turn created the second risk, which was that DBLs coun-
terparties might not have been able to obtain payment or securities from DBL, depending 
on the nature of the transactions. Id. at 133. The third risk was related to the second. As 
settlement slowed in certain markets, financing costs for DBLs counterparties would in-
crease as settlement slowed down. Thinly-capitalized, highly-leveraged, and badly posi-
tioned firms that did not have sufficient resources to withstand those losses or pay the car-
rying costs could be forced out of business in the event that there were delays in DBLs 
settlement of trades. Id. 
 148. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1542. 
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uncertainty to cause a prospective lender to reconsider its decision to 
accept options as collateral for loans.149 The Senate also identified 
the restrictions on the ability of domestic clearing agencies to use 
foreign financial institutions and clearing agencies as custodians for 
their members securities, which led investors to set up a number of 
clearing and custodial relationships, as a problem arising from 1977 
Article 8.150 The result was that no single clearing agency could as-
sess . . . the investors total financial exposure. This detracts from the 
liquidity of the clearance and settlement system by requiring a 
greater volume of money and securities settlements than may other-
wise be necessary.151 
 Even the congressional commitment to uniformity among the 
states was weak. Although the Market Reform Act amended the Ex-
change Act by adding section 17A(f), which grants the SEC the power 
through regulation to preempt state law concerning the transfer of 
interests in certain securities,152 each state was allowed to individu-
ally opt out of any SEC promulgated rule concerning transfers of se-
curities within two years of the promulgation of any such rule.153 
 Of course, the lack of an overarching justification for Revised Arti-
cle 8 does not mean that it should have been rejected, merely that 
the case in its favor is weaker than its proponents would like it to be. 
Revised Article 8 makes a number of major changes in state law, 
however, that argue for significantly amending certain revised sec-
tions. 
IV.   BAD ACTOR TRANSFEREES 
 Revised Article 8 contains provisions covering both securities, 
whether certificated or uncertificated, and securities entitlements 
that are analogous to the provisions covering bona fide purchasers 
and adverse claims that are contained in section 8-302 of 1977 Arti-
cle 8. The provisions covering securities in Revised Article 8 vary 
from those contained in 1977 Article 8 by dropping the good faith 
requirement for bona fide purchaser status and narrowing the defini-
tion of notice. Two additional important changes are present in the 
three revised provisions covering securities entitlements. All three 
provisions place the burden of proof on the party alleging that the 
                                                                                                                      
 149. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, COORDINATED CLEARANCE AND 
SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1990, H.R. DOC. NO. 477, at 7 (1990). Accord SENATE COMM. ON 
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE MARKET REFORM ACT OF 1990, S. DOC. NO. 
300, at 63 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 SENATE REPORT]. 
 150. 1990 SENATE REPORT, supra note 149, at 63. 
 151. Id. In other words, no netting of payment and delivery obligations was possible; 
therefore, the benefits of netting in reducing systemic risks, which are briefly described in 
supra Part III, were not available. 
 152. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f)(1) (1997). 
 153. See id. § 78q-1(f)(3). 
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transfer is wrongful, and all three, in different ways, severely limit 
the acts that will support a claim against a transferee. These 
changes were suggested in order to further the policy of post-
settlement finality in securities transactions.154 Before looking at the 
content of these changes, one general argument made by Professor 
Rogers in favor of these changes should be addressed. 
 Professor Rogers argues that favoring transferees of securities 
and securities entitlements over the beneficial owners is not a policy 
that works to the [dis]advantage of investors or any other particular 
category of potential claimant.155 His basic point is that, in the event 
that a securities intermediary steals securities from a customer, the 
immediate transferee is likely to be a securities intermediary with 
investors as its customers and that any policy favoring beneficial 
owners will hurt the transferee securities intermediarys custom-
ers.156  
 This argument ignores two things. First, as a practical matter, 
under 1977 Article 8, a beneficial owner almost always would have 
had a greater chance of recovering against his or her own securities 
intermediary rather than against the transferee. All of the difficult 
issues involved in tracing a transfer of indirectly held securities 
would have been avoided.157 Usually, the beneficial owner is pursuing 
the transferee because the beneficial owners securities intermediary 
is insolvent or has declared bankruptcy.158 As the immediate trans-
feree is often another securities intermediary acting for itself or a 
customer, 159 any ultimate transferee that is a customer of a trans-
feree securities intermediary would be protected. A transferee securi-
ties intermediary has an obligation to deliver the securities to its 
                                                                                                                      
 154. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1460-73, for an in-depth discussion of this policy. 
 155. Id. at 1516. 
 156. See id. at 1522-23. 
 157. See Schroeder, supra note 31, at 332-34. 
 158. See, e.g., Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Comark, 610 F. Supp. 406, 408 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (customers sued liquidating broker-dealer and its clearing broker); In re 
Scott, Gorman Mun., Inc., 28 B.R. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (customer of bankrupt broker-dealer 
sued clearing broker). 
 159. The transferee also could be a traditional lender such as a bank, a purchaser in a 
repurchase agreement or a lender of securities to cover short positions that takes a secu-
rity interest in other collateral securities. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1527-29. Depending 
on the type of transferee, the transferees customers might suffer a real loss. But, under 
Revised Article 8s statutory approach, individual investors who each hold a security enti-
tlement would always be disadvantaged, while, under 1977 Article 8s statutory approach, 
such individual investors only occasionally would be disadvantaged. 
 The generalization in the text also would not apply to the rolodex market, which con-
sists of large institutions directly trading with each other. DIVISION OF MARKET 
REGULATION, SEC, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY DEVELOPMENTS 
II-13 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 2000] According to the SEC, this activity does not ap-
pear to involve significant volume. Id. 
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customer.160 And as the transferee securities intermediary is not nec-
essarily insolvent or bankrupt, its customer will only be negatively 
affected by the transferor beneficial owner pursuing the transferee 
securities intermediary if the transferee securities intermediary is 
rendered bankrupt by its obligation to make such a delivery.161 
 Second, certain categories of investors are infrequent traders. The 
typical individual shareowner, for example, engages in only a few 
stock transactions per year.162 Insofar as the risk is that a securities 
intermediary may either mishandle or steal a financial asset that is 
held indirectly, it is more likely that an active trader, rather than an 
individual investor, will benefit from the extended finality rules of 
Revised Article 8. 
V.   THE DIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM AND PROTECTED PURCHASERS 
 For directly held securities, Revised Article 8 substitutes the term 
protected purchaser for bona fide purchaser.163 Under Revised Ar-
ticle 8, a purchaser of a security can become a protected purchaser 
of such security if he/she (1) gives value; (2) does not have notice of 
any adverse claim to the security; and (3) obtains control of the certi-
ficated or uncertificated security.164 1977 Article 8 requires that a 
bona fide purchaser be a purchaser for value in good faith and 
without notice of any adverse claim that receives a security through 
certain defined means.165 Some cases and commentators have treated 
good faith and notice as separate elements to proving bona fide 
purchaser status,166 while others have treated notice as simply an 
                                                                                                                      
 160. See generally EGON GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS ¶¶ 8.02[2]-8.05 
(4th ed. 1987) (describing obligations of broker-dealers to customers under 1962 Article 8 
and 1977 Article 8, state common law, federal rules and self-regulatory organization (SRO) 
rules). 
 161. The shareholders of the transferee securities intermediary, of course, would suffer 
a loss. But this type of loss is exactly the type of risk to which it is appropriate to expose 
equity owners. 
 162. One 1989-90 survey found that 70.7% of individual shareowners traded two or 
fewer times per year, while another 1984-1985 survey found the same minimal level of 
trading by 55.3% of individual shareowners. MARKET 2000, supra note 159, at ex. 9. 
 163. Compare 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-303(a), with 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, 
supra note 4, § 8-302 (1). 
 164. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-303(a). 
 165. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-302(1). 
 166. See, e.g., First Natl Bank v. Lewco Sec. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1413 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(It must be stressed that section 8-302 imposes two independent requirements for a pur-
chaser of securities to attain BFP status: the purchaser must take the securities in good 
faith, and without notice of adverse claims. These two requirements must not be confused 
or conflated . . . .) (citation omitted); Brian A. Blum, Notice to Holders in Due Course and 
Other Bona Fide Purchasers Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 B.C. L. REV. 203, 
207 (1981) (The U.C.C. requires that both good faith and lack of notice be established as a 
prerequisite for the status of bona fide purchaser and prescribes different standards for the 
determination of those separate elements.). 
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element of proving good faith.167 The issue becomes complicated be-
cause good faith is defined by the 1977 UCC as a subjective test,168 
while notice in the 1977 UCC contains an objective test as well.169 
Revised Article 8 in its notice definition removes any reasonable per-
son standard and deletes any mention in revised section 8-303 of 
good faith as a requirement for protected purchase status. 
A.  Notice 
 The first change in Revised Article 8 from 1977 Article 8 is the 
narrowing of the notice defintion in Revised Article 8. 1977 Article 
8 relies on the general definition of notice in Part 1 of the UCC, 
which defines notice of a fact as both when a person has actual 
knowledge of it or from all the facts and circumstances known to 
him at the time in question . . . has reason to know that it exists.170 
Revised Article 8 creates a unique definition of notice when dealing 
with adverse claims. A reasonable person standard with regard to 
notice is rejected.171 Notice of an adverse claim exists only if the 
transferee has actual knowledge of the adverse claim172 or if the 
transferee is willfully blind to information that might establish the 
existence of the adverse claim.173 In turn, in order to find willful 
blindness, two things must be established. First, it must be shown 
that the person is aware of the facts sufficient to indicate that there 
is a significant probability that the adverse claim exists.174 It is not 
enough that a claim may exist; there must be a significant probabil-
                                                                                                                      
 167. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Key Biscayne Bank, 501 F.2d 1322, 1326 (5th Cir. 
1974) (The good faith and without notice requirements are practically synonymous.); 
ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 33 (The concept of good faith added nothing of 
value to the definition of bona fide purchaser, as applied by New York courts, nor did it 
disclose any additional requirement for taking free of adverse claims under New York case 
law.). 
 168. Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 1977 
OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 1-201(19), (emphasis added). 
 169. A person has notice of a fact when . . . from all the facts and circumstances 
known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists. 1977 OFFICIAL 
TEXT, supra note 4, § 1-201(25)(c) (emphasis added). 
 170. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, §§ 1-201(25)(a), (c). 
 171. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-105 cmt. 1. 
 172. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-105(a)(1) cmt. 3. 
 173. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-105(a)(2) cmt. 4. There is a third type of no-
tice that arises if the person has a duty, imposed by statute or regulation, to investigate 
whether an adverse claim exists, and the investigation so required would establish the exis-
tence of the adverse claim. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-105(a)(3) (emphasis 
added). This subsection covers a very limited range of situations. The duty must be one to 
investigate an adverse claim. Presumably the duty to know ones customer, described in in-
fra Part V.B., would not meet the criterion of revised subsection 8-105(a)(3). The comments 
indicate that an example of the type of duty covered by revised subsection 8-105(a)(3) is the 
duty of brokers and dealers under federal securities laws to check with a registry of stolen 
securities with respect to securities offered for sale or pledge. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, su-
pra note 2, § 8-105(a)(3) cmt. 5. 
 174. Id. § 8-105(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
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ity of its existence. Second, the person must deliberately avoid[ ] in-
formation that would establish the existence of the adverse claim.175 
Mere negligence, perhaps even gross negligence, would not meet this 
second prong. Revised Article 8 will make it very difficult, if not im-
possible, for a beneficial owner to prove that a transferee of a secu-
rity took with knowledge of any adverse claim. This is a significant 
change from 1977 Article 8 as applied in most jurisdictions.176 
 New York had a nonuniform definition of notice of adverse 
claims,177 which supporters of Revised Article 8 believe is comparable 
to the revised new definition.178 In fact, the legal significance of this 
                                                                                                                      
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. City Natl Bank, 628 F.2d 
969, 970 (6th Cir. 1980) (The Uniform Commercial Code definition of notice partakes of 
an objective standard by which the reasonableness of [the initial transferees] protestations 
that nothing about the transaction suggested impropriety to him must be judged.); Oscar 
Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that either ac-
tual or constructive notice will prevent one from obtaining the favored status of bona fide 
purchaser); Miriani v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1011, 1013-14 (N.D. Ill. 
1973). See generally Blum, supra note 166, at 212-16 (describing constructive notice under 
the UCC). 
 177. Except as provided in this section, to constitute notice of an adverse claim or a 
defense, the purchaser must have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such 
facts that his action in taking the security amounts to bad faith. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 8-
304(4) (McKinney 1990). Article 3 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code contains an 
almost identical provision in section 3-304(7): In any event, to constitute notice of a claim 
or defense, the purchaser must have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of 
such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW 
§ 3-304(7) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998). 
 178. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 18-19; Rogers, supra note 7, at 1536 
n.156. While Pennsylvania does not have a nonuniform provision comparable to the New 
Yorks 1977 Article 8, there is Pennsylvania case law interpreting section 8-304 of 1977 Ar-
ticle 8 in a manner consistent with the Article 8 Bar Reports position. See Colin v. Cent. 
Penn Natl Bank, 404 F. Supp. 638, 640-42 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 544 F. 2d 512 (3d Cir. 
1976) (mem.). Only the actual knowledge of a person claiming bona fide purchaser status is 
relevant, not what a reasonable person should have known. See id. But see SEC v. Inves-
tors Sec. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 745, 756 (W.D. Pa. 1976), revd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 561 
(3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a warning from a bank about a different transaction and other 
factual circumstances mandated inquiry in the instant transaction and, absent inquiry, the 
security holder acted in bad faith). 
 Although more recent Pennsylvania case law purports to adhere to this purely subjective 
standard, Pennsylvania courts have relied on section 8-318 of 1977 Article 8 to avoid the 
subjectivity of section 8-304. Section 8-318 provides that [a]n agent or bailee who in good 
faith (including observance of reasonable commercial standards if he is in the business of 
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing with securities) has received securities and sold, 
pledged or delivered them according to the instructions of his principal is not liable for 
conversion. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-318 (emphasis added). 
 In Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1983), a broker-
dealer was held to the commercially reasonable standard under section 8-318 even though 
the court had determined that in all trades for the Morris Carroll account Cannon [the 
broker-dealer] became a purchaser when it acquired the bearer securities for sale. Id. at 
113. Although the finding that Cannon became a purchaser would suggest the application 
of section 8-304, the court applied the standard provided for in section 8-318. Too much 
weight cannot be placed on this seeming anomaly because, when the facts are read care-
fully, it is unclear whether Cannon did, in fact, become a purchaser. 
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nonuniform addition is unclear. There is ample precedent to support 
the proposition that, at least for brokers, New Yorks definition of no-
tice for Article 8 purposes was not materially different from that of 
other states.179 This line of cases holds brokers to a higher standard 
of good faith than other purchasers, one that encompasses more 
than actual knowledge or willful blindness. 
 In 1962, New York added a nonuniform subsection 8-304(3),180 
which was renumbered as (4) when Article 8 was amended in 1977, 
in New York. Even before there was New York case law interpreting 
the nonuniform provision, one influential commentator had ex-
pressed the opinion that, in view of the cases cited in the Official 
Comment to this section [8-304], several of which, decided in New 
York, appear to impose a somewhat higher standard of good faith 
upon a professional purchaser, e.g., a bank or broker, it is prob-
lematical to what extent, if any, . . . decisions under this section 
will vary from those in other states.181 
 This prediction bore fruit in 1967, when the New York Court of 
Appeals decided Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Walston & 
Co.182 The defendant broker was sued for conversion after the defen-
dant had sold shares of stock stolen from Bache & Co., which as-
signed its interest in the shares to the plaintiff.183 The Court of Ap-
peals relied on Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange184 to hold 
                                                                                                                      
 There is no such ambiguity in the incorporation of an objective standard in City of Sha-
mokin v. West End Natl Bank, 29 Pa. D. & C.3d 338 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1983). After determining 
that the bank had acted as a purchaser in the transaction in question, the court recognized 
that good faith focused on subjective intent only. The court then immediately noted that 
requirements in addition to honesty in fact are required for good faith under other pro-
visions of the Code, referring to section 8-318, and concluded that since the bank is in the 
business of dealing with securities, the objective good faith standard of observing reason-
able commercial standards should apply. Id. at 344. 
 179. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 234 N.E.2d 230, 235 
(N.Y. 1967); Berlitz Intl, Inc. v. Macmillan, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 1997, at 28 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1997). 
 180. See Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 N.Y. LAWS 553, at § 8-304(3). The language 
of subsection 8-304(3) was amended, in ways that are not material for this discussion, in 
1964. 1964 N.Y. LAWS  476, § 8. Since 1964, other than in its renumbering, the language of 
subsection 8-304(3) has not changed. 
 181. Carlos L. Israels, Practice Commentary, N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-304 (McKinney 1964). 
 182. 234 N.E.2d 230 (N.Y. 1967). 
 183. See id. at 233. Presumably the plaintiff was Bache & Co.s insurance company. 
 184. In 1967, Rule 405 required that a broker must use due diligence to learn the es-
sential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted 
or carried. Id. at 233 (quoting Rule 405). The Rules wording has not been changed since 
1967. See NYSE Rule 405, reprinted in 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 2405 (1995). 
 Similar know your customer rules have been promulgated by other self-regulatory or-
ganizations. See, e.g., American Stock Exchange Rule 411, reprinted in 2 AM. STOCK EX. 
GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 9431 (1995) (establishing due diligence, approval, and notice requirements 
for members and member organizations); section 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, reprinted in NASD DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) ¶ 
3010 (1995). See generally The Know Your Customer Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Bro-
ker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489 (1973). 
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that the defendant could not have acted in good faith unless in re-
ceiving and selling the shares for the account of [the thief or his or 
her confederate] . . . it observed reasonable commercial standards, 
which included the exercise of due diligence to learn the essential 
facts relative to this customer, his account and these sales orders.185 
As Walston was a case that arose prior to the effective date of Article 
8 in New York, it was decided under New Yorks version of the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act, which was contained in the Personal Prop-
erty Law. But the New York Personal Property Law included a bona 
fide purchaser provision that was very similar to that contained in 
section 8-304 of the UCC.186 In addition, the Walston court made ref-
erence to section 8-318 of the UCC and implied that the result would 
have been no different if that section of the UCC had applied.187 
 The reference to section 8-318 in Walston should alert the reader 
to one of the paradoxes of the reading of section 8-304 advocated by 
supporters of Revised Article 8. Section 8-304 deals with when pur-
chasers have notice of adverse claims, while section 8-318 protects 
agents and bailees from liability for conversion or for participation 
in breach of fiduciary duty.188 To obtain the shelter of section 8-318, 
the agent or bailee must have acted in good faith, which includ[es] 
observance of reasonable commercial standards if he is in the busi-
ness of buying, selling or otherwise dealing with securities.189 De-
pending on the factual circumstances of a transfer of a security under 
1977 Article 8, a broker-dealer can be a broker190 or just an inter-
mediary, e.g. when it transfers securities on a customers instruc-
tions, either without charge or for a nominal handling charge.191 
 New York did not adopt a nonuniform provision for section 8-318 
as it had for section 8-304. If the supporters of Revised Article 8 are 
correct in their reading of section 8-304 in 1977 New York Article 8, 
                                                                                                                      
 185. Walston, 234 N.E.2d at 237. The only attempt the defendant made to identify the 
individual who delivered the stolen certificates for sale was to examine 
one or two cards with the name Jack Arbetell [name used by the individual] on 
them. The best recollection of the witness [the defendants customers man] was 
that one of the cards was a business card. He did not recall what the other one 
was. This was the only evidence of identification that was produced. 
Id. at 233. 
 186. Compare N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1962) (repealed 1964) with N.Y. 
U.C.C. LAW § 8-304(4) (McKinney 1990). 
 187. See infra text accompanying notes 190-94 for further discussion. 
 188. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-318. 
 189. Id. 
 190. A broker is defined as a person engaged for all or part of his time in the busi-
ness of buying and selling securities, who in the transaction concerned acts for, buys a se-
curity from, or sells a security to, a customer. Id. § 8-303. Even when a broker is not a 
purchaser of a security for UCC purposes, i.e., it did not acquire an interest in the secu-
rity, see id. §§ 1-201 (22), (23), the broker can be a purchaser under section 8-304 for notice 
of adverse claims purposes, see id. § 8-304 cmt. 5. A broker also has the rights and privi-
leges of a purchaser under section 8-306 of 1977 Article 8. Id. § 8-306(10). 
 191. Id. § 8-306 cmt. 4. 
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it would have been possible for an agent or bailee without actual no-
tice of an adverse claim and that had received no or nominal compen-
sation to be liable for conversion under section 8-318 for activities 
that would not have endangered the bona fide purchaser status of a 
broker who was receiving a normal commission on an agency trans-
action. This reading of section 8-304 and 8-318 in 1977 New York Ar-
ticle 8 would have exposed agents and bailees to higher risks than 
UCC brokers. 
 The fact that the Walston court explicitly construed the term 
good faith is important in evaluating whether, under New York 
law, the good faith requirement added anything to the concept of no-
tice. The Walston court did not discuss notice or equate good faith 
with notice,192 both of which one would expect if Revised Article 8s 
proponents are correct that there is no functional difference between 
these two concepts under New York law.193 The Walston holding re-
mains good law in New York.194 
 In fairness to the Article 8 Bar Report, precedent exists that either 
questions the Walston holding195 or directly supports the reports in-
                                                                                                                      
 192. 234 N.E.2d at 235. In the language relevant to this discussion, sections 8-318 of 
1977 Article 8 and 1962 Article 8 are identical. Both provide that an agent or bailee is 
not liable for conversion or for participation in breach of fiduciary duty although the prin-
cipal had no right to transfer a security when the agent or bailee acted in good faith (in-
cluding observance of reasonable commercial standards if he is in the business of buying, 
selling, or otherwise dealing with securities). 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-318; 
1962 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-318. The Walston court did not discuss section 8-302 
of the UCC or the nonuniform New York addition to section 8-304. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 207-10 for a further discussion of the relationship between sections 8-318 and 
8-302. 
 193. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 33; Rogers, supra note 7, at 1536 
n.156. 
 194. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Royal Natl Bank, 545 F.2d 1330, 1334-
35 (2d Cir. 1976); FDIC v. Lewellyn, No. 82 Civ. 2311 (CBM), 1985 WL 1401, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1985); Cumis Ins. Socy v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1389 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Berlitz Intl, Inc. v. Macmillan, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 1997, at 28 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1997). Cf. Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 969, 
976-77 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (applying NYSE Rule 405 to determine whether defendant was 
negligent under section 3-406 of the Missouri UCC), affd in part, revd in part on other 
grounds, 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank, 318 
N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (applying Rule 405 in a case involving Article 3). 
But cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-70 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,748, at 99, 274-75 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 1970) (holding 
that interpreting Rule 405 to require investigation of title or ownership of stock certificates 
endorsed in blank is not consistent with New York case law). 
 195. In Royal National Bank, the court expressed some skepticism about whether Wal-
ston was correct in incorporating Rule 405 as reasonable commercial practice under New 
York law. 545 F.2d at 1335 n.2. The court implied that, absent a recognized private cause 
of action, the incorporation of the Rule 405 standard was not warranted. See id. 
 The federal courts are split as to whether there is a private federal cause of action pur-
suant to NYSE Rule 405. Compare Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir. 1969) (the first case to imply a private federal cause of ac-
tion for violations of know your customer rule), and Cook v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 726 
F. Supp. 151, 156 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that a private cause of action exists for viola-
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terpretation of New York law.196 In addition, the 1964 prediction that 
all professional dealers in securities would be held to a more exacting 
definition of notice has not borne much fruit. The reported cases find-
ing such a higher duty almost entirely deal with brokers who are 
subject to Rule 405.197 
                                                                                                                      
tions of the know your customer rule), and Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. 
Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a private cause of action exists for viola-
tions of the know your customer rule), affd in part, remanded on other grounds, 579 F.2d 
38 (2d Cir. 1978), and Faturik v. Woodmere Secs., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 943, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977); with In re VeriFone Secs. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993) (It is well estab-
lished that violation of an exchange rule will not support a private claim.), and Craighead 
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that NYSE Rule 405 does 
not imply a private federal cause of action), and Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 
318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal 
cause of action), and Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of action), and Birotte v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (D.N.J. 1979) (hold-
ing that NYSE Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of action), and Piper, Jaf-
fray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 297 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (holding that NYSE 
Rule 405 does not imply a private federal cause of action). 
 Many of the courts that find that the NYSE or NASD rules do not create a private cause 
of action still incorporate the standards established by those rules into other causes of ac-
tion under either the federal securities laws or applicable state law. These courts use viola-
tions of the NYSE and NASD rules as indicia of the behavior or intent necessary to prove 
other violations under these laws. See Miley, 637 F.2d at 333 (holding that, although there 
was no private cause of action for violations of NYSE and NASD rules, the jury could con-
sider a violation as a factor in determining if plaintiffs account had been excessively 
traded); Birotte, 468 F. Supp. at 1179 (holding that, although there is no private federal 
cause of action for violation of Rule 405, [t]his is not to conclude, however, that violation of 
Rule 405 might not be evidential, if relevant, to prove fraud alleged in a claim made under 
Rule 10b-5); Ladin, 399 F. Supp. at 298 (Both Rule 405 of the NYSE and the NASD Suit-
ability Rule are appropriate indicia of the standard of conduct required of a stock broker in 
the practice of his profession.). For Article 8 analysis, it should be irrelevant, therefore, 
whether a private cause of action exists under various SRO rules such as Rule 405. 
 196. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 18-19 (discussing two federal cases 
applying New York law and two pre-UCC New York cases). None of the four cases cited in 
the Article 8 Bar Report involved brokers, subject to Rule 405 or other similar know your 
customer rules, making bona fide purchaser defenses. See Gutekunst v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 486 F.2d 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1973) (bank); In re Lion Capital Group, 49 B.R. 163, 169 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (trust company); Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 118 N.E.2d 464, 466 
(N.Y. 1954) (bank); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sapowitch, 72 N.E.2d 166, 167 
(N.Y. 1947) (trust company). Nor did any of these four cases discuss either Rule 405 or any 
similar know your customer rule. The Article 8 Bar Report also could have cited to Mac-
millan Inc. v. Bishopgate Investment Trust, 1995 W.L.R. 978 (Ch.), affd on other grounds, 
1996 W.L.R. 388 (C.A.), where Justice Millett construed 1977 New York Article 8s test of 
good faith to be actual knowledge or suspicion and deliberate abstention from inquiry lest 
the truth be discovered, not reason to know or cause to suspect. Id. at 987. Bishopgate, 
however, also did not involve any brokers subject to Rule 405 or other similar know your 
customer rules. See Berlitz, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 1997, at 28. See Joseph H. Levie, Macmil-
lan: English Court Rules on New York UCC, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 13, 1994, at 5, for a discussion 
of Macmillan, including additional quotations on the notice issue that are not available in 
the edited version of Justice Millets opinion in The Weekly Law Report. 
 197. See Berlitz, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 24, 1997, at 28 (distinguishing good faith required of 
defendants in a prior related case, which were professional participants in overseas securi-
ties markets but not members of the NYSE, from that required of a defendant in Berlitz, 
which was a securities broker and a member . . . of the New York Stock Exchange, and 
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B.  Good Faith 
 The second major change made by Revised Article 8 is the deletion 
of the requirement that the protected purchaser have acted in good 
faith. The Article 8 Bar Report argues that this deletion does not 
change New York law,198 while Professor Rogers concedes that prior 
law may be changed but argues that the change is necessary in order 
to minimize confusion.199 Those courts that treat good faith as a sepa-
rate requirement from notice for bona fide purchaser status often use 
good faith as a means to examine circumstances surrounding a trans-
fer that shed light on the subjective intent with which the purchaser 
acted.200 Even where the purchaser has no actual or constructive no-
tice of an adverse claim, circumstances that indicate something was 
wrong may deprive the purchaser of its status as a bona fide pur-
chaser.201 
 As with the notice issue, the New York case law can be read to 
support either the position that notice and good faith are separate 
                                                                                                                      
thus held to a more stringent standard of good faith). Cf. Chemical Bank v. Haskell, 411 
N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that, in an Article 3 case, suspicious circumstances 
which might well have induced a prudent banker to investigate more thoroughly were not 
enough to jeopardize bona fide purchaser defense). In re Legel Braswell Govt Secs. Corp., 
695 F.2d 506 (11th Cir. 1983), is an exception to this generalization. The Legel Braswell 
court applied section 8-304(3) of 1962 New York Article 8, the predecessor to section 8-
304(4) of 1977 New York Article 8, relying in part on Irving Trusts status as a commercial 
bank, to hold that Irving Trusts disregard for suspicious circumstances, of which it had 
actual knowledge, constituted a taking in bad faith. Id. at 513-14. 
 198. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 33. 
 199. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1469-73. Although Professor Rogers notes that some 
courts have interpreted 1977 Article 8 as imposing a separate good faith requirement from 
the notice of adverse claims requirement, see id. at 1469 n.55, his personal view is that the 
better reading of the linguistic sources of the phrase and its use in prior cases indicates 
that good faith does not impose a separate requirement from that of notice. See id. at 1469-
73. Professor Rogers does not specifically discuss New York Article 8 at this point. He later 
mentions nonuniform section 8-304(4) in passing while discussing collusion, misstating 
New Yorks law on notice in much the same way that the Article 8 Bar Report does. See id. 
at 1536 n.156. 
 200. Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 1978). See 
generally Gregory C. Yadley & Atilla S. Ilkson, Bona Fide Purchasers of Lost and Stolen 
Securities: Meeting the Good Faith and Notice Requirements, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
101, 108-17 (1982) (discussing cases applying suspicious circumstances concept). 
 201. Oscar Gruss, 582 F.2d at 432 (finding that there was no notice but that there was 
a strong inference that facts indicated lack of good faith). Accord SEC v. Investors Security 
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 745, 756 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (stating that even where there is no notice, 
[f]rom all the facts and circumstances which were known . . . inquiry . . . [may be] re-
quired in order to establish bona fide purchaser status), revd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 
561 (3d Cir. 1997). See generally Egon Guttman, Mediating Industry and Investor Needs in 
the Redrafting of UCC Article 8, 28 UCC L.J. 3, 31 (1995) (Although the proposed revi-
sions of Article 8 reject the concept of constructive notice binding securities intermediaries, 
a purchaser who ignores warning signs may be unable to claim to be in good faith. But can 
it be alleged in all instances that there is knowledge or notice including constructive no-
tice?). 
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elements for bona fide purchaser status202 or the position of the Arti-
cle 8 Bar Report.203 The splits in the New York case law suggest that 
there is no legal consensus on the type of notice of adverse claims 
that is appropriate under Article 8 or on whether there is a difference 
between good faith and notice. A justification for the tightening of 
the notice standards or the discarding of good faith in Revised Article 
8 has to be found in policy arguments rather than in reliance upon 
precedent. Regrettably, neither Professor Rogers nor the Article 8 
Bar Report explicitly put forward policy arguments for these two 
changes. It is certainly true that it would not be appropriate to im-
pose new, higher standards requiring frequent investigation by 
transferees. Such standards would impede the free transferability of 
securities.204 However, this does not necessarily mean that the cur-
rent standards should be lowered as they are in Revised Article 8. 
C.  Implications 
 The notice standards embodied in 1977 Article 8 have not led to 
significant confusion in their application. Commentators have been 
able to formulate clear guidelines to regulate the behavior of partici-
pants in American securities markets.205 Parallel guidelines exist for 
good faith behavior.206 In addition, the weakening of notice standards 
combined with the dropping of the good faith requirement raises the 
issue of what restraints there would be on market participants. Un-
der 1977 Article 8, a transferee must be concerned about constructive 
notice of adverse claims or about suspicious circumstances, which 
should make a transferee attentive to the business practices of the 
transferor. This attentiveness is necessary to provide a shield from 
                                                                                                                      
 202. See, e.g., Otten v. Marasco, 353 F.2d 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1965) ([I]t is clear that 
failure to inquire may under certain circumstances constitute bad faith under New York 
law.); Garner v. First Natl City Bank, 465 F. Supp. 372, 383 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating 
that it is not necessary to hold that a defendant had knowledge of adverse claim to deny 
bona fide purchaser status; it is enough if suspicious circumstances existed). 
 203. See, e.g., Gutekunst v. Continental Ins. Co., 486 F.2d. 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(stating the clear rule set forth in New York decisions and section 8-304(3) of 1962 New 
York Article 8 is that it is not ignorance, but guilty knowledge or conduct that can be 
equated with guilty knowledge, that can rise to bad faith); Chemical Bank v. Haskell, 411 
N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that in a case under Article 3, suspicious circum-
stances which might well have induced a prudent banker to investigate more thoroughly 
are not enough to jeopardize bona fide purchaser status); Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 118 
N.E.2d 464, 467 (N.Y. 1954) (stating that in a case under Negotiable Instruments Law, the 
existence of merely suspicious circumstances does not, without more, amount to notice of 
an infirmity or defect). The Article 8 Bar Report cites Benjamin Ctr. v. Hampton Affiliates, 
Inc., 482 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (App. Div. 1984), affd and modified on other grounds, 488 
N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1985), which does not discuss the issue of suspicious circumstances and, 
therefore, does not supply much support for the Article 8 Bar Reports position. 
 204. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1471. 
 205. See, e.g., Yadley & Ilkson, supra note 200. 
 206. See id. 
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liability under either section 8-302 (bona fide purchaser) or 8-318 (no 
conversion for good faith conduct by agent or bailee).  
 Weakening the incentive to transferee attentiveness puts in-
creased weight on federal regulation of broker-dealers as the primary 
means of disciplining bad actor transferees who are negligently or in-
tentionally jeopardizing the property rights of beneficial owners of 
securities.207 This policy choice to favor federal regulation is criticized 
in Part VIII of this Article. The immediate transferee in the indirect 
holding system is usually either a financial institution itself or a fi-
nancial institution acting as an agent, in either case possessing ex-
tensive knowledge of the relevant market practices and partici-
pants.208 Who better to police transferors?209 
                                                                                                                      
 207. See infra Part IV for further discussion. 
 208. Ironically, exactly this principle was proposed by the SEC and the SROs in con-
nection with clearing brokers acting on behalf of introducing brokers. See Michael Sico-
nolfi, Heat Rises on Wall Street Clearing Operations, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1997, at C1. 
The collapse of A.R. Baron & Co., a small brokerage, in July 1996 was the catalyst for ex-
amining the duties of clearing brokers. See Diana B. Henriques & Peter Truell, Should a 
Clearing-House Be Its Brokers Keeper? Queries For Bear Stearns After a Firm Fails, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at D1. A number of legal actions were commenced against Bear 
Stearns Companies, which had cleared trades for over 3,000 accounts for A.R. Baron, alleg-
ing that Bear Stearns knew about unauthorized trades and sales misrepresentations in-
volving these accounts but continued to do a clearing business with A.R. Baron. See id. In 
turn, the SEC and the Manhattan District Attorneys office commenced investigations of 
Bear Stearns role. See Patrick McGeehan & Michael Siconolfi, New Rules Expected on 
Clearing: More Responsibility Seen for Big Firms, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1997, at C1. 
 Ultimately, the SROs decided to propose imposing reporting requirements on clearing 
brokers without requiring an affirmative duty for clearing firms to report to regulators 
suspicious activity at their introducing brokers. Betty Santangelo & Marc E. Elovitz, Pro-
posed Rules Regarding the Responsibilities of Securities Clearing Firms for Their Introduc-
ing Brokers, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS, Fall 1997, at 
1, 2. The NYSE has proposed an amendment to its Rule 382 to make clearing brokers re-
sponsible for forwarding complaints of an introducing brokers customers to the appropri-
ate regulator; creating mechanisms for introducing firms to request certain reports to as-
sist the introducer in supervising and monitoring customer accounts; requiring the clear-
ing broker to maintain these reports; and requiring the introducing broker to represent to 
the carrying organization that it has supervisory procedures in place, which it enforces and 
which are satisfactory to the carrying organization, with respect to the issuance of [nego-
tiable] instruments by introducing brokers to their customers. Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., to 
Amend its Rule 382 Relating to Carrying Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39200 
(Oct. 10, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 53,369, 53,370 (1997) (emphasis added). NASD is considering 
a similar rule. See Self-Regulatory Organization; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change 
and Amendment No. 1 by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to Amend its 
Rule 3230 Relating to Clearing Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39349 (Nov. 28, 
1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,589 (1997).  
 It is of course possible that these reporting and record keeping obligations will be liber-
ally interpreted to require reporting by clearing brokers of suspicious activity. See Santan-
gelo & Elovitz, supra, at 2; see also Confirmation of Transaction Under Unfixed Commis-
sions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11629 (Sept. 3, 1975), 7 SEC Docket 782 (in situations 
involving potential violations by an institution of its fiduciary duty to its customers, noting 
that a broker acting on behalf of such institution would have a duty of inquiry with re-
spect to his participation in a cause of conduct which, to a reasonable person, would raise a 
question of fraudulent or deceptive acts or practices). The Financial Crimes Enforcement 
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VI.    THE INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM 
A.   Favored Purchasers 
 Revised Article 8 does not use a term comparable to protected 
purchaser to describe a protected transferee under the indirect hold-
ing system. Rather, it provides that an adverse claim to a financial 
asset may be asserted only against a person who (a) acquires a se-
curity entitlement,210 (b) purchases a financial asset or an interest 
therein,211 or (c) purchases a security entitlement, or an interest 
therein, from an entitlement holder,212 if the claimant can prove that 
certain stringent conditions have been met. Revised section 8-510 
deals with purchases from an entitlement holder, while revised sec-
tions 8-502 and 8-503 deal with a purchase from a securities inter-
mediary. On the face of the statute there is a conflict between the 
standards for favored purchaser status in revised sections 8-502 (no-
tice) and 8-503 (collusion).213 The Official Comments attempt to re-
solve this difference in favor of collusion.214 This Article will refer to 
                                                                                                                      
Network of the Department of Treasury may propose similar reporting requirements. See 
Santangelo & Elovitz, supra, at 4. 
 In response to micro-cap fraud, New York Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco propsed ad-
ditional measures to require clearing brokers to monitor introducing brokers. See BUREAU 
OF INVESTOR PROTECTION AND SECURITIES, NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEYS OFFICE, REPORT 
ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD 133-36 (1997). Other states have also focused regulatory re-
sources on examining clearing brokers because of concerns about micro-cap fraud. See, e.g., 
Rachel Witmer, Oppenheimer Gives Access to Records After Utah Regulators Suspend Li-
cense, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 135 (Jan. 23, 1998) (describing developments in 
Utah). 
 This regulatory approach was presaged by some court decisions that have held clearing 
brokers liable to customers of introducing brokers under legal theories of control or aiding 
and abetting for the actions of introducing brokers. See William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. 
Carman, An Analysis of the Business and Legal Relationship Between Introducing and 
Carrying Brokers, 40 BUS. LAW. 47 (1984). The trend, however, has been to recognize that 
only a contractual relationship between the clearing broker and the introducing brokers 
customer can provide a basis for liability. See Henry F. Minnerop, The Role and Regulation 
of Clearing Brokers, 48 BUS. LAW. 841 (1993). 
 209. Revised Article 8 does maintain the transferee incentive to guard against trans-
fers of nonexistent financial assets. This is obviously true where a transferee is trading for 
its own account, but it is also true where the financial asset is held on behalf of an entitle-
ment holder. In the latter case, the transferee has an obligation to obtain and maintain 
the financial asset for the entitlement holder. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-504 
(a). The incentive to guard against transfers of assets upon which there are adverse claims 
is much weaker. 
 210. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-502 (emphasis added). 
 211. Id. § 8-503(e) (emphasis added). 
 212. Id. § 8-510(a) (emphasis added). 
 213. Professor Rogers attempts to minimize the difference between the notice and col-
lusion standards by attributing the lack of uniformity to the ordinary dynamics of any de-
liberative process involving large numbers of persons having different views and perspec-
tives. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1535. The differing values contained in these different 
views and perspectives are not explored further by Professor Rogers. 
 214. The Official Comments state: 
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purchasers against whom these conditions cannot be proved as fa-
vored purchasers in order to distinguish them from the defined term 
protected purchasers. In addition, a secured creditor of a securities 
intermediary is in a position analogous to that of a favored purchaser 
when the secured creditor is in control of a financial asset. 
1. Recovery Barriers 
 The first substantive change from prior law is common to revised 
sections 8-502, 8-503 and 8-510, all of which deal with favored pur-
chasers. The claimant alleging that the transfer is wrongful now 
bears the burden of proof.215 In contrast, under prior law the burden 
was placed on the transferee claiming bona fide purchaser status.216 
 Beyond shifting the burden of proof for wrongful conduct to the 
claimant, revised sections 8-502, 8-503 and 8-510 erect additional 
substantial barriers to recovery from a transferee. First, the pro-
posed definition of notice for the indirect holding system, which is 
relevant to revised sections 8-502 and 8-510 but not to revised sec-
tion 8-503, is identical to that for certificated and uncertificated se-
curities. The restrictive subjective meaning of notice217 also will ap-
ply, therefore, to transferees of securities entitlements. Second, re-
vised sections 8-502 and 8-510 require notice of the particular ad-
verse claim that is asserted in order for a purchaser to lose its fa-
vored status.218 In contrast, 1977 Article 8 requires that a bona fide 
                                                                                                                      
The rule of subsections (d) and (e) [of § 8-503] takes precedence over the gen-
eral cut-off rules of these sections [§§ 8-502 and 8-510], because Section 8-503 
itself defines and sets limits on the assertion of the property interest of enti-
tlement holders. Thus, the question of whether entitlement holders property 
interest can be asserted as an adverse claim against a transferee from the in-
termediary is governed by the collusion test of Section 8-503(e), rather than by 
the without notice test of Sections 8-502 and 8-510. 
1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503 cmt. 2. 
 215. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503 cmt. 3; ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, su-
pra note 6, at 42. Although both the Official Comment to revised section 8-503 and the Ar-
ticle 8 Bar Report refer only to revised section 8-503 when discussing the burden of proof, 
all three proposed sections dealing with favored purchasers have the same structure to 
their language, i.e., that an action based upon the type of property that is the subject of the 
pertinent section may not be asserted against a certain type of purchaser. It seems likely 
that courts will interpret this language consistently for all three revised sections. 
 216. See, e.g., Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424, 433 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(applying Illinois UCC); Garner v. Pearson, 545 F. Supp. 549, 558 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (apply-
ing Florida UCC). 
 217. See supra Part V.A. 
 218. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, §§ 8-502, 8-510(a) (both revised sections 
use the phrase the adverse claim) (emphasis added). This was an inadvertent change in 
early drafts that Professor Rogers noticed when preparing the Proposed Final Draft. See 71 
A.L.I. PROC. 233 (1994) (comments of Professor James S. Rogers). When Professor Rogers 
proposed changing back to the any adverse claim approach of 1977 Article 8, the Drafting 
Committee and Advisers wanted to keep the new language because theres a lot to be said 
for making the rules claim-specific; that, if an adverse claimant wants to assert a claim 
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purchaser be without notice of any adverse claim.219 Therefore, 
knowledge of a claim other than the one being asserted against the 
transferee will not count in determining favored purchaser status. As 
Professor Egon Guttman has so aptly stated, this limitation on the 
type of adverse claim creates an unsurmountable [sic] burden for a 
person attempting to prove that a transferee is not a favored pur-
chaser.220  
 The justification given in the Official Comments for this change is 
particularly weak. The Official Comments explain that a particular 
entitlement holders interest in the financial assets held by its inter-
mediary is necessarily subject to the interest of others; therefore, 
reference must be made to a specific adverse claim rather than to ad-
verse claims in general.221 Why Revised Article 8 could not have 
made a specific exception from the definition of adverse claim for the 
pro rata interests of other entitlement holders is never explained. 
Such an exception would have avoided the broadening of the protec-
tion given favored purchasers under revised sections 8-502 and 8-
510. 
 A greater barrier to recovery from a transferee under Revised Ar-
ticle 8 is created by the very definition of a securities entitlement. 
As described above,222 a securities entitlement is not a property in-
terest in a particular financial asset; therefore, it is extremely un-
likely that an investor in the indirect holding system will ever be 
able to prove that he or she has any interest in any particular finan-
cial asset. Comments to revised section 8-502 explore this result. As 
comment 2 describes and as comment 3 illustrates in a number of 
examples, it will normally be impossible for anyone to trace the path 
of any particular security that is cleared and settled in the indirect 
holding system;223 therefore, it will usually be impossible for anyone 
even to make an equitable argument for recovery against a trans-
feree.224 
 Revised section 8-503 describes the favored purchaser status of 
purchasers of financial assets in comparison to that of acquirers or 
purchasers of securities entitlements described in revised sections 8-
502 and 8-510. If the barriers to disproving a transferee as a favored 
purchaser would be high under revised section 8-502, they would be 
virtually insurmountable under revised section 8-503. Instead of re-
                                                                                                                      
against someone, the claimant should show that someone had the necessary awareness of 
that claim and not be able to dredge up questions about something else. Id. at 234. 
 219. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-302(1) (emphasis added). 
 220. Guttman, supra note 201, at 24. 
 221. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-502 cmt. 1. 
 222. See supra Part II.B. 
 223. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-502 cmts. 2, 3. 
 224. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-502 cmt. 3, exs. 4, 5 (describing tracing 
arguments as implausible). 
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quiring the claimant to prove notice, revised section 8-503 requires 
the claimant to prove that the purchaser is act[ing] in collusion with 
the securities intermediary in violating the securities intermediarys 
obligations under Section 8-504.225 Professor Rogers argues that too 
much attention has been focused on this change, calling it at one 
point a very small point of drafting technique226 that, no matter 
how it is expressed, will have no material impact on the inevitable 
risk of intermediary theft.227 Even if this Author were to agree with 
Professor Rogers that the risk of theft occurring would not be in-
creased,228 the separate issue of whether the likelihood of any claim-
ants recovery from a purchaser is lowered by the proposed collusion 
standard would remain. Finally, Professor Rogers argues that there 
is, in application, no difference between the new collusion standard 
and the old notice of adverse claims standard.229 
2. New Collusion Standard 
 The Article 8 Bar Report relies on this last argument and spends a 
little more than three pages describing the new collusion standard as 
simply a restatement of New York case law. The Report has to en-
gage in this process because there is no definition of collusion in 
Revised Article 8, although two Official comments do discuss collu-
sion.230 These three pages constitute an attempt to provide guidance 
                                                                                                                      
 225. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503(e). Of course, the quoted language con-
tains two separate elements. First, there must be collusion. Second, there must be a par-
ticular type of collusion: collusion to violate revised section 8-504, which provides that a se-
curities intermediary must promptly obtain and thereafter maintain a financial asset in a 
quantity corresponding to the aggregate of all securities entitlements it has established in 
favor of its entitlement holders with respect to that financial asset. Id. § 8-504(a). The im-
port of this second requirement is not clear. Presumably it means that, for example, if 
Lender knows that Broker has a shortfall of security X but no shortfall of security Y, that 
Lender may purchase security Y free of any adverse claims. In other words, the Lenders 
knowledge of bad action by Broker with respect to certain financial assets does not consti-
tute collusion with respect to other financial assets. This interpretation would create yet 
another difficult barrier for any claimant to clamber over. 
 226. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1530 n.145. 
 227. Id. at 1530. 
 228. This Article argues at infra Part VI.A. that one of the reasons to withhold favored 
purchaser status from secured lenders who are in control is to encourage them to monitor 
their securities intermediary borrowers. 
 229. Id. at 1536. 
 230. The closest that Revised Article 8 comes to a definition are two Official Com-
ments. The first is a description in the Official Comments of the fundamental principles 
behind revised section 8-503(e): The entitlement holder cannot assert rights directly 
against other persons, such as other intermediaries through whom the intermediary holds 
the positions, or third parties to whom the intermediary may have wrongfully transferred 
interest, except in extremely unusual circumstances where the third party was itself a par-
ticipant in the wrongdoing. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503 cmt. 2 (emphasis 
added). 
 The second describes the collusion test as applied to a securities intermediary or a bro-
ker or other agent or bailee as asking whether the participant conduct rises to a level of 
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complicity in the wrongdoing carried out by the customer or principal. 1994 OFFICIAL 
TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-115 cmt. 5 (emphasis added). The comment goes on to state that 
[t]he collusion test is intended to adopt a standard akin to the tort rules that determine 
whether a person is liable as an aider or abettor for the tortious conduct of a third party. 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876). The Restatement standard requires, 
for liability, that the alleged aide and abettor (i) act in concert with . . . [an]other or pur-
suant to a common design with him or (ii) give substantial assistance or encouragement 
to anothers conduct that the alleged aide and abettor knows is a breach of duty. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (emphasis added). There is a third category 
in the Restatement, but it requires an independent breach of a duty to the injured party by 
the alleged aider and abettor, something that is very unlikely in securities clearance and 
settlement, especially in the indirect holding system. See id. 
 Professor Rogers also draws attention to two sections of Article 9 where collusion is used 
either in the text of the UCC or the comments, stating that case law under these sections 
can give guidance on the interpretation of the concept of collusion. HAWKLAND & ROGERS, 
supra note 31, at 627. However, the case law under the sections mentioned by Professor 
Rogers does not clarify or help to define the concept of collusion. Both sections protect pur-
chasers of collateral. Under either section, the courts, in denying protection to a purchaser, 
can rely solely on a failure of the purchaser to act in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Because of this two-tiered approach in which the courts look first to the commercial rea-
sonableness of the actions undertaken before looking at collusion, the courts have never 
had occasion to define collusion. If one acts in collusion, he/she also will have acted in a 
commercially unreasonable manner. For this reason, the concept of collusion has not been 
adequately defined, even in the case law, which Professor Rogers points to as providing 
guidance on the meaning of collusion. 
 Section 9-504(4) protects a purchaser at public foreclosure sales, even if the sale did not 
meet Article 9 requirements, so long as the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in 
the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the 
person conducting the sale. U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(a) (1996) (emphasis added). Even though it 
is not specifically mentioned in either section 9-504(4) or the Official Comments to section 
9-504(4), the courts applying section 9-504(4) rely on the concept of commercial reason-
ableness in determining whether a purchaser has knowledge of any defects. See, e.g., 
Thornton v. Citibank, 640 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); PWS, Inc. v. Ban, 285 
Cal. Rptr. 598, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 
405 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
 The other provision that Professor Rogers points to for a definition of collusion is section 
9-306. Section 9-306 provides that a secured partys interest continues in identifiable pro-
ceeds from the sale of collateral and that a secured party is entitled to the proceeds from 
the sale of such collateral. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1996). Those proceeds are not identifiable if 
they are commingled with the funds of the debtor by being deposited in the debtors per-
sonal accounts. See Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 620 
(1st Cir. 1990). 
 Comment 2(c) to section 9-306 states that a transferee takes free of all claims by secured 
parties when funds are placed into a debtors checking account and paid out in the ordi-
nary course of business, but that, in certain cases, recovery is warranted by a secured 
party from a transferee out of the ordinary course or otherwise in collusion with the debtor 
to defraud the secured party. U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2(c) (1996) (emphasis added). In inter-
preting the phrase ordinary course, the courts look at whether a recipient of proceeds 
from the sale of collateral has failed to observe commercially reasonable standards or col-
luded in order to determine if the recipient is vulnerable to the claims of a secured party. 
 Unlike the situation under section 9-504(4), where there is no explicit reference to con-
cepts of commercial reasonableness or the ordinary course of business, section 9-306, com-
ment 2(c) explicitly mentions this two-tiered analysis. But the courts have never been re-
quired to adequately define collusion under section 9-306 because they have consistently 
relied solely on the concept of commercial reasonableness. See, e.g., J.I. Case Credit Corp. 
v. First Natl Bank, 991 F.2d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir. 1993); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 897 
F.2d at 622. 
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on the meaning of collusion.231 Although the Article 8 Bar Report 
acknowledges that New York cases exist that would support the posi-
tion that overt proof of malicious interaction among conspirators 
must be demonstrated for collusion to be shown, or that collusion is a 
narrower category than is bad faith (as that term is used in New 
York Article 8),232 the report advocates what it presents as a lesser 
standard for establishing collusion.233 
 This section of the Article 8 Bar Report has an Alice-in-
Wonderland quality. When interpreting New York statutes, New 
York courts ordinarily do not emphasize reliance upon legislative 
history.234 This is not surprising when one remembers the paucity of 
New York legislative materials and the difficulty of public access to 
those few materials that do exist.235 It is unlikely that any New York 
court, faced with the difference of language between revised sections 
8-502 and 8-510 (notice) and section 8-503 (collusion), will be aware 
of the interpretation proposed by the Article 8 Bar Report. The New 
York court would have to wrestle with the differences in the new 
statutory language to arrive at its own conclusion. It seems unlikely 
to this Author that, even if a New York court were aware of the in-
terpretation contained in the Article 8 Bar Report, the court would 
give it any more weight than any other secondary source. Indeed, 
New York courts are no less likely than those in other jurisdictions to 
interpret statutory provisions by looking at the explicit text and by 
treating different words in the same statute as having different 
meanings.236 
                                                                                                                      
 231. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 n.2 (The Committee on Consumer 
Affairs has concluded that the Report . . . provides guidance regarding the operation of Sec-
tions 8-503 through 8-508, particularly with respect to the collusion standard and the 
meaning of good faith, which should diminish potential difficulties for individual investors 
. . . .). 
 232. Id. at 45 (discussing Estate of Greene v. Glucksman, 669 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987)). 
 233. See id. at 44. (At a minimum, a demonstration that (i) the transferee had knowl-
edge that the intermediary was acting wrongfully with respect to the financial assets 
transferred and (ii) the transferee acted in concert with the intermediary in doing so, will 
be sufficient to meet the collusion standard.) Exactly how this proposed standard, with its 
in concert language, differs from the higher standard that the Article 8 Bar Report claims 
is inappropriate is not at all clear to this Author. See id. In addition, the Article 8 Bar Re-
port provides an interpretation of how to resolve the procedural issues of proof under a col-
lusion standard: Under Revised Article 8, once an entitlement holder comes forward with 
some colorable evidence of collusion, the burden of going forward to show the absence of 
collusion should be placed on the transferee. Id. 
 234. See 97 N.Y. JUR. 2d Statutes §§ 145-46 (1992). 
 235. See ELLEN M. GIBSON, NEW YORK LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE I-92 (2d ed. 1998); see 
also ROBERT A. CARTER, LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN NEW YORK STATE: MATERIALS, CASES AND 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 (1981); Ernest H. Breuer, Legislative Intent and Extrinsic 
Aids to Statutory Interpretation in New York, 51 L. LIBR. J. 2, 3 (1958). 
 236. See Albano v. Kirby, 330 N.E.2d 615, 618 (N.Y. 1975) (When different terms are 
used in various parts of a statute or rule, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction be-
tween them is intended.) (citations omitted). 
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 Although Official Comments are not part of the UCC, courts, in-
cluding New York courts, often look to them for guidance.237 A New 
York court, relying on the two comments in Revised Article 8, easily 
could construe collusion to cover only a narrow range of conspirato-
rial conduct,238 the very concept rejected by the Article 8 Bar Report. 
 The bill adopting Revised Article 8 in New York has a statement 
of legislative intent in a preamble that clarifies that the collusion 
standard is the narrow concept suggested by the literal language of 
Revised Article 8.239 The bill states that [t]he legislature intends col-
lusion to include acting in concert, acting by conspiratorial arrange-
ment, or acting by agreement for the purpose of violating the enti-
tlement holders rights or with actual knowledge that the securities 
intermediary is violating those rights.240 The 1996 predecessor bill 
passed by the Assembly had a much different clarification of collu-
sion. The 1996 bill provided that, beyond the normal meanings of col-
lusion, [t]he legislature also intends collusion to include actual 
knowledge by a party or a partys deliberate closing of its eyes to 
facts that would provide knowledge.241 Although a helpful step, this 
                                                                                                                      
 237. See, e.g., 107 N.Y. JUR. 2d Uniform Commercial Code §§ 3, 19 (1992). 
 238. If a New York court were to look at comment 5 to revised section 8-115, it would 
find that [k]nowledge that the action of the customer is wrongful is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of the collusion test. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-115 cmt. 5. 
To find that there has been collusion, the comment advocates that a securities intermedi-
ary or broker must engage in affirmative misconduct in assisting the customer in the 
commission of a wrong. Id. 
 239. See Uniform Commercial Code-Investment Securities, 1997 N.Y. LAWS 566, at § 1. 
 240. Id. The language from the legislative intent preamble, startling in its bluntness, 
goes on to state the following: 
Under this standard, collusion includes transactions with a securities inter-
mediary in which the purchaser has actual knowledge that the securities in-
termediary has violated or is violating an entitlement holders property inter-
est. The legislature intends that the purchasers knowledge will be judged on a 
subjective, not an objective basis. When considering whether a purchaser has 
the requisite actual knowledge of the wrongdoing, the legislature intends that 
the purchaser be charged with possession of information that is brought to the 
purchasers attention or that is contained in communications made or sent to 
the purchaser but that the purchaser has declined to receive or to communicate 
to persons within its own organization who are conducting the transaction. 
Nevertheless, nothing in this standard imposes a duty of inquiry. Thus, for ex-
ample, a purchasers knowledge of the precarious financial situation of the fi-
nancial intermediary coupled with rumors, allegations, or reports of suspected 
wrongdoing does not amount to collusion. As used in this act, the collusion 
standard strikes a balance between two competing goalsthe need for liquidity 
and finality in the market for financial assets and the need for assurance that 
the rules that protect liquidity and finality are not subject to abuse by a pur-
chaser who is willing to participate with or assist an intermediary for the pur-
pose of violating the rights of an intermediarys customers, or a purchaser who 
acts with actual knowledge of an intermediarys wrongdoing. 
Id. The last sentence of the above paragraph talks about balancing two competing goals. 
This Author fails to see anything but a tipped scale. 
 241. A. 9454-B § 1 (N.Y. 1996). [C]arelessness or negligence would not have been 
enough. The bill gave an example of carelessness or negligent behavior that does not 
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approach still read any requirement of good faith out of New York 
law. In addition, one can only speculate about what New York courts 
would have done with a legislative statement of intent that conflicts 
with the explicit language of the statute and the Official Comments. 
Now one does not have to speculate. The triumph of the financial in-
stitutions is complete and not even the few crumbs offered by the Ar-
ticle 8 Bar Report are left for investors. 
B.   Securities Intermediaries 
 Revised section 8-503(a) is one of the more radical sections of Re-
vised Article 8. It estabishes the general principle that financial as-
sets held by a securities intermediary are held by the securities in-
termediary for its entitlement holders to the extent necessary to sat-
isfy the entitlement holders and are not property of the securities 
intermediary.242 As Professor Rogers notes, if an intermediary ac-
quires securities for its own account, and thereafter customers ac-
quire claims to that issue of securities, all units of that security will 
be devoted first to the customers claims.243 Revised section 8-511(a) 
carries out this general principle by providing that if a securities in-
termediary were to have a shortfall in a particular financial asset, all 
claims of entitlement holders who have interests in the financial as-
set would have priority over any claim of a creditor of the securities 
intermediary.244 It is especially important that such a policy choice 
favoring entitlement holders has been made as most investors rarely 
will be able to assert a claim against any particular financial asset 
due to their inability to trace the financial asset.245 
 Professor Rogers concludes that revised sections 8-503(a) and 8-
511 embody the basic principle that entitlement holders of an in-
termediary do not take the credit risk of the intermediary.246 He can 
conclude that this basic principle has been properly embodied in Re-
vised Article 8 only by focusing on the claims of general creditors 
against securities intermediaries. Once the focus shifts to certain 
types of secured lenders, it becomes clear that entitlement holders 
may well be taking a credit risk with their securities intermediaries. 
                                                                                                                      
amount to collusion: a purchasers knowledge only of the precarious financial situation of 
the financial intermediary coupled with rumors or unsupported reports. Id. In other 
words, good faith no longer would have been an independent requirement under New York 
law. 
 242. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503(a). 
 243. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1518. 
 244. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-511(a). 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25. 
 246. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1518. 
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1. Control Creditors 
 By defining a securities entitlement as a bundle of rights against 
a securities intermediary rather than as a right in any financial as-
set, Revised Article 8 would have the effect of increasing entitlement 
holders exposure to the risk of insolvency of their securities interme-
diaries. This insolvency risk arises from the crucial exception that 
revised section 8-511 makes in favor of entitlement holders: Any 
claim of a creditor of the securities intermediary that has control of 
the financial asset has priority over any claim of an entitlement 
holder to the financial asset.247 A purchaser, including any control 
creditor,248 would control a financial entitlement when either (a) the 
purchaser were to become[ ] the entitlement holder249 or (b) the se-
curities intermediary that creates the securities entitlement were to 
agree[ ] that it will comply with entitlement orders originated by the 
purchaser without further consent by the entitlement holder.250 Con-
trol creditors would include not only certain secured lenders but also 
certain higher level securities intermediaries that create securities 
entitlements for lower level securities intermediaries.251 
 The insolvency risk arises from the very nature of secured lend-
ing. If the financial assets and other assets that a securities interme-
diary holds for its own account have been pledged to a secured lender 
and the secured lender has control of these financial assets, the only 
financial assets left to satisfy claims of entitlement holders will be 
those held by the securities intermediary on behalf of its entitlement 
holders.252 If the financial intermediary becomes insolvent and there 
is a shortfall in the financial assets held on behalf of entitlement 
holders, the entitlement holders will be only general creditors with 
                                                                                                                      
 247. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-511(b). 
 248. A purchaser is a person who takes by purchase. U.C.C. § 1-201(33) (1996). In 
turn, a purchase is any . . . voluntary transaction creating an interest in property, id. § 
1-201(32), which includes security interests granted to lenders. 
 249. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-106(d)(1). 
 250. Id. § 8-106(d)(2). 
 251. See id. § 8-106(e). The lower level securities intermediary, in its capacity as an en-
titlement holder, must grant an interest in the security entitlement to the higher level 
securities intermediaries for control to exist. Id. Priorities among control creditors are 
dealt with in revised section 9-115(5). See generally Super-Priority of Securities Intermedi-
aries under the New Section 9-118(5)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1937 (1995) (discussing arguments on priority issue available to a secured creditor 
and a securities intermediary when both are in control). 
 252. The lack of empirical data concerning lending to broker-dealers makes it difficult 
to evaluate the likelihood of this scenario. Is it common for a broker-dealer to have a senior 
lender that has a security interest in substantially all of its assets? Does the answer to this 
question vary depending on what type of broker-dealer is involved, e.g., large publicly held 
versus small privately held? Moreover, even if control lending has been uncommon in the 
past, will revised section 8-511(a) provide an incentive to increased control lending in the 
future? See infra text accompanying notes 260-65 for a brief discussion of borrowing by 
broker-dealers. 
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respect to the shortfall and may well suffer a loss. Assume Securities 
Intermediary holds fifty A shares for its own account and fifty A 
shares on behalf of Entitlement Holder. Assume Securities Interme-
diary has granted control to a Secured Lender over the fifty A shares 
held for its own account. Assume finally that Securities Intermediary 
misappropriates twenty-five customer A shares and grants control to 
the Secured Lender, which is noncolluding, over these twenty-five A 
shares. If Securities Intermediary becomes insolvent, Entitlement 
Holder has priority under revised section 8-511 only with respect to 
the twenty-five customer A shares that were not misappropriated by 
Securities Intermediary. A related scenario shows that an entitle-
ment holder can even be subjected to unbargained for market risks 
involving financial assets in which the entitlement holder did not in-
vest. 
 Assume Securities Intermediary grants control to Secured Lender 
of 100 A shares with a market value of $50 per share and fifty B 
shares with a market value of $100 per share in return for a loan of 
$10,000. Assume further that Securities Intermediary has violated 
the Entitlement Holders rights in granting control over the fifty B 
shares but that Secured Lender has not colluded in this violation. 
Assume finally that, upon Securities Intermediarys default on the 
loan, the A shares have a market value of zero dollars. Now Secured 
Lender has priority over Entitlement Holder with respect to all of the 
B shares. Thus, Entitlement Holder has become subject to the mar-
ket risk of a decline in the value of A shares, in which he or she may 
not have invested, if Securities Intermediary wrongfully grants con-
trol to Secured Lender over the fifty B shares and Securities Inter-
mediary becomes insolvent. 
 The same risks, of course, would arise under 1977 Article 8 if Se-
cured Lender were a bona fide purchaser of the twenty-five A shares 
under the first hypothetical or fifty B shares under the second hypo-
thetical.253 But, to date, little bona fide purchaser secured lending has 
been done under Article 8.254 
 If one confines consideration of this issue purely to the language 
of 1977 Article 8 and ignores the approach taken by the courts in ap-
plying 1977 Article 8, Revised Article 8 arguably decreases, not in-
creases, an entitlement holders exposure to insolvency risk. Under 
1977 Article 8, most indirectly held securities are held as part of a 
fungible bulk, in which the purchaser is the owner of a proportion-
ate property interest;255 therefore, tracing and earlier-in-time con-
                                                                                                                      
 253. See 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, §§ 8-313(1)(g), (2), 8-320. 
 254. See Howard M. Darmstadter, Revised Article 8 and the Agreement to Pledge, 28 
UCC L.J. 202, 211-12 (1995). 
 255. 1977 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 4, § 8-313(2). Exceptions for indirectly held secu-
rities exist for a certificated security specially [e]ndorsed to or issued in the name of the 
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cepts, which in theory operate fortuitously, should determine 
whether customers or creditors receive priority.256 What this argu-
ment ignores is that 
in almost all cases [involving government broker-dealers, the 
courts] tried to find ways of favoring customers seeking to assert 
ownership rights in securities held by broker-dealers over creditors 
claiming security interests in the same. . . . After reading these 
cases, it should be obvious why the securities clearing industry is 
so anxious to reform existing law, and why retail customers might 
be a little less eager.257 
 These exercises in judicial creativity have involved the use of fic-
tions of vicarious possession.258 Difficult as such exercises were to 
justify under 1977 Article 8, such exercises would be almost impossi-
ble to justify under Revised Article 8 with its explicit rejection of any 
tracing notions with respect to financial assets. 
 As a practical matter, these changes in Revised Article 8 would 
not be a significant concern if control lending were not a significant 
securities industry practice or if creditors were subject to meaningful 
restrictions on their ability to become favored purchasers. There is 
very little empirical research on broker-dealers borrowing. In addi-
tion, this Author is unaware of any authoritative study of securities 
lending practices that addresses the more narrow issue of the extent 
to which control-type relationships are currently common industry 
practice. Anecdotal evidence indicates that control-type lending rela-
tionships are not currently important to major broker-dealers in 
their normal operations, although they may be important to smaller 
broker-dealers.259 
                                                                                                                      
purchaser in the possession of a financial intermediary, id. § 8-313(1)(c), and a specific 
certificated security in the financial intermediarys possession that the financial interme-
diary has identifie[d] as belonging to the purchaser, id. § 8-313(1)(d)(i). 
 256. See 1991 ABA REPORT, supra note 5, at 36-37. See James S. Rogers, UCC Article 
8-Investment Securities: The Need for Revision to Accommodate Securities Holdings 
through Financial Intermediaries, in 1993 COMM. L. ANN. 419 (Louis F. Del Duca & Pat-
rick Del Duca eds., 1993), for a variety of hypotheticals involving transfers under 1977 Ar-
ticle 8. 
 257. Schroeder, supra note 31, at 335-36. One supporter of Revised Article 8 has writ-
ten that  
Honesty compels me to say that in the event of . . . [a reduction or disappear-
ance of] federal regulation, current Article 8 might be marginally preferable to 
Revised Article 8. In the event of that regulatory revolution, what are flaws in 
current Article 8 become virtues. Under current Article 8, it is possible to make 
property-based arguments that would allow original owners to claim their lost 
property back from transferees. 
Letter from Paul M. Shupack to Norman Silber, Professor, Hofstra School of Law, 12 (June 
13, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shupack Letter]. 
 258. Schroeder, supra note 31, at 336. 
 259. See Darmstadter, supra note 254, at 211-12 (reporting that brokers with publicly 
held parents primarily borrow unsecured in public debt markets and that, when borrowing 
is necessary, secured bank loans are available to large, credit-worthy brokers at the same 
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 Professor Rogers devotes three pages to a description of broker-
dealer borrowing, citing to only a handful of sources.260 Professor 
Mooney proposed the model of upper-tier priority,261 which became 
the intellectual foundation of Revised Article 8, without once examin-
ing actual borrowing practices of broker-dealers.262 Broker-dealers 
have diversified away from a reliance on banks, using repurchase 
agreements with a variety of counter parties for their day-to-day li-
quidity needs.263 Committed bank lines of credit, however, remain the 
fall back for broker-dealers in times of great liquidity needs.264 
 Primary dealers in Treasury securities presently rely on repur-
chase agreements to finance most of their positions rather than on 
collateralized loans from commercial banks, which were utilized in 
the past.265 This movement to repos as the primary financing device 
is also true of broker-dealers in general.266 There are three common 
types of repurchase agreements: delivery, tri-party and custody. In a 
delivery repo, the purchaser takes possession of the underlying secu-
rities, which is the repurchase markets version of the hard pledge 
discussed below. In a tri-party repo, a third party, such as a bank, 
acts on behalf of the purchaser and seller and holds the repo collat-
eral put up by the dealer in custody for the investor for the life of the 
repo.267 Finally, in custody repos, the underlying securities remain 
with the seller.268 Custody repos remain popular with investors due 
                                                                                                                      
interest rates as secured loans). Standby secured lending facilities for providing liquidity to 
a broker-dealer holding company would be important in the event that its access to the 
commercial paper market were to dry up. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS 116 (1990). 
 260. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1527-29 (citing to two sources). 
 261. Professor Mooney describes this model: 
The cornerstone of the priority rule proposed here is one overriding principle: 
claimants on a higher tier will always prevail over claimants on a lower tier. To 
state this principle of upper-tier priority . . . another way, the transferee of an 
interest in a fungible bulk of securities controlled by its intermediary can look 
only to its intermediary for the benefits of the securities transferred. 
Mooney, supra note 114, at 379-80. 
 262. Id. at 379-97. 
 263. After the October 1987 stock market crash and problems obtaining bank loans, 
broker-dealers sought to increase their sources of credit by increasing their use of the re-
purchase market. See Stephen E. Frank, The Carnage in Stocks: If the Sell-Off Continues, 
Banks Have Crucial Role, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1997, at C19. 
 264. See id. Broker-dealers pay a small annual premium for these lines of credit, 
which can be quite substantial in size. See id. Merrill Lynch & Co., for example, has $6.6 
billion available through its committed credit lines. See id. Most of these lines are unse-
cured, although some banks are now asking for collateral. See id. 
 265. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-86-80 BR, U.S. 
TREASURY SECURITIES: THE MARKETS STRUCTURE, RISKS, AND REGULATION 24-25 (1986) 
[hereinafter GAO, TREASURY SECURITIES]. 
 266. SEC, THE FINANCING AND REGULATORY CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY 22-23 (1985). Repurchase agreements are cheaper than bank loans and allow for 
borrowing against a larger percentage of the collateral pool. See id. at 23. 
 267. STIGUM, REPO, supra note 101, at 191-201. 
 268. See id. 
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to the lower costs associated with them,269 and with broker-dealers 
because of operational efficiencies that accompany custody repos.270 
 Professor Rogers assumes that, as a significant amount of control 
lending is done by mutual funds and pension funds, any rule favoring 
entitlement holders over controlling secured creditors would only end 
up hurting individuals with interests in mutual funds and pen-
sions.271 Without some real data on lending to broker-dealers it is im-
possible to evaluate this point. The most favorable public policy may 
change depending on the percentage of the borrowing that the typical 
broker-dealer finances with money market mutual funds and pension 
funds. The higher the percentage, the more attractive Professor 
Rogers argument becomes. But even if the percentage is very high 
during normal business times, will the same lenders be there during 
crises in either the financial markets as a whole or in the business of 
one particular broker-dealer? Major broker-dealers have not made 
this assumption, relying on committed bank lines of credit for crisis 
periods.272 
 In addition, the evidence of past bank lending practices, in which 
agreement to pledge arrangements have been favored, may not be an 
accurate guide for future bank lending practices. Banking lawyers 
are now advising their clients that control arrangements are the pre-
ferred method of perfecting security interests in securities under Re-
vised Article 8.273 Agreement-to-pledge arrangements are, in Revised 
Article 8s terms, non-control arrangements.274 One goal of Revised 
Article 8 was to provide an unambiguous legal foundation for agree-
ment to pledge lending.275 But the primary impetus behind agree-
                                                                                                                      
 269. See id. at 199-200; see also GAO, TREASURY SECURITIES, supra note 265, at 106-
07, 113. 
 270. See STIGUM, REPO, supra note 101, at 198-99. 
 271. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1523-29. Professor Rogers explains this point: 
If one really does think that sound public policy dictates that providers of fi-
nancing to securities firms should lose to customers of the firm in the event 
that the firm has wrongfully transferred securities, then one has to bite the 
bullet and say that one thinks it sensible to shift the risk of loss from the cus-
tomers of a failed securities firm to shareholders of a money market mutual 
fund. 
Id. at 1528. 
 272. See Frank, supra note 263, at C19. But see Tom Pratt, Will Your Bank Be There 
When You Need It Most? Secured Credit Lines Appeal to Brokerage Firms for Crisis Protec-
tion, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Feb. 28, 1994, at 10 (reporting that, as of early 1994, 
only two major broker-dealers had setup committed secured bank lines, although other 
firms were considering such bank lines). 
 273. See, e.g., Alan M. Christenfeld & Shephard W. Melzer, Treasury Securities: New 
Federal Regulations, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1997, at 5 (Most secured parties will find that con-
trol is the most useful means to perfect liens on treasuries, which are now subject to Re-
vised Article 8 by Department of the Treasury rules.). 
 274. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 9-115 cmt. 6. 
 275. See Darmstadter, supra note 254, at 206-07. New York accomplished this through 
amendments in 1988 to section 8-313 of 1977 New York Article 8. See Act to Amend the 
Uniform Code, in Relation to Clarifying the Definition of Financial Intermediary and the 
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ment to pledge lending may have been technological deficiencies in 
depository operational handling of pledgesdeficiencies that may 
soon be overcome.276 In the event that the deficiencies are overcome, 
control lending could become increasingly important.277 In addition, 
the new rule set forth in revised section 8-511(a) favoring entitle-
ment holders over non-control creditors should provide a significant 
incentive to bank lenders to create control lending arrangements. If 
control bank lending grows in importance, the net result of revised 
section 8-511(b) would put entitlement holders at a severe disadvan-
tage in future insolvencies of securities intermediaries involving a 
shortfall of financial assets and significant bank creditors. 
 Revised section 8-511(b) raises two issues related to a creditors 
ability to become a favored purchaser. First, the meaning of control 
of a security entitlement in Revised Article 8 is unclear and the cur-
rent draft of proposed Article 9 proposes a clarification that will re-
move any ambiguities in achieving control over a security entitle-
ment by giving a very broad meaning to control. The first means of 
obtaining control under revised section 8-106(d), the purchaser be-
comes the entitlement holder,278 has not generated discussion. The 
second means, the securities intermediary has agreed that it will 
comply with entitlement orders originated by the purchaser without 
further consent by the entitlement holder,279 has prompted all of the 
debate. The issue is whether an agreement by a securities intermedi-
ary to follow entitlement orders of a purchaser280 that is conditioned 
upon the occurrence of some further event, such as a default by the 
                                                                                                                      
Transfer of Interests in the Securities that Remain in the Possession of a Financial Inter-
mediary, ch. 708, 1988 N.Y. LAWS 1452. 
 276. See Darmstadter, supra note 254, at 213-15. 
 277. Cost should not be a significant deterrent. One 1995 article reported that Deposi-
tory Trust Company, for example, charged only eleven cents per CUSIP number, i.e., per 
securities issue, for a hard pledge. See id. at 213. A hard pledge occurs when securities 
are transferred on the books of a clearing corporation from the debtors account to the 
lenders account or to a special pledge account for the lender where they cannot be disposed 
of without the specific consent of the lender. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 9-115 
cmt. 6. 
 278. Id. § 8-106(d)(1). 
 279. Id. § 8-106(d)(2). 
 280. Although the most common transaction involving a purchaser might be a secured 
transaction, revised section 8-106 uses the more general term purchaser in order to cover 
repurchase agreements, which have been characterized by some courts as purchase-and-
sale arrangements and by other courts as secured transactions. See HAWKLAND & ROGERS, 
supra note 31, at 232 (By using the term purchaser, it is possible to state rules for repur-
chase agreement transactions in a fashion that makes it unnecessary . . . to decide the dis-
putable question of whether . . . the transfer of securities in a repo transaction is . . . gov-
erned by Article 9.). This word usage allows Revised Article 8 to remain neutral on the is-
sue of the legal characterization of repurchase agreements. See Prefatory Note, 1994 
OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, at 23-24. (The rules of Revised Article 8 have . . . been 
drafted to minimize the possibility that disputes over the characterization of the transfer 
in a repo would affect substantive questions that are governed by Article 8.). 
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entitlement holder that has granted a security interest, can consti-
tute a control arrangement.  
 In part, this debate has been occasioned by Official Comment 7 to 
revised section 8-106, which applies a general gloss on the meaning 
of control: The key to the control concept is that the purchaser has 
the present ability to have the securities sold or transferred without 
further action by the transferor.281 The use of present suggests 
that any future condition means control does not exist currently be-
cause an entitlement order will not be followed until the condition oc-
curs.282 
 The latest draft of Article 9 suggests a change to Official Com-
ment 7 to revised section 8-106 to delete the word present in the 
first sentence of the last paragraph and to add four new sentences 
clarifying that a purchaser may have present control of a security 
entitlement even though the purchasers right to give entitlement or-
ders to the securities intermediary is conditioned on the entitlement 
holders default or the purchasers informing the securities interme-
diary that the entitlement holder is in default.283 This change would 
                                                                                                                      
 281. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-106 cmt. 7 (emphasis added). 
 282. Some attorneys will not render control opinions in this factual situation because 
of this language in the Official Comments. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Rev. Art. 8 and Mul-
tiple Secured Parties (visited Apr. 23, 1997) <http://ucclaw-l@assocdir.wuacc.edu>. The 
practical solution has been to put any conditions in a separate document to which the secu-
rities intermediary is not a party. See Steve Weise, Rev. Art. 8 and Multiple Secured Par-
ties (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http://ucclaw-l@assocdir.wuacc.edu>. 
 A separate, but related issue, is raised by the requirement that the securities intermedi-
ary agree to act without further consent by the entitlement holder for control of a secu-
rity entitlement to exist. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-106(d)(2). This language 
also suggests the practical wisdom of keeping any conditions on the exercise by a secured 
party of its rights in a separate document between the secured party and the debtor. As 
Professor Rogers notes:  
Lawyers negotiating and drafting [control] agreements should take care to keep 
separate the question whether the arrangement suffices to give the secured 
party the power to obtain the collateral from the intermediary and the question 
whether the secured partys exercise of that power in a particular situation is 
rightful as against the debtor. 
HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 235. 
 283. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9 Secured Transactions; Sale of Ac-
counts, Chattel Paper, And Payment Intangibles; Consignments (with conforming amend-
ments to Articles 1, 2, 5, and 8) app. § 8-106 cmt. 7 (Discussion Draft No. 2, April 14, 1997). 
The full text of these four proposed new sentences is as follows: 
Moreover, the purchasers right to direct the intermediary may be subject to 
conditions. For example, a purchaser may have present control of a security en-
titlement even though the purchasers right to give entitlement orders to the 
securities intermediary is conditioned on the entitlement holders default or the 
purchasers informing the securities intermediary that the entitlement holder 
is in default. Better practice for both the intermediary and the purchaser would 
be to insist that any conditions be effective only as between the purchaser and 
the entitlement holder. That would avoid the risk that the intermediary could 
be caught between conflicting assertions of the entitlement holder and the pur-
chaser as to whether the conditions in fact have been met. Nonetheless, the ex-
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protect both secured parties and purchasers in repurchase agree-
ments to the extent such purchasers are treated as secured parties. 
 Delivery repos should create control in the purchaser, regardless 
of whether the underlying financial assets are certificated securities, 
uncertificated securities or security entitlements. The proposed re-
vised Official Comment would clarify that tri-party and custody re-
pos may create control relationships even if there are conditions to a 
purchasers exercise of its rights. If all repurchase agreements, in-
cluding custody repos, can involve a control arrangement, then one 
potential conceptual barrier to control lendings domination of secu-
rities intermediaries financing has been removed. 
 In addition, the limits on a control creditor are unclear. In other 
words, is revised section 8-511(b) subject to the collusion standard of 
revised section 8-503(e)? The Official Comments to revised section 8-
511(b) state that such a connection exists284 but nothing in the text of 
the statute explicitly subjects a control creditor to revised section 8-
503(e).285 As discussed above, even if the collusion test applies to con-
trol creditors, it fails to provide meaningful protection for entitlement 
holders.286 
2. Impact of the Multi-Tier System 
 The potential problems with control lending are magnified by the 
fact that the indirect holding system is a multi-tier system. If there 
were to be (a) a shortfall in a financial asset at a higher level securi-
ties intermediary that has a control creditor with respect to the fi-
nancial asset and on whose books a lower level securities intermedi-
ary has a securities entitlement with respect to the financial asset on 
                                                                                                                      
istence of unfulfilled conditions effective against the intermediary would not 
preclude the purchaser from having control. 
Id. 
 284. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-511 cmt. 1 (If . . . the secured creditor 
acted in collusion with the intermediary in violating the intermediarys obligation to its en-
titlement holders, then under section 8-503(e), the entitlement holders . . . could recover 
the interest from the secured creditor . . . .). 
 285. What weight, if any, to be given the Official Comments in interpreting the UCC 
has been a matter of some controversy. Compare Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin 
of American Law: Committee Notes, Comments, and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REV. 993, 994 
(1995) ([C]ourts should assign little, if any, weight to these examples of gloss [such as 
U.C.C. comments] . . . . [T]hese materials are not a desirable addition to American juris-
prudence.) with Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 806 (1978) (advocating 
a purposive interpretation of the UCC that has, as one of its steps, an examination of the 
purpose articulated in the Official Comments); Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the 
Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597, 631 (Study of the 
comments is indispensable to a knowledge of the Code.); Sean Hannaway, Note, The Ju-
risprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 962, 985-86 (1990) (The truth of the matter is that the Comments are 
authoritative.). 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 231-42. 
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behalf of its own entitlement holder and (b) the higher level securi-
ties intermediary were to become insolvent, the entitlement holder 
might find him or herself with a shortfall of financial assets on which 
he or she has a claim.287 The lower level securities intermediary does 
not necessarily have to replace these financial assets. Although re-
vised section 8-504(a) provides that [a] securities intermediary shall 
promptly obtain and thereafter maintain a financial asset in a quan-
tity corresponding to the aggregate of all securities entitlements it 
has established in favor of its entitlement holders with respect to 
that financial asset,288 the lower level securities intermediary may, 
in turn, hold these financial assets indirectly.289  
 The duty set forth in revised section 8-504(a) is not absolute. If 
the lower level securities intermediary has exercise[d] due care in 
accordance with reasonable commercial standards to obtain and 
maintain the financial asset, it has met its duty to obtain and main-
tain the financial asset.290 Thus, an insolvency of the higher level se-
curities intermediary that could not reasonably be foreseen would 
appear to relieve the lower level securities intermediary of any duty 
to the entitlement holder for financial assets held through the higher 
level securities intermediary.291 
 Professor Mooney, the intellectual progenitor Revised Article 8s 
general approach, proposed that a much more stringent warranty of 
good title be made by a securities intermediary in favor of its enti-
tlement holders.292 This warranty was to be the quid pro quo for 
subjecting entitlement holders to the risk of a policy favoring upper-
                                                                                                                      
 287. The entitlement holder only has a property interest in particular financial assets, 
not in all financial assets held for customers. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, §§ 8-
503(a), (b). 
 288. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-504(a) (emphasis added). The Official 
Comments justify restricting an entitlement holder to recourse against his or her securities 
intermediary when the securities intermediary is solvent by giving an expansive reading to 
revised section 8-504: If the intermediary does not hold financial assets corresponding to 
the entitlement holders claims, the intermediary has the duty to acquire them. Id. § 8-503 
cmt. 2. This would not necessarily be true in the event of an insolvency of a higher level se-
curities intermediary. See infra text accompanying notes 300-06. 
 289. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-504(a) (The securities intermediary 
may maintain those financial assets directly or through one or more other securities in-
termediaries.). 
 290. Id. § 8-504(c)(2). 
 291. There also are potential procedural pitfalls for an entitlement holder if his or her 
securities intermediary became insolvent while there was a shortfall in a financial asset at 
a higher level securities intermediary. An entitlement holder cannot assert rights [under 
Revised Article 8] directly against other persons [other than his or her own securities in-
termediary], such as other intermediaries through whom the intermediary holds the posi-
tions . . . except in extremely unusual circumstances where the third party was itself a par-
ticipant in the wrongdoing. Id. § 8-503 cmt. 2. Any legal action against the higher level se-
curities intermediary would have to be brought by the lower level securities intermediary 
as debtor-in-possession or by its trustee. 
 292. Mooney, supra note 114, at 405-10. 
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tier market participants.293 Revised Article 8 has significantly diluted 
this suggested warranty.294 This Author can imagine the justifica-
tion for such dilution that could be made by supporters of Revised 
Article 8. By holding indirectly, entitlement holders have agreed to 
subject themselves to these risks.295 This Author would have more 
sympathy for this argument, however, if there were any practical 
means of holding publicly traded securities other than indirectly.296 
3. Direct Intermediary Interests 
 Finally, there are risks imposed on individual investors by the 
control relationship that may exist between a securities intermediary 
and its entitlement holders. Revised section 8-106(e) grants control of 
a securities entitlement held for an entitlement holder to a securities 
intermediary when the securities intermediary has an interest in 
the security entitlement. The language of revised section 8-106(e) is 
quite vague.297 There is no definition of interest.298 The only guid-
ance is in the Official Comments to revised section 8-106, which state 
that [a] common transaction covered by this provision is a margin 
loan from a broker to its customer.299 Revised Article 8 may be refer-
ring to a security interest in 8-106 (e). This would make sense if con-
trol were relevant only in Article 9 and in determining priority 
                                                                                                                      
 293. See id. at 380. 
 294. Professor Rogers would not agree with this characterization. In describing revised 
section 8-504, he has written: 
[T]he basic statement in subsection 8-504(a) of the intermediarys duty to 
maintain assets corresponding to entitlement holders claims does not say that 
an intermediary shall try to have the assets or take reasonable measures to 
try to have the assets; it states flatly that the intermediary shall promptly ob-
tain and thereafter maintain a financial asset corresponding to each security 
entitlement that it has established. 
HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 652. 
 This Author believes that a court can easily read revised sections 8-504(a) and (b) to-
gether to stand for exactly the proposition that Professor Rogers rejects. 
 295. Professor Mooney makes a similar argument with respect to defects or defaults 
where the issuer is at fault, noting that the warranty should not extend to such defects 
and faults since the qualities of the issuer and the issuers behavior comprise risks prop-
erly assumed and borne by the transferee. Mooney, supra note 114, at 405 n.363. 
 296. See infra Part VII for a discussion of the impracticality of opting out of the indi-
rect holding system. 
 297. A securities intermediary has control [i]f an interest in a security entitlement is 
granted by the entitlement holder to the entitlement holders own securities intermediary. 
1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-106(e). 
 298. Presumably an interest is a property right of some type created by a purchase. 
See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1996) (Purchase includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, 
mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an 
interest in property.) (emphasis added). 
 299. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-106 cmt. 6. The last paragraph of Comment 
4 to revised section 9-115 also defines control by reference to a customers borrowing from 
its securities intermediary and granting the securities intermediary a security interest in 
connection with a borrowing. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 9-115 cmt. 4. 
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among conflicting security interests.300 But control performs an addi-
tional, albeit a more limited, function in the indirect holding system 
in connection with adverse claim protection for transferees in general 
rather than just for holders of security interests.301 
 Through revised section 8-106(e), the individual investor is subject 
to risks involving not just control lenders to higher level securities 
intermediaries, but also to risks involving the higher level securities 
intermediary itself. Assume entitlement holder has a security enti-
tlement with respect to a financial asset at a lower-level securities 
intermediary (LLSI), which financial asset in turn is held by LLSI in 
a security entitlement at a higher level securities intermediary 
(HLSI). Assume further that HLSI has a revised section 8-106(e) in-
terest in LLSIs security entitlement, that HLSI is a favored pur-
chaser of LLSIs security entitlement, that there is a shortfall in the 
financial asset at HLSI, and that HLSI becomes insolvent. The enti-
tlement holder may well suffer a shortfall in the financial asset. 
 This statutory approach means that any individual entitlement 
holder is subject to risks of a shortfall of a financial asset not only at 
his or her securities intermediary but at all securities intermediaries 
in the chain from the entitlement holder to the depository for the fi-
nancial asset. Of course, if the higher level securities intermediary 
were not to become insolvent, the lower level entitlement holder 
would be protected against a short fall at the higher level securities 
intermediary through revised sections 8-503(a) and 8-504, unless the 
shortfall at the higher level securities intermediary was due, in turn, 
to the insolvency of an even higher level securities intermediary. 
C. Secured Creditors of Clearing Corporations 
 Even if an entitlement holder did not lose in a priority contest 
with a control lender over a financial asset in which there was a 
shortfall, he or she could still lose to a creditor of a clearing corpora-
tion when the creditor has a security interest in that financial as-
set.302 The creditor of a clearing corporation does not have to control 
                                                                                                                      
 300. Revised section 9-115(5) provides the priority rules for conflicting security inter-
ests in the same investment property. Id. § 9-115(5). A security interest of a secured party 
with control has priority over that of a secured party without control. See id. § 9-115(5)(a). 
In turn, revised section 9-115(5)(c) creates a default rule that gives a security interest in a 
security entitlement . . . granted to the debtors own securities intermediary . . . priority 
over any security interest granted by the debtor to another secured party. Id. § 9-
115(5)(c). Revised section 9-115(5)(c) is an exception to the general rule of revised section 9-
115(5)(b) that provides that conflicting security interests of secured parties each of whom 
has control rank equally. Id. 
 301. See HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 224-25. 
 302. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-511(c). See id. § 9-115 cmt. 7, for a descrip-
tion of secured lending to clearing corporations. 
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the financial asset in order to achieve this priority.303 The proponents 
of Revised Article 8 argue that this provision is necessary to assure 
lenders who have established stand-by emergency financing ar-
rangements to enable payment [by a clearing corporation] of the set-
tlement obligations of a defaulting participant that these arrange-
ments are supported by an unassailable security interest.304 
 Insofar as a clearing corporation is a replacement in clearing and 
settlement for a securities intermediary whose settlement obligation 
has become that of the clearing corporation,305 the individual inves-
tors risk has just been magnified. The individual investor now bears 
the risk that not only might there be a shortfall at his or her securi-
ties intermediary and at all the securities intermediaries up to the 
depository, but that a totally unrelated settlement default at the 
clearing corporation may affect the financial assets to which he or 
she has a security entitlement. Professor Rogers argues that such an 
event is incredibly unlikely and that the priority rule of revised sec-
tion 8-511(c) is necessary to prevent the occurrence of such a hor-
rendous event.306 Of course, the individual investor might be for-
given for finding the disappearance of his or her securities entitle-
ment to also be a horrendous event. And if enough individual inves-
tors were affected seriously enough, systemic risk could be created by 
their withdrawal from the world of indirectly held securities, i.e., by 
a run on the bank. 
 In light of the risks that Revised Article 8s approach to priority 
disputes imposes on entitlement holders, one would expect that in-
vestors might seek to opt out of the indirect holding system. The 
practical ability of any investor to opt out of the indirect holding sys-
tem, of which revised section 8-511 is part, however, is limited. 
                                                                                                                      
 303. Revised Article 8 justifies the deletion of the control requirement for clearing cor-
porations on two grounds: 
The clearing corporation may be the top tier securities intermediary for the se-
curities pledged, so that it would not be practical for the lender to obtain con-
trol. Even where the clearing corporation holds some types of securities 
through other intermediaries, however, the clearing corporation is unlikely to 
be able to complete the arrangements necessary to convey control over the se-
curities to be pledged in time to complete settlement in a timely manner. 
Id. § 9-115 cmt. 7. Professor Rogers notes that control could not be taken by the secured 
lender because [d]oing so would require either physical delivery of certificates to the 
lender or entries on the books of the issuers of each of the securities in question. 
HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 718. Presumably Professor Rogers and the Official 
Comments are referring to control concepts related to certificated and uncertificated secu-
rities because clearing corporations usually hold the securities directly, rather than indi-
rectly. 
 304. HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 718-19. 
 305. In the United States, the National Securities Clearing Corporation, for example, 
which clears 95% of all corporate stocks and bonds, assumes the role of buyer or seller and 
guarantees settlement of all matched trades. See 1 BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, supra note 
70, at 34, 36. 
 306. See HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 718. 
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VII.   OPTING OUT OF THE INDIRECT HOLDING SYSTEM 
 An investor could opt out by holding actual paper certificates, 
rather than holding a securities entitlement with a securities inter-
mediary. For any investor who will be active in the marketplace, this 
option is impractical.307 Settlement of most trades in corporate equity 
and debt securities must be completed within three days of the 
trade.308 This short time frame makes it difficult for an investor to de-
liver the paper certificate to his or her broker in time for settlement. 
As the goal of the SEC is one-day settlement by the end of the mil-
lennium,309 this practical difficulty will only increase. In addition, 
many brokers actively discourage their customers from obtaining pa-
per certificates.310 In the market for United States Treasury bills, 
notes and bonds, the largest securities market in the United States 
both in dollar amount and in average daily volume,311 paper securi-
ties have not been issued since August 1986.312 
 Almost all Treasury securities and most securities issued by fed-
eral agencies exist only as book entries in a system maintained by 
the Federal Reserve.313 In July 1986, the Treasury created the 
TREASURY DIRECT system that allows investors to register their 
ownership directly with the Treasury.314 The reason for establishing 
the rights of ownership for securities held in TREASURY DIRECT is 
that it will give investors the assurance that the forms of registration 
they select will establish conclusively the rights to their book-entry 
securities.315  
 On its face, TREASURY DIRECT provides a means for an inves-
tor to avoid the dangers of holding Treasury securities indirectly. In 
practice, however, an investor in TREASURY DIRECT suffers from 
                                                                                                                      
 307. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-9. The committee that drafted the 
Article 8 Bar Report  
discussed the extent to which alternate methods of holding securities were 
available to investors willing to avoid the risks associated with the indirect sys-
tem. Although the direct holding of paper certificates would have this effect, 
this often would not be desirable or practicable for investors wishing to be ac-
tive in the marketplace and should not be held out as a cure. 
Id. 
 308. See supra note 73.  
 309. See id.  
 310. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Investors Feel Heat to Keep Securities in Street Name, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at C1. 
 311. See FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY 1992, supra note 69, at 22. 
 312. Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills (Feb. 22, 
1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 8420, 8421 (1996). The Treasury started offering only Treasury bills in 
book-entry form in December 1976, adding notes and bonds in August 1986. See id. at 
8420. By December 1995, 99.7 percent of Treasury securities (exclusive of these held in 
various government trust funds) were held in book-entry form. See id. at 8421. 
 313. See FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY 1992, supra note 69, at 22. 
 314. See Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury Bonds, Notes, and Bills (May 15, 
1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 18,260 (1986).  
 315. Id. 
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the same practical disadvantages involving trading as does a paper 
certificate holder. In order to trade, a member of TREASURY 
DIRECT must first have his or her interest transferred to TRADES, 
the indirect holding system for Treasury Securities,316 or to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank.317 Although a transfer to the Federal Reserve 
Bank avoids, as a practical matter, intermediary risk, such transfer 
is no quicker than a transfer to a TRADES participant,318 and it is 
irrevocable, 319 thus locking the investor into a sale on the day that 
the security is transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank.320 This lat-
ter requirement provides an investor with considerably less flexibil-
ity as compared to having a securities entitlement with a broker-
dealer and has led the Department of the Treasury to warn that 
[t]he Department and the Federal Reserve Bank are not liable for 
changes in market conditions which may affect the price received by 
the investor.321 In addition, a participant in TREASURY DIRECT 
may not grant a security interest in his or her TREASURY DIRECT 
securities.322 As the Treasury itself has noted, TREASURY DIRECT 
is suited for persons who plan to hold their Treasury securities until 
maturity.323 
 Institutional investors have protected themselves against possible 
misbehavior by securities intermediaries through two separate 
means. First, the major institutional investors use large commercial 
banks as custodians.324 These large commercial banks are believed to 
have a de facto guaranty against failure from the Federal Reserve.325 
Second, for corporate equity and debt securities, institutional inves-
tors that use custodian banks receive direct confirmations from DTC 
of transactions through DTCs institutional delivery system.326 Nei-
ther of these protections is available to the average individual inves-
tor. Using a custodian bank requires fees that are not large relative 
to an institutional investors holdings but that would be large rela-
tive to most individual investors holdings.327 In addition, DTCs insti-
tutional delivery system only functions for institutions, not for indi-
viduals. 
                                                                                                                      
 316. See 31 C.F.R. § 357.22 (1997). 
 317. See Regulations Governing Book-Entry Treasury Bonds, Notes and Bills (Aug. 20, 
1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 46,860, 46,861 (1997) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 357.22(b)). 
 318. Compare id. at 46,861 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 357.22(b)(3)) with 31 C.F.R. § 
357.22(a)(3) (1997). 
 319. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 46,861 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §357.22(b)(9)). 
 320. Id. (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §357.22(b)(3)). 
 321. Id. at 46,860. 
 322. 31 C.F.R. § 357.25 (1997). 
 323. 61 Fed. Reg. at 8423. 
 324. See Mooney, supra note 114, at 324. 
 325. See STIGUM, AFTER THE TRADE, supra note 33, at 221-22. 
 326. See id. at 254. 
 327. See id. at 219-20. 
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VIII.   REGULATORY AND INSURANCE SCHEMES 
 Some supporters of Revised Article 8 have relied upon the con-
tinued presence of, other federal and state law, regulation, oversight 
and enforcement [concerning the relationship between investors and 
brokers] and the continued availability of SIPC coverage as prem-
ises for passage of Revised Article 8.328 Other supporters, notably 
Professor Rogers, have argued that ones assessment of the ade-
quacy of these [regulatory and insurance] systems is essentially ir-
relevant for purposes of understanding and assessing Revised Article 
8.329 
 Professor Rogers main point is that Revised Article 8 is concerned 
with the traditional commercial law goal of ensuring finality in secu-
rities transfers, thereby controlling systemic risk.330 As this Author 
does not share Professor Rogers assessment of Revised Article 8s 
                                                                                                                      
 328. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 10; see also Mooney, supra note 114, 
at 313 (smaller, less sophisticated investors are protected by SIPA). The legislative history 
preamble to the bill enacting Revised Article 8 in New York relies explicitly on continued 
active oversight by agencies of the federal and state governments and the continued avail-
ability of the securities investor protection corporation . . . and the SIPC fund . . . to protect 
investors from loss in its declaration of legislative intent explaining the enactment of Re-
vised Article 8. See Uniform Commercial Code-Investment Securities, 1997 N.Y. Laws 566, 
§ 1. The preamble goes on to state that [i]f the federal or state government alters or re-
duces its role as protector of shareholders and other participants in the securities market, 
then the state may need to enact laws in addition to article 8 of the uniform commercial 
code to address these issues. Id. Presumably in order to provide the legislature with the 
information necessary to effectuate this legislative intent, the bill enacting Revised Article 
8 in New York provides that  
[t]he attorney general shall issue a report on or before June first of each year to 
the governor, the comptroller, the speaker of the assembly, and the temporary 
president of the senate on the assets and condition of the securities investor 
protection corporation (SIPC) . . . and the [SIPC] fund . . . its adequacy to meet 
losses that New York state residents may incur, and any material changes that 
have occurred in the coverage structure or funding of SIPC in the year preced-
ing the report. 
Id. § 28. This Author is skeptical that any substantial resources will be devoted to generat-
ing this report, as substantial resources were not devoted to studying Revised Article 8 be-
fore its adoption in New York. 
 329. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1539. Professor Rogers simultaneously makes the empiri-
cal claim that the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) is an effective insurance sys-
tem. See id. at 1538. If SIPA is relevant, then Professor Rogers and other proponents 
should seriously evaluate its effectiveness. If it is not relevant, then proponents should not 
attempt to backdoor in claims of effectiveness. Professor Rogers repeats this approach 
when discussing the collusion standard under Revised Article 8: 
To be perfectly frank, the author suspects that the question of the precise 
meaning of the collusion standard will for all time remain a matter for aca-
demic speculation concerning hypotheticals. Given the existence of the elabo-
rate regulatory system under which securities intermediaries operate, it seems 
relatively unlikely that many, or even any, litigated cases will actually arise in 
which courts would be called upon to interpret and apply the collusion standard 
of subsection 8-503(e). 
HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 31, at 630 (emphasis added). 
 330. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1539 (The basic policy of present law and Revised 
Article 8 is that the commercial law rules should be designed to ensure finality.). 
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role in limiting systemic risk, nor his view that Revised Article 8 is 
essentially irrelevant to protecting investors, this Article assumes 
that the insurance coverage provided by the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act (SIPA), which established the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corporation (SIPC), and the SECs rules covering a brokers 
capitalization and treatment of a customers securities and cash are 
relevant in evaluating Revised Article 8. This Article focuses on the 
SEC in examining the regulatory issues. There are other relevant 
regulatory agencies and bodies of rules promulgated by these agen-
cies. The most notable are the Federal Reserve Bank and the De-
partment of the Treasury, both of which play important roles in the 
United States Treasury securities markets.331 This Author, however, 
does not believe that the issues raised in this Article would be mate-
rially affected by separately discussing each relevant regulatory 
agency and its rules. 
 From 1967 to 1970, the securities industry underwent a profound 
back-office crisis.332 Trading volumes rose to record highs and bro-
ker-dealers were unable to deal with the increasing number of trans-
actions.333 Although SEC and self-regulatory organization (SRO) 
rules covering the capitalization of broker-dealers, record keeping by 
broker-dealers, and the safekeeping of customers securities predat-
ing the paperwork crisis,334 and major stock exchanges had instituted 
voluntary trust funds to protect customers, both the regulatory re-
gime and the private trust funds were found lacking. For example, 
prior to 1975, the SEC exempted from its net capital rules members 
of securities exchanges that imposed capital requirements more rig-
orous than those of the SEC.335 But the NYSE, for one, failed to en-
force its rule regarding capital requirements during the paperwork 
crisis. This failure led to Congress authorizing, and the SEC promul-
gating in 1975, the Uniform Net Capital Rules.336  
 Similarly, the voluntary trust funds failed during the paperwork 
crisis to protect all customers of broker-dealers due to three prob-
                                                                                                                      
 331. See generally GAO, TREASURY SECURITIES, supra note 265, at 56-65 (describing 
roles of the Treasury, Federal Reserve, OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
CTFC, and SEC in this area). 
 332. See generally SIDNEY M. ROBBINS ET AL., PAPER CRISIS IN THE SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY: CAUSES AND CURES (1969) (explaining the causes of the crisis and suggesting 
solutions to prevent future problems). 
 333. See id. at 21-51. The paperwork crisis also was an impetus behind 1977 Article 
8. See Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1017 (1979). 
 334. See generally Allan Gates, Comment, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 
1970: A New Federal Role in Investor Protection, 24 VAND. L. REV. 586 (1971) (describing 
the regulatory framework prior to enactment of SIPA). 
 335. See Steven L. Molinari & Nelson S. Kibler, Broker-Dealers Financial Responsibil-
ity Under the Uniform Net Capital RuleA Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1983). 
 336. See id. at 15-16, 15 n.94. 
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lems. First, the trustees had no legal obligation to the customers of 
member firms, maintaining discretion as to disbursements; second, 
the trust funds had limited financial resources; and finally, the trust 
funds did not cover non-exchange members customers.337 
 During the period from 1970 to 1975, Congress and the SEC took 
a number of important steps to strengthen customer protections, cre-
ating the framework upon which proponents of Revised Article 8 
have relied.338 In 1970, Congress passed SIPA.339 SIPA had two sepa-
rate goals, the first of which was to clarify and strengthen the SECs 
authority to regulate broker-dealers. SIPA did this by amending sec-
tion 15(c)(3) of the 1934 Act to cover over the counter broker-dealers 
and to clarify the SECs authority to promulgate rules concerning not 
just the financial responsibility of broker-dealers, but also concern-
ing related practices of broker-dealers.340 In particular, Congress 
wanted to clearly establish the SECs authority to adopt rules deal-
ing with free credit balances and segregation of securities.341 In late 
1972, the SEC adopted Rule 15c3-3,342 the customer protection rule 
providing for segregation by broker-dealers of customer securities 
and cash balances from the broker-dealers own property, which is 
discussed in greater detail in Part VIII of this Article. And, as was 
just mentioned, in 1975 the SEC reasserted its direct supervisory au-
thority over broker-dealers net capital. 
 SIPAs second goal was to create the SIPC, a nonprofit corporation 
consisting of all broker-dealers registered under section 15(b) of the 
1934 Act.343 The SIPC was charged with creating a SIPC Fund from 
                                                                                                                      
 337. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES 
INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP. 91-1613, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5257; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, SECURITIES 
INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, S. REP. 91-1218, at 3 (1970). These concerns were 
not merely theoretical. As of October 1970, the NYSE, for example, had refused reim-
bursement from its trust fund for the customers of three members or former members that 
had failed since August 1970, arguing that the trust fund was voluntary and there were no 
further funds available. See H.R. REP. 91-1613 at 3.  
 338. See generally Molinari & Kibler, supra note 335 (primarily describing the SECs 
regulatory regime); see also Michael E. Don & Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations 
Under the Securities Investor Protection Act and Their Impact on Securities Transfers, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 509 (1990) (describing SIPC and the insurance scheme). 
 339. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (1994). 
 340. Act of Dec. 30, 1970, § 7(d), 84 Stat. 1636, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1905, 
1926. 
 341. H.R. REP. 91-1613 at 14, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5254, 5267. 
 342. Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release 
34-9856 (Nov. 17, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 25,224 (1972). Rule 15c3-3 was the result of a politi-
cal process that had begun in 1939 with the SEC proposing a brokerage bank that was 
designed to take over from brokers all the banking and credit functions which they then 
performed. HURD BARUCH, WALL STREET: SECURITY RISK 57 (1971). Resistance from the 
financial industry caused the SEC to withdraw this concept. Id. By 1941, the SEC was 
proposing segregation rules similar to those enacted three decades later. Id. at 58-61. 
 343. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(1) (1994). 
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assessments imposed upon its members344 and given broad powers to 
liquidate broker-dealers whose continued operations might jeopard-
ize customers.345 The SIPC Fund is to be used to make advances of up 
to $500,000 for a customers claim for securities and cash, of which 
up to $100,000 may be for a cash claim, to a trustee that is liquidat-
ing a broker-dealer under SIPA.346 These advances, which are made 
when there are shortfalls in customer property held by the broker-
dealer being liquidated, function as insurance.347 
 The proponents of Revised Article 8 have given almost no account 
of either the insurance or the regulatory scheme to demonstrate why 
these schemes form an effective investor protection regime. Perhaps 
this is not so surprising when one realizes the paucity of secondary 
materials on those two important but relatively obscure areas.348 But 
                                                                                                                      
 344. See id. § 78ddd(a)(1). 
 345. See id. § 78eee. 
 346. See id. § 78fff-3. 
 347. SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., 560 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1977) (The SIPA 
was enacted for the protection of brokerage customers. In a loose, nontechnical sense, it 
provides benefits to them somewhat similar to insurance against the brokers insolvency, 
although not against the vagaries of the market.) (footnote omitted). 
 348. In the four years subsequent to the enactment of SIPA, there were a handful of 
law review articles. See, e.g., David M. Greenberg, An Analysis of the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970, 16 HOW. L.J. 907 (1971); Roberta S. Karmel & Jeffrey M. Weiss-
man, Taking Stock of the Courts Jurisdiction in a SIPA Liquidation, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 1 
(1974); Hugh L. Sowards & James S. Mofsky, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 
1970, 26 BUS. LAW. 1271 (1971); The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early 
Assessment, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1973); Gates, supra note 334; Note, The Securities In-
vestor Protection Act (How The S.I.P.C. Fared in the First Four Years of Its Existence), 7 U. 
WEST L.A. L. REV. 162 (1975). Subsequently, there have been only a few additional articles 
on the SIPC, including Harold S. Bloomenthal & Donald Salcito, Customer Protection From 
Brokerage Failures: The Securities Investor Protection Corporation and the SEC, 54 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 161 (1983); Bartley A. Brennan, The Role of SIPC in Brokerage Failures: A 
Case Study of the Demise of Bell and Beckwith, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 18 (1985); Don & Wang, 
supra note 338; Stephen P. Harbeck, Stockbroker Bankruptcy: The Role of the District 
Court and the Bankruptcy Court Under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 56 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 277 (1982); Michael D. Bolton, Note, Repurchase Agreement Transactions in 
Securities Investor Protection Act Proceedings, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 359 (1987); Sheila 
Cheston, Note, Investor Protection Under the SIPA: A Reassessment and Recommendations 
for Future Change, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 69 (1985), and one good general study, 
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-109, SECURITIES INVESTOR 
PROTECTION: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK HAS MINIMIZED SIPCS LOSSES (1992) [here-
inafter GAO 1992]. 
 There are at least four treatises besides Louis Loss and Joel Seligmans Securities Regu-
lation that discuss the federal regulation of broker-dealers. Of them, one has not been up-
dated in twenty years, see NICHOLAS WOLFSON ET AL., REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS 
AND SECURITIES MARKETS (1977), while the second only devotes one chapter to broker-
dealer regulation, see RALPH S. JANVEY, REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES AND 
COMMODITIES MARKETS 4-3 to 4-113 (1992); the third hardly mentions the net capital and 
various customer protection rules, see DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 
(1988); and the fourth has only three brief discussions of the net capital and customer pro-
tection rules and has not been comprehensively updated in twenty years, see SHELDON M. 
JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE TO THE REGULATORY 
PROCESS 156-158, 270-289 (1977). 
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the assumption that is made, namely that the SIPC and SEC regula-
tion provide adequate investor protection, is disturbing when there 
has been no evaluation of their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
The Article 8 Bar Report is particularly egregious in this respect for 
failing to cite even the few available secondary services when making 
the bald claim that SIPC coverage and SEC regulation have ade-
quately protected investors.349 As Revised Article 8 was in process for 
six years, one could have expected that some empirical work would 
have been done on this issue.350 Regrettably, none was undertaken. 
 This Article does not attempt to rectify the deficiencies of the ma-
terials prepared by proponents of Revised Article 8 by presenting a 
full analysis of SIPA insurance coverage or the SECs regulatory re-
gime. Rather, it attempts to show that there are substantial ques-
tions concerning the adequacy of SIPA insurance coverage and the 
SECs regulatory regime, questions that deserved a full hearing be-
fore too much weight was placed on such potentially weak reeds. 
A.   SEC Customer Protection 
1.   In General 
 It is appropriate to start with the SECs regulatory regime as the 
SIPC and the SIPA Fund are conceived of as a back-up to the regu-
latory frameworkincluding the net capital and customer protection 
rules[which] serves as the primary means of customer protec-
tion.351 Congress saw this clarification of SEC authority contained in 
SIPA and the regulatory measures that should follow as the primary 
means of protecting investors. It is clear that the protections to in-
vestors provided by the proposed SIPC fund are really only an in-
terim step. The long-range solution to these problems confronting the 
industry today is going to be found in the ultimate raising of the fi-
nancial responsibility of the brokerage community.352 
 The SECs substantive regulation of broker-dealers includes ex-
tensive rules meant to protect customers funds and securities. These 
                                                                                                                      
 The law review literature that focuses on the uniform net capital rules is even less ex-
tensive than that for the SIPC. See, e.g., Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 BUS. 
LAW. 863 (1992); Nelson S. Kibler & Steven L. Molinari, The SECs Recent Revisions to Its 
Uniform Net Capital Rule and Customer Protection Rule, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1982). 
 349. ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
 350. See infra Part VIII for further discussion of this point. 
 351. GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 22. The uniform net capital rule promulgated in 
1973 was intended to both enhance the protection of customer funds and securities held 
by broker-dealers . . . [and] to protect the SIPC fund by requiring all broker-dealers to op-
erate under a sound capital base. Net Capital Rule: Proposed Uniform and Comprehen-
sive Regulation, Exchange Act Release 34-9891 (Dec. 5, 1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 56 (1973). 
 352. H.R. REP. 91-1613 at 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5266. 
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rules cover record keeping;353 financial reports;354 net capital;355 early 
warning to the SEC and the designated SRO of certain net capital, 
record keeping or reporting violations;356 segregation and reserve re-
quirements for customer securities and funds;357 use of customer free 
credit balances;358 quarterly box counts of securities;359 and hypothe-
cation of customer securities.360 This article will briefly discuss only 
the rules that are most important for customer protecton: Rules 
15c3-1 (uniform net capital),361 15c3-3 (segregation of customer secu-
rities and funds), and 15c2-1 and 8c-1 (companion rules dealing with 
hypothecation of customer securities). 
 Three initial points should be noted. First, supporters of Revised 
Article 8, who rely on the SECs support for Revised Article 8 to ar-
gue for its passage,362 also rely on the presence of an effective SEC 
regulatory regime to argue that Revised Article 8 does not need to be 
concerned with protecting investors.363 An extraordinary legitimacy is 
being accorded the SECs views and policies. No consideration is 
given by the proponents of Revised Article 8 to whether the SEC has 
an agenda other than investor protection. There are potential issues 
of capture of the regulatory agency by interest groups,364 which may 
                                                                                                                      
 353. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 7 SECURITIES REGULATION 3107-16 (3d ed. 
1991). 
 354. See id. at 3117-28. 
 355. See id. at 3137-57. 
 356. See id. at 3157-60. 
 357. See id. at 3160-75. 
 358. See id. at 3175-76. 
 359. See id. at 3176-79. 
 360. See id. at 3179-90. 
 361. The SEC is currently studying whether the net capital rule should be amended to 
allow firms to use statistical models to calculate net capital requirements. Net Capital 
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39456 (Dec. 17, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 68,011, 68,012 
(1997). The net effect of such an approach would be that a firm would be able to recognize, 
to a greater extent, the correlations and hedges in its securities portfolio and have a com-
paratively smaller capital charge for market risk. Id. at 68,015. 
 362. See, e.g., Shupack Letter, supra note 257, at 12. 
 363. The new statute was drafted within a context in which an intricate federal regu-
latory scheme governing securities intermediaries exists, and in which substantial protec-
tion is given to any customer of a securities intermediary by federal and state statutes. Id. 
 364. A regulatory agency can be captured by a public lobby, including pro-consumer 
groups, as well as by the regulated industry. RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES 154-86 (2d ed. 1996). 
Whether the SEC has been captured has been a matter of some discussion. Compare JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET xi (1982) (The SEC is not a captive of 
the industries it regulates. Quite simply, such a suggestion cannot be sustained by a rea-
sonable reading of the Commissions history.), with SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD 
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 21-23 (1981) (applying public choice theory to 
argue that the public interest has not been an important consideration in the [SECs] 
regulatory process). One commentator has gone so far as to argue that the SEC is an obso-
lete agency due to fundamental charges in Americas capital markets, which has led to its 
capture by interest groups. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence 
and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 
948-49 (1994). 
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(but do not have to) include the regulated industry, and conflicting 
congressionally mandated goals for the SEC. The SEC has a mandate 
to improve market efficiency as well as to protect investors. These 
two goals may, at times, conflict and the SEC must make a value 
judgment favoring one over the other.365 And, of course, the balance 
between efficiency and investor protection in the SECs decision mak-
ing is not a fixed equation and may change over time.366 The litera-
ture supporting Revised Article 8 does not include any discussion of 
these issues. 
 Second, the relevant universe for examination is not just the SEC 
itself but, perhaps more importantly, the activities of the SROs to 
which almost all broker-dealers belong.367 Federal securities regula-
tion is not a matter of SEC action alone. In fact, federal securities 
regulation is a two level affair. The SROs have their own rules and 
provide much of the day-to-day supervision of broker-dealers compli-
ance with federal securities rules.368 The SEC oversees SROs by, 
among other things, conducting oversight broker-dealer examina-
tions to reexamine broker-dealers that have already been examined 
by SROs, thus checking SRO examination results;369 inspecting the 
                                                                                                                      
 From an individual investors perspective, the problem with the SEC is that so few indi-
vidual investors participate in SEC rule making. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-86-83, SECURITIES REGULATION: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION OVERSIGHT OF SELF REGULATION 55 (1986) [hereinafter GAO, SEC 1986]. The 
SEC has reported that small investors rarely comment on proposed [SRO] rule changes 
but that this is not a problem in reviewing SRO rule changes because the SEC officials be-
lieved that they themselves adequately represented the interests of the small investor in 
the rule review process. Id. This is a statement for which this Author is unaware of any 
well-developed support. One might expect pension funds to act as a proxy for small inves-
tors except for the fact that these institutional investors have pursued strategies to insu-
late themselves from the risks of financial intermediary misbehavior in the indirect hold-
ing system that are different from those available as a practical matter to individual inves-
tors. See supra Part VI.B. 
 365. See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of 
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315 (1985). This Article takes no position 
on Professors Macey and Haddocks basic point that the SEC has used the public interest 
as a subterfuge to disguise its search to maximize its political support by favoring certain 
special interests in the securities industry. See id. at 361-62. 
 366. Another possible dichotomy in the SECs goals of potential importance to evaluat-
ing its regulatory regime is between its functions in promoting full disclosure by market 
participants and in regulating the market. The SEC has been a signal success in 
provid[ing] investors with the information needed to trade intelligently in markets free of 
fraud and other abuse. Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 
755, 755 (1984). In contrast, the SEC has not been as successful in its attempt to ensure 
the effective and responsible operation both of those [securities] markets and of the securi-
ties industry. Id. 
 367. The two best-known SROs are, of course, the NYSE and the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD). 
 368. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 6 SECURITIES REGULATION 2692-2705 (Stock Ex-
changes), 2787-94 (securities associations in general), 2795 n.24 (NASD) (3d 1991). 
 369. GAO, SEC 1986, supra note 364, at 20-29. In addition, the SEC performs cause 
examinations in response to customer complaints or other information. See id. at 20. 
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SROs themselves to examine SRO procedures;370 and reviewing SRO 
proposed rules.371 Insofar as concerns with regulatory capture should 
be considered with the respect to the SEC, they are even more perti-
nent to the SROs, which are membership organizations.372 Nowhere 
do the supporters of Revised Article 8 discuss these issues on either a 
theoretical or an empirical level. 
 Finally, there is an issue of whether the SECs regulation of finan-
cial service firms is comprehensive enough to provide meaningful 
protection to U.S. investors and the financial system.373 Large bro-
ker-dealers have greatly expanded the range of their activities and 
have become members of complex financial institutions,374 while SEC 
regulations have remained focused only on the broker-dealer compo-
nents of financial service firms.375 Without a careful analysis . . . of 
the . . . nature and size of activities done outside broker-dealers it is 
impossible to know what risks are posed by the limited range of SEC 
regulation.376 Of particular relevance to Revised Article 8 is an ex-
amination of the adequacy of net capital rules in light of the change 
in the nature of the business and organizational forms of large bro-
ker-dealers. Although the SEC is working on the issue of regulatory 
coverage, it has made no public report yet.377 As the GAO concluded 
in 1992, Determining the risks these activities pose, and developing 
an appropriate regulatory response, should be done as soon as possi-
ble.378 
                                                                                                                      
 370. See id. at 30-39. 
 371. See id. at 40-47. 
 372. See generally Sam S. Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical 
Examination, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (1985) (describing securities industry SROs and 
problems associated with their operation). 
 373. GAO, SECURITIES FIRMS, supra note 124, at 2.  
 374. See id. at 29-46. 
 375. See id. at 51. 
 376. Id. at 83. 
 377. This is not surprising in light of the GAOs concerns in 1992 that the SEC may 
have already determined, without first collecting and analyzing the data, that just obtain-
ing information is the preferred approach to reforming its regulatory scheme and that the 
SEC has no time frame to implement its approach. Id. at 84-85. To date, all the SEC has 
accomplished is the creation of a risk assessment record keeping and reporting system for 
broker-dealers and their Material Associated Persons. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17h-1T, 17h-2T 
(1999). Similar record keeping and reporting systems have been established for futures 
commission merchants, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.14, 1.15 (1999), and registered government secu-
rities brokers and dealers, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 404.2(b), 405.5 (1999). 
 378. GAO, SECURITIES FIRMS, supra note 124, at 85. The debate over whether regula-
tion of financial derivatives is appropriate and whether there should be a single regulator 
for financial derivatives and securities is a separate, albeit related, debate. See generally 
Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. 
ON REG. 279 (1997) (ascribing persistence of multiple financial regulators to a combination 
of Congressional committee turf protection, lack of widespread public interest in deriva-
tives and an alliance among farm groups, future exchanges and banks); Roberta Romano, 
A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1 (1996) 
(describing current regulatory regimes for derivative securities). 
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 A 1986 GAO study indicates that these empirical issues deserve 
further exploration.379 Although the GAO did not express any serious 
reservations concerning the SECs oversight of SROs, it did note sev-
eral troubling facts. In the early 1980s, the failure rate of SROs in 
detecting broker-dealer securities law violations increased.380 In addi-
tion, it was unclear how serious these violations were, as the SEC 
had no system for tracking the gravity of these violations.381 Most 
importantly for evaluating Revised Article 8, these undetected viola-
tions were most heavily concentrated in recordkeeping, net capital 
computations, miscellaneous provisions of the customer protection 
rule, and financial reporting.382 These are exactly the areas of SEC 
regulation that proponents of Revised Article 8 rely on in arguing 
that investors do not need any substantial independent protection in 
Revised Article 8. It should be noted that the GAO examined the six-
teen failures in 1983 and 1984 of broker-dealers involving the SIPC383 
and found that missed violations were generally not a significant 
factor in the failures.384 This Author is not aware of any authorita-
tive work that updates this eleven-year-old GAO study.385 And with-
out an updated study, what conclusion can be drawn concerning the 
robustness of the SECs oversight of the SROs? 
 Furthermore, the supporters of Revised Article 8 fail to discuss 
the impact of the anti-regulatory movement born in the Reagan ad-
ministration on the SECs ability to function. This is particularly 
surprising considering the extensive scholarly writing on this topic,386 
although not on the SEC in particular. Although the ultimate import 
of this anti-regulatory movement is far from clear,387 it has affected, 
at a minimum, SEC funding and staffing.388 
                                                                                                                      
 379. See GAO, SEC 1986, supra note 364. 
 380. See id. at 21-22 (examining 1982-84). 
 381. See id. at 22-23. 
 382. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted). 
 383. See id. at 15. 
 384. Id. at 26. 
 385. In 1991, another study was released that, by its title, seems to support the conclu-
sion that the SECs oversight procedures work well. See UNITED STATES GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAD/GGD-92-17, SECURITIES REGULATION: CUSTOMER PROTECTION 
RULE OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES APPEAR ADEQUATE (1991). This study, however, only de-
scribed the SEC procedures; it did not attempt to evaluate their effectiveness. See id. at 1. 
 In addition, the study did not evaluate the requirement that broker-dealers establish a 
special reserve bank account for customers. See id. at 4 n.7. Finally, although the total 
number of regulatory violations was not known, the study reported that the SEC, NYSE, 
and NASD have found numerous broker-dealer violations of possession or control require-
ments over the last 3 years. Id. at 7. 
 386. See, e.g., HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 364 (discussing the FTC and EPA); Mi-
chael Fix, Transferring Regulatory Authority to the States, in RELIEF OR REFORM? 207-34 
(George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984). 
 387. While the EPA, for example, suffered significant budgetary cutbacks, reductions 
in enforcement actions, and the near-elimination of new regulations, the institutions and 
policies of the public lobby regime held firm. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 364, at 275. 
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 The decline in the early 1980s in the SECs resources took place 
while the trading volume, transaction numbers, individual investor 
participation, and the number of broker-dealers all increased materi-
ally.389 While the SECs resources have increased since the mid-
1980s,390 they have failed to increase at a rate even remotely compa-
rable to the tremendous growth of the securities markets.391 The lack 
of an increase in SEC resources is particularly troubling because of 
the increased involvement of individual investors in the securities 
markets in the last seven years392 combined with increased trading 
volumes.393 As the GAO noted in 1986, commenting on a similar phe-
nomenon ten years earlier: 
Very recently individual investors have increased their trading, 
encouraged by a continued upward movement of the market. 
Growth in the number of transactions is important because a 
transaction, as the interaction of an investor with market profes-
sionals, is one of the basic activities that must be watched for po-
tential problems.394 
 As a result of these financial constraints, in the mid-1980s, the 
SEC was only able to audit five to eight percent of broker-dealers 
each year through its oversight examination program.395 This is not 
surprising when one realizes that there were only 100 SEC examin-
ers for approximately 8,000 broker-dealers.396 The ratio of examiners 
                                                                                                                      
The Reagan administration had achieved, in this interpretation, temporary regulatory re-
lief rather than lasting regulatory change. Id. But see Fix, supra note 386, at 207-34 (not-
ing that the Reagan administration succeeded in shifting responsibility for certain envi-
ronmental problems to states, which in many areas have not been as activist as the EPA). 
 388. See GAO, SEC 1986, supra note 364, at 58-60. 
 389. See id. 
 390. In fiscal year 1982, the SEC had 1,882 positions and a budget of approximately 
$83 million. See SEC, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT iii-iv. By fiscal year 1994, the SEC had 2,775 
positions and a budget of approximately $256 million. See SEC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 160. 
 391. In the period from 1982 to 1993, looking only at share trading on exchanges, the 
number of shares traded increased from 22,491,935,000 shares to 83,056,237,000 shares, 
see SEC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 155, and the dollar volume increased from 
$603,094,266,000 to $2,610,504,390,000, see id. at 156. 
 392. See Press Release from NASDAQ (Feb. 21, 1997), Number of Investors Has Dou-
bled to 43 Percent in Past Seven Years, According to Comprehensive Shareholder Survey 
(on file with author). This press release headline with its 43 percent figure reported the 
results of a random sample of over 1000 adults. Telephone Interview with Guy Molyneux, 
Peter Hart Associates (July 9, 1997). 
 393. From 1994 to 1996, on the NYSE alone, reported share and dollar volume grew 
from 73,420,401,000 shares and $2,454,241.6 million volume to 104,636,180,000 shares 
and $4,063,054.6 million volume. NYSE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1996 11 (1997). 
 394. GAO, SEC 1986, supra note 364, at 59. 
 395. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-86-26, SECURITIES 
AND FUTURES: HOW THE MARKETS DEVELOPED AND HOW THEY ARE REGULATED 51 (1986). 
 396. See id. The scarcity of SEC resources has led one defense lawyer to propose neat-
ness as a preventive measure because SEC inspectors often must rely on a first impres-
sion of a registrant, based on the appearance of its records, to determine whether an inten-
sive inspection of that registrant is warranted. Richard D. Marshall, SEC Inspections: The 
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to broker-dealers has not changed.397 The SEC has taken several 
steps to use its scarce resources more effectively. It has centralized 
its inspection staff into the Office of Compliance Inspections and Ex-
aminations, whose director reports to the SEC chairman.398 In addi-
tion, the SEC has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with 
certain SROs and the comptroller of the currency to coordinate bro-
ker-dealer inspections and has entered into joint declarations with 
certain overseas securities regulators about inspecting foreign advis-
ers.399 This Author is unaware of any study evaluating the effective-
ness of these measures. 
2.   Specific Rules 
 Finally, mention should be made of problems in the SECs rules 
themselves. This discussion is not meant to serve as a thorough ex-
ploration of potential problems; its goal is merely to indicate that 
there are issues that require thorough study before one can, as do the 
supporters of Revised Article 8, take comfort in the assurance that 
the federal regulatory regime adequately protects small investors. In 
discussing whether the segregation rule could supplant the net capi-
tal rule, the SEC itself has identified a number of theoretical and 
practical problems in the customer protection rule.400 In gaining pos-
session or control of securities, there are pronounced delays.401 In 
addition, examination by the Commission and self-regulatory or-
ganizations have found substantial and continuing violations of Rule 
15c3-3 and an apparent lack of understanding of the rule among 
some brokers and dealers some eight years after the rules adop-
tion.402 Furthermore, many broker-dealers liquidated by the SIPC 
                                                                                                                      
Preventable Prelude to Enforcement Action, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: 
TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 11, 18 (Richard M. Phillips ed., 1997). 
 397. In 1994, [t]he SEC completed a total of 680 examinations, consisting of 478 over-
sight and 202 cause examinations. SEC, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 34. As there were over 
8,600 registered broker-dealers, see id. at 28, in 1994 the SEC conducted oversight exami-
nations of approximately 5.5% of these broker-dealers. The quality of the SECs empirical 
studies of the securities industry has also greatly declined in the past decade. See Joel 
Seligman, Another Unspecial Study: The SECs Market 2000 Report and Competitive De-
velopments in the United States Capital Markets, 50 BUS. LAW. 485, 485-92 (1995) (criticiz-
ing Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market, the SECs most recent overall 
study of the securities markets, for its lack of comprehensiveness, inadequate research and 
presentation of the research that was done and lack of independence of the studys staff). 
This lack of rigor in Market 2000 may be a reflection of deficiencies in the SECs resources. 
At the very least, this lack of rigor cautions against too great a reliance on the SECs for-
mulation of the issues in clearance and settlement of securities and their resolution. 
 398. Establishment of Office and Delegation of Authority to Administer Functions, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-36031 (July 28, 1995), 60 Fed. Reg. 39,643 (1995). 
 399. See Marshall, supra note 396, at 25-26. 
 400. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers; Amended Rules, Exchange 
Act Release 34-18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 3512, 3514 (1982). 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
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did not make the required deposits as they approached financial dif-
ficulty.403 Finally, the SEC noted that the calculation of the Reserve 
Formula is only done weekly, and the required deposit is made three 
calendar days later.404 
 The segregation rule also allows a broker-dealer to oversecure a 
margin loan by forty percent. In practical terms, this means that a 
broker-dealer does not have to obtain physical possession or control 
of securities whose market value is equal to this forty percent.405 
 The hypothecation rules406 contain their own problems. For exam-
ple, two of the general prohibitions of Rules 8c-1 and 15c2-1 only ap-
ply when a customers securities have not been commingled with 
those of the broker-dealer or other customers.407 In addition, the third 
general provision of the two hypothecation rules only protects cus-
tomers against hypothecations that exceed[ ] the aggregate indebt-
edness of all customers.408 As the leading securities law treatise 
notes, theoretically, a broker-dealer owed $100,000 in margin ac-
counts by all customers could hypothecate one customers securities 
                                                                                                                      
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. The SEC was summarizing Rule 15c3-3(e)(3). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(3) 
(1999). Until the late 1980s, the securities industry used the weekly deposit requirement to 
reduce its weekly reserve requirements. Broker-dealers would obtain loans secured by cus-
tomer securities on the next business day after the weekly rule 15c3-3(e) calculation. These 
loans would be repaid with unsecured loans just before the weekly calculation. This proc-
ess was repeated each week. See Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 Both the SEC and the SROs took actions to close this loophole. In 1986 the SEC began 
investigating this practice and in 1987 brought a proceeding against a broker-dealer for 
exploiting this loophole. See In re Underwood, Newhaus & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 
34-25531, 40 S.E.C. Docket 785 (Mar. 30, 1988). In the appeal from this proceeding, the 
Second Circuit held that, although this pay down practice was in literal compliance with 
Rule 15c3-3(e), the SEC was entitled to make a broad interpretation that would reduce the 
substantial risk customers were exposed to for most of the week. See Upton, 75 F.3d at 
97. In 1989, the NYSE notified its members that this pay-down practice could violate Rule 
15c3-3(e). See NYSE, Broker-Dealer Censured for Violation of SEC Rule 15c3-3 and Dis-
cussion of the Intent and Objective of the Rule, Interpretation Memo 89-10 (Aug. 23, 1989). 
 405. Rule 15c3-3(a)(5) defines excess margin securities as those securities referred to 
in paragraph (a)(4) of this section [defining margin securities] carried for the account of a 
customer having a market value in excess of 140 percent of the total of the debit balances 
in the customers account or accounts encompassed by paragraph (a)(4). 17 C.F.R. § 
240.15c3-3(a)(5) (1999). The 140% comes from bank lending practices at the time of enact-
ment of Rule 15c3-3. If a bank would only loan 75% of the fair market value of a security, it 
required approximately $140 worth of securities to secure a $100 loan. See WOLFSON ET 
AL., supra note 348, at ¶ 7.02[1][a] n.22. 
 406. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.8c-1 (1999); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1 (1999). Two rules, both 
identical in language, were adopted because section 8 of the 1934 Act applies only to a reg-
istered broker or dealer, member of a national securities exchange, or broker or dealer who 
transacts a business in securities through the medium of any member of a national securi-
ties exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1994) (emphasis added), while section 15 applies to any 
manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance by any broker or 
dealer in connection with any transaction in . . . any security . . . otherwise than on a na-
tional securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 407. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1(a)(1), (a)(2); 240.15c2-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (1999). 
 408. Id. §§ 240.8c-1(a)(3); 240.15c2-1(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
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for that sum even though that one customer owed a much lesser 
amount.409 Customers are not necessarily left without legal protec-
tion in these situations. Rule 15c3-3, the segregation rule, may over-
ride the hypothecation rules through its requirements that a broker 
or dealer shall promptly obtain and shall thereafter maintain the 
physical possession or control of all fully-paid securities and excess 
margin securities carried by a broker or dealer for the account of cus-
tomers.410 Some commentators have read the segregation rule and 
the hypothecation rules in this way.411 But it should be noted that the 
SEC also proposed amendments to the hypothecation rules in 1971, 
the same release first proposing Rule 15c3-3, that would have re-
stricted hypothecation or stock lending in a manner consistent with 
Rule 15c3-3.412 The SEC, however, never adopted these restrictions. 
Accordingly, it is just as consistent with the regulatory history to ar-
gue that the hypothecation rules override the segregation rule as it is 
to assert the converse. Due to the conflict between Rule 15c3-3 and 
the hypothecation rules, it is possible that whatever protection exists 
is afforded by state, not federal, law.413 The irony of this legal situa-
tion would probably be lost on supporters of Revised Article 8, as 
they have such an a priori faith in the efficacy of SEC regulation. 
 Not only are there gaps in the SECs rules that could affect inves-
tors, but the enforcement of these rules rests with the SEC and the 
SROs. Courts have been unsympathetic to plaintiffs bringing private 
causes of action under the segregation or hypothecation rules.414 Al-
though rare exceptions exist,415 most courts have held, under a vari-
ety of factual circumstances and legal theories, that section 15 of the 
1934 Act does not give rise to a private cause of action.416 The empiri-
                                                                                                                      
 409. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 7 SECURITIES REGULATION 3190 n.180 (3d ed. 
1991). This problem was identified at least as early as 1971, see BARUCH, supra note 342, 
at 55-56, but was not remedied in the SECs rulemaking following the passage of SIPA. 
 410. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(1) (1999). 
 411. See, e.g., Bloomenthal & Salcito, supra note 348, at 168. 
 412. See Reserves and Related Measures Respecting the Financial Responsibility of 
Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release 34-9388 (Nov. 23, 1971), 36 Fed. Reg. 22,312, 
22,313-14 (1971). 
 413. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 409, at 3189-90. 
 414. Id. at 3160 n.112 (Rule 15c3-3), 3179 n.158 (section 8(b) and Rule 8c-1). 
 415. See, e.g., Gotshall v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 675, 678 (N.D. Ill. 
1988). 
 416. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1578 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1043 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 
677 F.2d 1301, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1982); Kidder Peabody & Co. v. Unigestion Intl, Ltd., 903 
F. Supp. 479, 493-95 (S.D.N.Y 1995); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848, 
857-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Section 17 of the 1934 Act and its record keeping requirements 
also do not create a private cause of action. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U.S. 560, 571 (1979); accord Continental Bank, Natl Assn v. Village of Ludlow, 777 F. 
Supp. 92, 103 (D. Mass. 1991); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 727 F. Supp. 1182, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 
1989), affd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 1994); Deutsch v. Integrated Barter 
Intl, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 194, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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cal evaluation of the SECs and SROs effectiveness in enforcing the 
various rules promulgated under section 15 becomes even more cru-
cial in light of inability of private litigants to enforce these rules. 
Therefore, the lack of any serious study by the supporters of Revised 
Article 8 of such enforcement activities becomes even more problem-
atic. 
IX.   SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT 
 This Article does not attempt an in-depth review and discussion of 
SIPA and the SIPC. Rather, it highlights a number of practical prob-
lems in the SIPCs administration of SIPA that proponents of Re-
vised Article 8 have ignored. In addition, the interaction of Revised 
Article 8 and SIPA creates a number of legal issues that cast doubt 
on the continued effectiveness of insurance coverage. 
 The first practical problem is the size of the SIPC Fund, which is 
based on questionable assumptions. The preconception that the SIPC 
is a back-up to the SECs regulatory regime417 accounts for the SIPCs 
assumption that it will never have to liquidate more than one major 
broker-dealer418 within a short period of time. In addition, the SIPC 
has assumed that any failed broker-dealer would have complied with 
the SECs possession and control rules and that, therefore, there 
would be no shortfall in customer securities.419 Based on these as-
sumptions, the SIPC has set $1 billion as its goal for the SIPC 
Fund.420 
 The assumption that only one large broker-dealer can fail at one 
time is based on a further assumption that there is no systemic risk 
involving broker-dealers. If the potential occurrence of the domino ef-
fect predicted by the systemic risk theory was real, then more than 
one large broker-dealer could fail at one time. The fact that the SIPC 
                                                                                                                      
 417. See supra Part VIII. 
 418. See GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 44. 
 419. See id. at 45. On the other hand, the SIPC has made certain other, more conserva-
tive, assumptions, including that the failed broker-dealers capital would be depleted to 
the point that its required reserves would be exhausted and that the trustee would not re-
cover any portion of the broker-dealers partially secured and unsecured receivables. Id. 
 420. See id. at 44. In addition, the SIPC has a bank line of credit of $1 billion, see id. at 
19, and the ability to borrow an additional $1 billion from the SEC, which in turn would 
borrow the funds from the Department of the Treasury, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ddd(g)(h) 
(1994). Although the SIPC has set the size of the SIPA Fund to accommodate the liquida-
tion of a single major broker-dealer, the SIPC has made no special arrangement for liqui-
dating such a broker-dealer. See GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 54. This lack of preparation 
is striking because, as of 1992, the largest SIPC liquidation had involved processing only 
61,000 customer claims while, in 1990, there were over fifty securities firms with more 
than 100,000 customers accounts. See id. In addition, the SIPC is a minuscule agency with 
a mere twenty-nine staff members in 1996. See SIPC, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 4. These are 
hardly the numbers needed for a major liquidation. 
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is overseen by the SEC,421 one of the prime movers behind Revised 
Article 8 and presumably a subscriber to the systemic risk theory, 
lends a certain irony to the SIPCs position. 
 The GAO has criticized the second assumption behind the size of 
the SIPA Fund. In view of the prevalence of fraud in past smaller 
SIPC liquidations, we believe that the possibility of fraud or of a seri-
ous breakdown of internal controls cannot be ruled out, even though 
SEC contends that these controls are monitored more closely in lar-
ger broker-dealers.422 
 The final practical problem with SIPA is the exclusion from its 
coverage of certain financial intermediaries that have access to cus-
tomer funds and securities.423 In raising this issue in its 1992 report, 
the GAO did not estimate the parameters of this issue (e.g., number 
of customers affected, typical size of securities holding, etc.), al-
though it did note that, in the last 5 years, 26 of 39 SIPC liquida-
tions involved failures resulting from fraud on the part of introducing 
                                                                                                                      
 421. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(e) (1994). In 1992, the GAO criticized the SEC for not paying 
sufficient attention to its SIPC oversight responsibilities. GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 
61. 
 422. GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 45. The uniform net capital rule finally adopted in 
1975 was intended to both enhance the protection of customer funds and securities held 
by broker-dealers . . . [and] to protect the SIPC fund by requiring all broker-dealers to op-
erate under a sound capital base. Net Capital Rule: Proposed Uniform and Comprehen-
sive Regulation, Exchange Act Release 34-9891 (Dec. 5, 1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 56 (1973). In 
1982 the SEC significantly reduced the net capital requirements of broker-dealer using the 
Alternative Capital Method (ACM). See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Deal-
ers; Amended Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 
3512 (1982). At the same time, haircuts (required discounts in calculating reserve capital) 
were increased on most debt securities and preferred stock. See Net Capital Requirements 
for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-18737 (May 13, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 
21,759 (1982). In 1985, only a minority of broker-dealers used ACM, but this minority in-
cluded most of the large broker-dealers. See SEC, THE FINANCING AND REGULATORY 
CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 60 ex. 13, 68 ex. 18 (1985). The net effect of 
the 1982 amendments was to reduce the required regulatory capital of broker-dealers by 
over $550 million. See id. at 14. By these amendments the Commission intended to give 
broker-dealers greater freedom to use capital where it can be most productive. Id.  
 423. See id. at 68-69. All persons registered with the SEC under section 15(b) of the 
1934 Act are members of SIPC unless they fall into an excluded category. See 15 U.S.C. § 
78ccc(a)(2)(1994). SIPC membership includes: 
all persons registered as brokers or dealers under section 78o(b) of this title, 
other than 
(i) persons whose principal business, in the determination of SIPC, taking into 
account business of affiliated entities, is conducted outside the United States 
and its territories and possessions; and 
(ii) persons whose business as a broker or dealer consists exclusively of (I) the 
distribution of shares of registered open and investment companies or unit in-
vestment trusts, (II) the sale of variable annuities, (III) the business of insur-
ance, or (IV) the business of rendering investment advisory services to one or 
more registered investment companies or insurance company separate ac-
counts. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
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firms that did not retain customer accounts.424 Although applicable 
state law may require government securities brokers or dealers to be 
SIPC members, federal law does not.425 In a 1990 report, the GAO 
noted that most broker-dealers that deal in government securities 
are registered under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act and, therefore, are 
members of SIPC.426 A small group of specialist dealers, some of 
which can hold customer funds and securities, are not SIPC mem-
bers.427 Finally, there is a group of bank dealers that are not SIPC 
members,428 and that may hold customer cash and securities.429 As 
with the 1992 report, the GAO in its 1990 report provided no esti-
mates of the potential size of the risk represented by these specialist 
and bank dealers. 
 All that this Article means to suggest by the foregoing cursory re-
view of SIPA and the practical operations of the SIPC is that the 
adequacy of the insurance coverage for investors whose securities 
and cash is held by financial intermediaries is unclear. Certainly, the 
GAOs conclusion that the regulatory framework within which SIPC 
operates has thus far been successful in protecting customers while 
at the same time limiting SIPCs losses430 must be read as what it is, 
a statement of past history and not a prediction of the future.431 
                                                                                                                      
 424. GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 69. 
 425. See Don & Wang, supra note 338, at 513 n.22. 
 426. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-114, U.S. 
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES: MORE TRANSACTION INFORMATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 
MEASURES ARE NEEDED 5, 25-26, 60-61 (1990). By July 1989, 1,496 diversified securities 
firms that were already registered with the SEC had updated their registration with the 
SEC on a revised form that better described the firms government securities activities. 
Id. at 25. 
 427. See id. at 60-61. In July 1989, this consisted of a total of sixty-three specialist 
firms, twenty of which could hold customer funds and securities. See id. at 26, 60. 
 428. See id. at 27. In July 1989, there were 281 registered bank dealers. See id. at 26. 
 429. See id. at 26 n.3. There is no FDIA coverage for shortfalls of securities although 
there may be insurance coverage under the FDIA for cash up to $100,000 held by an in-
sured bank. Similarly, if a bank failed, securities held for a customer would be returned to 
that customer . . . . Bank customers would appear, however, to have less protection than 
under SIPC if a bank failed, a customers securities were missing, and the bank was liqui-
dated rather than merged into another institution. Id. at 62. 
 430. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 431. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1538 (quoting the GAOs conclusion without any dis-
cussion of the GAOs concerns); see also Mooney, supra note 114, at 313 (relying upon SIPA 
to argue that [a]n upper-tier priority rule would neither pit the rich against the poor nor 
the large and sophisticated against the small and unsophisticated). Professor Mooney also 
states that the private insurance maintained by many securities firms provides addi-
tional protection to customers. Id. at 313 n.8. In coming to this conclusion, he ignores the 
criticism of private insurance made by the GAO. See GAO 1992, supra note 348, at 51-52. 
As the GAO notes: 
[h]istorical experience with private insurance plans, like the excess customer 
protection insurance coverage carried by many major broker-dealers, has 
shown that coverage frequently cannot be obtained when it is needed most. For 
example, private insurance coverage for customers with account values above 
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 In addition, the defined term customer has been given a re-
stricted reading by the courts in situations where the customers are 
trustees acting on behalf of numerous beneficiaries. This reading, in 
turn, deprives these customers of access to the SIPA Fund. In SIPC 
v. Morgan, Kennedy & Co.,432 the Second Circuit held that the trus-
tees of a profit-sharing plan constituted a single customer under 
SIPA.433 Although there were 108 employee-beneficiaries of the plan, 
only one recovery by the trustees was allowed.434 The effect of this 
holding was to give each employee-beneficiary an interest in a recov-
ery limited to what a single customer could receive. The Second Cir-
cuit noted that an analogy to the Federal Deposit Insurance Acts 
protection of customer accounts was inappropriate.435 SIPA does treat 
                                                                                                                      
SIPC coverage limits was not renewed at either Drexel or Thomson McKinnon 
before their closing.  
Id. 
 432. 533 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 433. See id. at 1318 (The financial relationship, insofar as the Plan is concerned, was 
entirely between the beneficiaries and their employer, not the broker-dealer.). 
 434. See id. at 1321. 
 435. See id. at 1318 (We cannot accept appellees analogy of the two statutes in the 
case at bar. SIPA and FDIA are independent statutory schemes. . . .). As the Second Cir-
cuit noted, certain predecessor bills to SIPA had provided for a separate recovery by each 
beneficial owner of an account with an insolvent broker-dealer but these provisions had 
disappeared in the final, enacted bill. See id. at 1318 n.8. In fact, the first predecessor bills 
had explicitly provided that: 
[SPIC] shall not be required to recognize as the owner of any portion of a cus-
tomer account or insured liability appearing on the records of a closed insured 
broker or insured dealer under a name other than that of the claimant, any 
person whose name or interest as such owner is not disclosed on the records of 
such closed broker or dealer as part owner of said customer account or insured 
liability, if such recognition would increase the aggregate amount of the in-
sured customer accounts or insured liability in such closed broker or dealer. 
S. 2348, 91st Cong. § 7(d) (June 9, 1969); H.R. 13308, 91st Cong. § 7(d) (Aug. 4, 1969) (em-
phasis added). The subsequent Senate bills dropped this restriction, providing that each 
customer of a broker-dealer or bank that had an account with a debtor under SIPA would 
be considered a separate customer of the debtor if the books and records of the debtor or 
. . . the books and records of the broker-dealer or bank establish that the claims of such 
broker or dealer or bank arise out of transactions for customers of such broker or dealer or 
bank. S. 2348, 91st Cong. § 11(c) (Sept. 21, 1970); accord S. 2348, 91st Cong. § 2 (June 18, 
1970) (proposing a new section 35(i)(8) to the 1934 Act); S. 3988, 91st Cong. § 2 (June 18, 
1970) (proposing a new section 35(j) to the 1934 Act); S. 3989, 91st Cong. § 2 (June 18, 
1970) (proposing a new section 35 (j)(8) to the 1934 Act). 
 Under FDIA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et. seq. (1997), in contrast, employee beneficiaries of a 
trust, similar to the trust in question in the Morgan, Kennedy case, would be treated as in-
dividual customers for purposes of determining the limit of insurance coverage. Section 
1821(a)(1)(B) provides that the net amount due to any depositor at an insured depository 
institution shall not exceed $100,000 as determined in accordance with subparagraphs (C) 
and (D). 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (1997). Subparagraph (D) states that coverage is pro-
vided on a pro rata or pass-through basis to a participant in or beneficiary of an employee 
benefit plan. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(D) (1997). For a definition of an employee benefit plan, 
one has to look to section 1821(a)(8)(B)(ii), which provides that an employee benefit plan 
has the same meaning given to that term found in section 1002(3) of the Employment Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et. seq. (1988).  
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each customer of a broker or dealer or bank as a separate cus-
tomer of the debtor when the net equity claim of the broker or 
dealer or bank arises out of transactions for customers.436 But the 
failure to similarly protect beneficiaries of a trust is a glaring omis-
sion that cautions against placing too much reliance on quick analo-
gies to FDIC insurance. 
 These practical and definitional concerns are exacerbated by the 
legal issues that Revised Article 8 raises with respect to SIPA. Al-
though Professor Rogers attempts to separate discussion of Revised 
Article 8 from that of SIPA, Revised Article 8 has the potential of 
greatly weakening SIPAs protection of individual customers. This 
weakening arises from the disparity between the conceptions of the 
property interest held by customers of broker-dealers underlying 
SIPA and Revised Article 8. Revised Article 8 is based on the concept 
that in almost all cases when a customer holds her investment as-
sets in an account at a securities intermediary, she will be deemed 
not to be the direct holder of such assets, but a holder of this new sui 
generis property right created by Part 5 of Revised Article 8.437 In 
contrast, SIPA is based on concepts of possession and constructive 
possession. In a liquidation, customers covered by SIPA receive pref-
erence over any creditors of the bankrupt SIPC member with respect 
to customer name securities and, more importantly, customer 
property. Customer name securities438 correspond roughly to what 
Revised Article 8 defines as a security,439 when that security has 
been registered to a customer. In the indirect holding system, few se-
curities are customer name securities. 
 SIPAs broader category of customer property covers cash and se-
curities (except customer name securities delivered to the customer) 
                                                                                                                      
 Section 1821(a)(3) makes it clear that the pass-through basis described in 1821(a)(1)(D) 
insures in an amount not to exceed $100,000 per participant per insured depository insti-
tution. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (a)(3)(A) (1997) (emphasis added). Section 1821(a)(3)(B) supports 
this, stating that the amount aggregated for insurance coverage . . . shall consist of the 
present vested and ascertainable interest of each participant under the plan. 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(a)(3)(b) (1997) (emphasis added). 
 Assuming that a plan is an employee benefit plan, FDIC insurance provides better pro-
tection for the beneficiaries of a trust deposited with a bank than SIPA provides for simi-
larly situated beneficial owners of securities. 
 436. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a)(5) (1994). 
 437. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism about Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 455, 522 n.210 (1996). 
 438. The SIPA defines customer name securities as  
securities which were held for the account of a customer on the filing date by or 
on behalf of the debtor and which on the filing date were registered in the name 
of the customer, or were in the process of being so registered pursuant to in-
structions from the debtor, but does not include securities registered in the 
name of the customer which, by endorsement or otherwise, were in negotiable 
form. 
15 U.S.C. § 78lll(3) (1994). 
 439. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-102(a)(15). 
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at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account of a 
debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer.440 Under 
SIPA, the term securities is roughly congruent with the defined 
term security441 in Revised Article 8.442 This creates a definitional 
problem:443 it is possible that a securities intermediary under Revised 
Article 8 may hold no securities, as such term is defined in SIPA. It 
may hold only security entitlements or a combination of securities 
and security entitlements. Such security entitlements, however, 
would presumably fall under the catch all provisions of SIPAs defini-
tion of customer property: any other property of the debtor which, 
upon compliance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations, would 
have been set aside or held for the benefit of customers.444 Assuming 
that applicable laws would be construed to include Revised Article 
8, a securities intermediary could hold a security entitlement for cus-
tomers, as required under SIPA, because the securities intermediary, 
under Revised Article 8, would be holding such security entitlement 
for entitlement holders [t]o the extent necessary for a securities in-
termediary to satisfy all security entitlements with respect to a par-
ticular financial asset . . . .445 This set aside applies to all interests in 
financial assets held by a securities intermediary, not just financial 
assets themselves, and, therefore, would cover a securities interme-
diarys own security entitlements. Insofar as a court were to use Re-
vised Article 8 to construe SIPA, either by applying the applicable 
law phrase of the catch all provision to the entire definition of cus-
                                                                                                                      
 440. 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(4) (1994) (emphasis added). Proceeds of customer property, in-
cluding proceeds derived from unlawful conversion, are also customer property. See id. 
 441. The term security is defined as 
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, any 
collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
able share, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit, certificate of deposit 
for a security, any investment contract or certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or mineral royalty or lease (if 
such investment contract or interest is the subject of a registration statement 
with the Commission pursuant to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 
[15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.]), any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any se-
curity, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based 
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into 
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase or sell any of the 
foregoing, and any other instrument commonly known as a security. Except as 
specifically provided above, the term security does not include any currency, 
or any commodity or related contract or futures contract, or any warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase or sell any of the foregoing. 
15 U.S.C. § 78lll(14) (1994). 
 442. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-102(a)(15). 
 443. This argument is an elaboration of one set forth by Professor Schroeder. See 
Schroeder, supra note 31, at 486-87. 
 444. 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(4)(D) (1994). 
 445. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-503(a). 
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tomer property,446 or by directly construing the phrase at any time 
received, acquired, or held by or for the account of a debtor from or 
for the securities account of a customer in the definition,447 Revised 
Article 8 would dramatically change the meaning of customer prop-
erty. 
 This change would arise from the exception for certain creditors of 
a securities intermediary that revised section 8-503 makes to the set 
aside for entitlement holders.448 The exception is for creditors of a se-
curities intermediary that have control over the pertinent financial 
asset449 and for creditors of a clearing corporation that have a secu-
rity interest in the pertinent financial asset.450 Insofar as these two 
categories of creditors have a claim upon certain financial assets, 
these financial assets are no longer available to entitlement holders 
under Revised Article 8 and, presumably, no longer customer prop-
erty under SIPA. The corpus of customer property under SIPA, there-
fore, can be diminished by unilateral action by a securities interme-
diary, even unilateral action that is in violation of its obligations un-
der revised section 8-504451 and the applicable SEC rules.452 
 Nor does a securities intermediary have to violate its obligations 
in order to pledge customer securities. Even a securities intermedi-
ary that is in compliance with revised section 8-504 and the applica-
ble SEC rules may pledge customer securities to secure loans made 
to customers. The SECs segregation and hypothecation rules over-
ride revised section 8-504 insofar as revised section 8-504 requires a 
securities intermediary to obtain and thereafter maintain a finan-
cial asset and these requirements are the subject of SEC rules.453 
The SECs hypothecation rules allow free hypothecation of customer 
securities in amounts that do not exceed aggregate customer debt to 
                                                                                                                      
 446. See Schroeder, supra note 31, at 486. 
 447. See, e.g., SEC v. Aberdeen Sec. Co., 480 F.2d 1121, 1127 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding 
that local law or applicable regulations should be used to determine meaning of the 
term obligations in section 6(g) of the 1970 version of SIPA). 
 448. Revised section 8-503(a) explicitly states that financial assets necessary to meet 
claims of entitlement holders are not subject to claims of creditors of the securities inter-
mediary, except as otherwise provided in Section 8-511. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 
2, § 8-503(a). 
 449. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-511(b). See supra Part VI.B.1. for a dis-
cussion of control creditors. 
 450. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-511(c). See supra Part VI.C. for a dis-
cussion of secured creditors and clearing corporations. 
 451. Revised section 8-504 sets forth a securities intermediarys obligation to promptly 
obtain and thereafter maintain a financial asset in a quantity corresponding to the aggre-
gate of all security entitlements it has established in favor of its entitlement holders with 
respect to that financial asset. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-504(a). 
 452. Schroeder, supra note 31, at 490. 
 453. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, §§ 8-504(a), 8-509(a). If the substance of a 
duty imposed upon a securities intermediary by Sections 8-504 through 8-508 is the subject 
of other statute, regulation, or rule, compliance with that statute, regulation, or rule satis-
fies the duty. Id. § 8-509(a). 
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the broker-dealer,454 while the segregation rules allow the hypotheca-
tion of margin securities other than excess margin securities. Setting 
aside the issue of how these two sets of rules coordinate,455 the hy-
pothecation rules allow considerable leeway to securities intermedi-
aries in pledging their customers securities. 
 The argument made by proponents of Revised Article 8, that the 
SIPC only has to cover shortfalls in securities holdings and, there-
fore, that the current $500,000 insurance limit for each customer is 
more than adequate,456 looks suspect when one realizes that the cate-
gory of customer property has been severely restricted by Revised Ar-
ticle 8. Only if customer property is not materially depleted by the 
claims of control creditors of securities intermediaries or secured 
creditors of clearing corporations does the concern about the ade-
quacy of SIPA coverage for individual investors disappear.457 
 A more farfetched concern is raised by Revised Article 8s recon-
ceptualization of an entitlement holders property interest in a secu-
rity entitlement. Insofar as it could be plausibly argued that this 
property interest is now only a contractual right of the entitlement 
holder against his or her securities intermediary, the SIPC could ar-
gue, in a liquidation proceeding, that the entitlement holder is not 
eligible for protection under SIPA. Numerous cases under SIPA have 
held that the contractual or securities law claims of a customer of a 
SIPC member that is being liquidated do not, in and of themselves, 
give rise to claims under SIPA.458 In coming to this conclusion, the 
                                                                                                                      
 454. See supra text accompanying notes 407-08. 
 455. See supra text accompanying notes 409-12. 
 456. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1538 n.161. 
 457. Professor Guttmans point that SIPA coverage is inadequate to protect many in-
vestors, especially professionals dependent on such investments as nest eggs for their re-
tirement, Guttman, supra note 201, at 18, remains a valid one, despite Professor Rogers 
dismissal of it, see Rogers, supra note 7, at 1538 n.161. 
 458. See, e.g., In re Stalvey & Assoc., Inc., 750 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs 
customer status in the course of some dealings with a broker will not confer that status 
upon other dealings, no matter how intimately related, unless those other dealings also fall 
within the ambit of the statute); SEC v. S.J. Salmon & Co., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 867, 870 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (rescission claim based on fraudulently induced securities purchases is not 
a customer claim under SIPA); In re Oberweis Sec., Inc., 135 B.R. 842, 846 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1991) (a failure to execute an order to buy securities . . . is not a customer claim pro-
tected by the SIPA) (citation omitted); In re Bell & Beckwith, 124 B.R. 35, 36 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1990) (fraudulent inducement to a purchase is not a customer claim even when 
plaintiff had another valid customer claim); In re Govt Sec. Corp., 90 B.R. 539, 542 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (mark-up paid to broker-dealer for a securities purchase does not 
give rise to a claim under SIPA whether it was paid unknowingly, or by reason of non-
disclosure or by reason of actual fraud); In re MV Sec., Inc., 48 B.R. 156, 160-61 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (claim of fraud or overreaching is not a customer claim); SEC v. Invest-
ment Sec. Corp., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 453, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1976) (Persons having 
claims for damages on account of breach of contract, or for damages arising out of tortious 
conduct where a trust fund or trust property is not created by that tortious conduct, are 
not customers within the meaning of [SIPA].); SEC v. Howard Lawrence & Co., 1 Bankr. 
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courts have relied upon both the requirements of the definition of 
customer459 and upon the policies behind SIPA.460 A customer un-
der SIPA is a person who has a claim on account of securities re-
ceived, acquired or held by the debtor.461 In turn, a security is de-
fined as a type of instrument.462 Whatever securities entitlements 
are, they are not instruments. The policy arguments, which focus on 
who SIPA was meant to protect,463 do not lend themselves so easily to 
a restrictive meaning for customer. Under either approach, the 
courts have shown, however, a great hesitancy in expanding SIPA 
coverage, even if a category of claimants meet the literal require-
ments of SIPAs definition of customer.464 The same issue of 
whether to take a liberal or conservative approach to the definition of 
customer also is reflected in cases involving repurchase agreement 
buyers who do not take possession of the underlying securities and 
whose counterparties are liquidated under SIPA.465 
 As with the 1934 Acts segregation and hypothecation rules,466 
customers of broker-dealers have to depend upon the regulatory 
agencies to ensure that the SIPC carries out its statutory duties. 
Only the SEC has the right to obtain judicial review of the refusal of 
SIPC to commit its funds or otherwise to act for the protection of cus-
tomers of any member of SIPC.467 Customers do not have this 
right.468 The lack of any study of the SIPA by supporters of Revised 
                                                                                                                      
Ct. Dec. (CCR) 577, 579 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1975) (The SIPA does not protect customer 
claims based on fraud or breach of contract.). 
 459. See, e.g., In re Stalvey & Assoc., Inc., 750 F.2d at 472. 
 460. See, e.g., SEC v. S.J. Salmon & Co., Inc., 375 F. Supp. at 867. 
 461. 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(2) (1994). 
 462. Id. at § 78lll(14). 
 463. See SEC v. F.O. Baroff Co., 497 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1974) (indicating that Con-
gress intended to protect only public customer[s] and trading customers); SEC v. S.J. 
Salmon & Co., 375 F. Supp. at 871 (The principal purpose of [SIPA] was to protect inves-
tors against financial losses arising from the insolvency of their brokers). 
 464. See, e.g., In re Stalvey & Assoc., Inc., 750 F.2d at 472 (Judicial interpretations of 
customer status support a narrow interpretation of the SIPAs provisions.). 
 465. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repur-
chase Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 
1037-42 (1996) (discussing case law involving broker-dealer liquidations under Chapter 7 
and SIPA and repurchase agreements). The cases have split on whether such buyers are 
customers under SIPA. Id. at 1040-42. 
 466. See supra Part VIII.A.2. 
 467. 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1994). 
 468. SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 425 (1975). In holding that customers of SIPC 
members do not have an implied private right of action under the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act of 1970 . . . to compel the SIPC to exercise its statutory authority for their bene-
fit, id. at 413-14, the Barbour Court explained the policy behind its holding in the follow-
ing way: 
Except with respect to the solidest of houses, the mere filing of an action predi-
cated upon allegations of financial insecurity might often prove fatal. Other 
customers could not be expected to leave their cash and securities on deposit, 
nor other brokers to initiate new transactions that the firm might not be able to 
cover when due if a receiver is appointed, nor would suppliers be likely to con-
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Article 8 becomes more troubling given the procedural limitations on 
enforcement of what are already substantively problematic statutory 
provisions. 
X.   THE REVISION PROCESS LEADING TO REVISED ARTICLE 8 
 Professor Rogers refers a number of times to the generalist law-
yers involved in the drafting process to answer any concern that Re-
vised Article 8 is the creation of a small group of financial industry 
participants. This group of generalist lawyers is Professor Rogers 
most powerful argument that individual investors interests were 
thoroughly considered and were protected in the drafting process.469 
 Starting with the 1988 ABA report that was the progenitor of Re-
vised Article 8, the process of revising 1977 Article 8 was dominated 
by representations of major corporate law firms, federal regulators of 
the securities and banking industries, and SROs in the securities in-
dustry. Of the seventeen members of the ABAs Advisory Committee 
on Settlement of Market Transaction, five were current or former 
partners of major American corporate law firms;470 four came from 
                                                                                                                      
tinue dealing with such a firm. These consequences are too grave, and when 
unnecessary, too inimical to the purposes of the Act, for the Court to impute to 
Congress an intent to grant to every member of the investing public control 
over their occurrence. On the contrary, they seem to be the very sorts of consid-
erations that motivated Congress to put the SIPC in the hands of a public 
board of directors, responsible to an agency experienced in regulation of the se-
curities markets. 
Id. at 422-23 (footnotes omitted). The Barbour Court did leave open the issue of whether, 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, a determination by the SEC not to bring an ac-
tion against the SIPC might be reviewable . . . for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 425 n.7. 
There has been no case law that addresses this issue. 
 469. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1433, 1544-45. Professor Norman I. Silber criticizes this 
type of argument: 
It does not suffice to assert that an interest has been adequately considered be-
cause of the inclusion of the personal sympathies of individuals with other dis-
tinctive formal roles and responsibilitiesespecially roles that require them to 
try to separate themselves from such sympathies . . . . In the securities case, the 
fact that some drafters had their own stock portfolios tells us little or nothing 
about whether they represented the interests of consumers. 
Norman I. Silber, Consumer Participation in the Law-Drafting Process: Past, Present, and 
Future, 9 ADVANCING THE CONSUMER INTEREST 27, 28 (1997). 
 470. Robert Haydock, Jr., (Bingham, Dana & Gould), Stephen H. Case and Richard B. 
Smith (both Davis Polk & Wardwell), George P. Haley (Pillsbury Madison & Sutro), and 
Robert C. Mendelson (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius). Bingham, Dana & Gould represents 
Bank of Boston Corp. and Liberty Financial Cos. Ltd. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Skadden, 
Arps Leads in Financial Survey Again, NATL L.J., June 17, 1996, at C2. Davis Polk & 
Wardwell counts among its most important clients J. P. Morgan & Co. Inc., Merrill Lynch 
& Co. Inc., Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter, Discover & Co., Aetna Inc., Donaldson, Lufkin & 
Jenrette, SunAmerica Inc., and The Chubb Corp. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro represents 
BankAmerica Corp., Wells Fargo & Co., Union Bancal Corp., Westamerica Bancorp., and 
Lincoln Natl Corp. And Morgan, Lewis & Bockius represents CoreStates Financial Corp., 
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., General Reinsurance Corp., and Charles Schwab Corp. See Mar-
garet Cronin Fisk, Who Represents Financial America; New York Megafirms Lead Finan-
cial Field, NATL L. J., Oct. 13, 1997, at C3. 
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the counsels offices of federal agencies;471 three came from the coun-
sels offices of SROs;472 and two were academics.473 
 The drafting committee for Revised Article 8 was more broadly 
representative of the legal community and contained practicing law-
yers with a variety of backgrounds. Although they were not lawyers 
from The American Lawyers listing of the 100 most important corpo-
rate law firms, as of 1997, they were members of regional law firms 
with not less than nine attorneys,474 with the median being twenty-
seven attorneys.475 Judging by their current Martindale-Hubbell en-
tries, although at least four were litigators, not one was a plaintiffs 
lawyer476 or a consumer advocate. Three members of the drafting 
                                                                                                                      
 471. Jonathan Kallman (SEC), Andrea M. Corcoran (Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission), Ernest T. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), and Virginia Rutledge 
(Treasury Department). 
 472. Dennis Dutterer (Board of Trade Clearing Corp.), Richard G. Ketchum (NASD), 
and Richard B. Nesson (The Depository Trust Company). 
 473. Professor Egon Guttman (American University, Washington College of Law), and 
Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania School of Law). An early 
draft of Professor Mooneys influential article advocating a complete revision of 1977 Arti-
cle 8, Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities 
Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305 (1990), was published in October 
1989 as part of a contractor report on clearance and settlement prepared by Bankers Trust 
Company for the Office of Technology Assessment. See 2 BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, supra 
note 70, at 157. Professor Mooney brought his own well thought out approach to the proc-
ess of revising 1977 Article 8, one congruent enough to that of the federal regulators to be 
included in the Bankers Trust Company report. 
 474. K. King Burnetts firm, Webb, Burnett, Jackson, Cornbrooks, Wilber, Vorhis & 
Rouse, LLP, is the smallest firm with only nine attorneys. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL 
LAW DIRECTORY MD421B-422B (1997). 
 475. Richard Hites firm, Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hites, Kellogg, has twenty-four at-
torneys. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY KS141B-142B (1997). Justin Vig-
dors firm, Boylan, Brown, Code, Fowler, Vigdor & Wilson, has thirty-three attorneys. See 
11 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NY483B-486B (1997). Howard Swibels firm, 
Arnstein & Lehr, has ninety-eight attorneys. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 
IL 88B-96B (1997). John Fox Arnolds firm, Lashly & Baer, has twenty-seven attorneys. 
See 10 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY MO337B-340B (1997). Of course, Davis, 
Polk & Wardwell, Richard B. Smiths firm, is the largest with 480 attorneys. See 12 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NYC306B-316B (1997). These numbers do not re-
flect any inclusion of member Harold T. Rosen as he is not listed in any directory. 
 476. K. King Burnett listed himself as a Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers, 
and one of his practice areas as litigation. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 
MD421B (1997). Richard C. Hite was also a Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers, in 
addition to being a member of the Kansas Association of Defense Council and practicing in 
the areas of civil trial and product liability. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 
KS141B (1997). Howard J. Swibel practiced in, among other things, litigation. See 7 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY IL93B (1997). Finally, Justin L. Vigdor listed one 
of his practice areas as commercial litigation. See 11 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW 
DIRECTORY NY484B (1997). The American College of Trial Lawyers is an exclusive associa-
tion of roughly 5,000 of the top trial lawyers in the country. See William J. Dean, Action by 
Administrative Board of the Courts, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 7, 1997, at 3. Three of these attorneys 
also listed business or securities law as one of their practice areas: K. King Burnett, How-
ard J. Swibel, Justin L. Vigdor. Two more lawyers were evidently transactional business 
lawyers: John Fox Arnold (Member, National Association of Bond Lawyers) and Richard B. 
Smith (Davis Polk & Wardwell). Mr. Smith served as Commissioner, U.S. Securities and 
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committee were legal academics,477 with Professor Rogers serving as 
the Reporter. The Review Committee for the Drafting Committee478 
consisted of one in-house counsel for a major university, one lawyer 
functioning as the president and chief executive officer of a major 
corporation, and a lawyer from a regional law firm.479 
                                                                                                                      
Exchange Commission from 1967 through 1971. See 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW 
DIRECTORY NYC307B (1997). 
Although this Author has no basis on which to evaluate the contributions made by these 
attorneys to Revised Article 8, Professor Rubins experience with revised Article 3 and 4 
suggests that individuals with such backgrounds do not necessarily function as consumer 
surrogates. Although 35 of the usual 108 members of the ABAs subcommittee on the Arti-
cles 3 and 4 revisions were lawyers [e]mployed by [c]orporate [u]sers and only 25 were 
[e]mployed by [b]anks and [o]ther [f]inancial [i]nstitutions, Rubin, Thinking Like a Law-
yer, supra note 13, at 748 n.17, the corporate user attorneys did not represent consumer in-
terests. This role fell largely to the law professors. Id. at 755 (citations omitted). Insofar 
as all of the corporate user attorneys have personal checking and other banking accounts, 
one would have expected them to function as consumer surrogates if Professor Rogers is 
correct that the dedicated generalist lawyers can substitute for consumer advocates. See 
Rogers, supra note 7, at 1544-45. Although Professor Rubin does not remark on the failure 
of the corporate user attorneys to represent consumer interests in the revision of Articles 3 
and 4, many of the factors he discusses with respect to revised Articles 3 and 4 would apply 
with equal force to Revised Article 8. See Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 13, at 
748-68. Professor Rubin described the various ways in which the bank attorneys on his 
subcommittee tended to see the world from the perspective of their clients. Id. at 749. 
This point would have to be generalized to apply to the lawyers involved in the Article 8 
Drafting Committee. Most of these lawyers did not represent the broker-dealers and com-
mercial banks that will benefit directly from Revised Article 8. But they could all be ex-
pected to share the perspective that major institutions of American capitalism, such as 
leading broker-dealers and commercial banks and their federal regulatory agencies, are, in 
Professor Rubins words, reputable, well-run institutions. See id. at 749. There is no real 
need to be concerned about individual investors because the major institutions of American 
capitalism are already concerned about them. 
 477. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2. Robert E. Desiderio teaches commercial 
law, corporations, tax and other related business law courses at the University of New 
Mexico; Egon Guttman teaches commercial law, corporations, securities and other business 
law related courses at the American University, Washington School of Law; Curtis R. Reitz 
teaches commercial law, contracts and other related courses at the University of Pennsyl-
vania School of Law; and Ann E. Conaway Stilson (formerly known as Ann E. Conaway 
Anker) teaches contracts, corporations, securities regulation, property and other business 
related courses at Widener University School of Law. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW 
SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1997-98 at 390, 514, 826, 939. 
 478. The Review Committee evaluates a draft completed by the Drafting Committee to 
improve the draft and determine if it is ready to submit to the entire Committee. In so do-
ing, the Review Committee suggests any necessary changes in language in order to clearly 
communicate the policy considerations and improve general understanding. See 
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-EIGHTH YEAR 411 
(1994). 
 479. Gerald L. Bepko works for Indiana University. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW 
DIRECTORY IN38P (1997). Michael P. Sullivan is President and Chief Executive Officer of 
Intl Dairy Queen. See 10 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY MN82P (1997). Reed L. 
Martineau is at Snow, Christensen & Martineau in Salt Lake City, Utah. See 16 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY UT114B (1997). 
 480. Although Curtis R. Reitz has written extensively on legal issues involving the 
Uniform Commercial Code, his writings in law reviews have not focused on Article 8 con-
cerns. See, e.g., Curtis R. Reitz, Manufacturers Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 WASH. 
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 Not one member of the ABAs Advisory Committee or the Drafting 
Committee and its Review Committee was a consumer advocate and, 
except for Professor Guttman, the legal academics had not written on 
issues of securities settlement and clearance, much less addressed 
these issues from an individual investor perspective.480 The individ-
ual investor was no better represented in the process of adoption in 
New York State. In New York, the major study of Revised Article 8 
was conducted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
which established a joint subcommittee of the Committee on Uniform 
State Law and the Banking Law Committee dominated by members 
of major New York City corporate law firms.481 
                                                                                                                      
U. L.Q. 357 (1997); Curtis R. Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 555 (1996); Curtis R. Reitz, Introduction: International 
Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 29 (1996); Curtis R. Reitz, Construction Lend-
ers Liability to Contractors, Subcontractors and Materialmen, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 416 
(1982); Curtis R. Reitz & Michael L. Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can 
Sue and Where?, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1973). 
 In addition to his law review articles, Professor Reitz co-edited a commercial law case-
book with John Honnold, see JOHN O. HONNOLD & CURTIS R. REITZ, CASES, PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS ON SALES TRANSACTIONS: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992), and 
wrote his own casebook, CURTIS R. REITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AS BASIC 
COMMERCIAL LAW (1975). 
 481. Of the ten members of this joint subcommittee, six came from such law firms: two 
from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (Sandra Rocks, a special counsel, see 12 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NYC224B (1997), and Daniel Feit, an associate, 
see id.), two from Davis Polk & Wardwell (Margaret E. Tahyar, an associate, see id. at NYC 
315B, and Randall D. Guynn, a partner see id. at NYC 312B), one from Sullivan & Crom-
well (Erik D. Lindauer, a partner, see id. at NYC 1351B), and one from Simpson Thacher & 
Bartlett (John L. Walker, a partner, see id. at NYC 1276B). Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Ham-
ilton represents Fleet Financial Group Inc., US Bancorp, Salomon Inc., American Express 
Co., General Reinsurance Corp., Greenpoint Financial Corp.; and Albank Financial Corp. 
Sullivan & Cromwell counts among its most important clients Bankers Trust New York 
Corp., The Bank of New York Co. Inc., Mellon Bank Corp., Comerica, Central Fidelity 
Banks, Inc., Riggs National Corp., American Intl Group Inc., H. F. Anmanson & Co., Dime 
Bancorp Inc., and Bank Plus Corp. And Simpson Thacher & Bartlett represents The Chase 
Manhattan Corp., and Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. See Fisk, supra note 470, at C2. Davis 
Polk & Wardwells broker-dealer and commercial banking clients are described at supra 
note 470. 
 There was an SRO lawyer, Norman R. Nelson, the general counsel of the New York 
Clearing House Association. See 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NYC289P 
(1997). The New York Clearing House Association is an organization responsible for proc-
essing electronic transfers for New York banks. Steven Marjanovic, In Concession, Fed to 
Test Faster Settlements, AM. BANKER, Jan. 28, 1998, at 1. For a general description of a 
clearing house and the settlements and transactions involved, see 8 MICHIE ON BANKS AND 
BANKING (A.D. Kowalsky et. al. eds.) Ch. 18 §§ 1, 2 (1988). Ms. Joseph was a legal aca-
demic at the time of the Article 8 Bar Report, and has published in the area of mediation. 
See Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators Can Invoke 
Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 629, 629 (1997). Two academics com-
pleted the committee: Professors Paul M. Shupack and James A. Fanto. In light of the 
dominant role played by Davis, Polk & Wardwell in the adoption process for Revised Arti-
cle 8, it is interesting to note that Professor Fanto was a Davis, Polk & Wardwell associate 
from 1988-1993. 
 Professor Shupack has written a number of articles concerning the UCC, mostly focused 
on Article 9, as well as Articles 3 and 4, but not on securities law issues. See, e.g., Paul M. 
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 The statement made by proponents of Revised Articles 8 that con-
sumer groups were not excluded from the revision process does not 
necessarily mean that adequate steps were taken to incorporate 
them. Professor Rogers does not deny that individual investors were 
not represented in the revision process for Revised Article 8: 
[A]lthough the Chair of the Revised Article 8 Drafting Committee 
wrote to a number of groups that represent the interests of indi-
vidual investors at the beginning of the revision project, none of 
them judged the project to be of sufficient concern to their con-
stituencies to come to drafting committee meetings or communi-
cate any other comments.482 
 Professor Rogers explanation for this lack of interest is that pre-
sumably . . . consumer law advocates naturally devote their limited 
resources to matters that genuinely concern the groups or interests 
they represent483 and that no such matters existed in Revised Article 
8. The explanation equally could be that Revised Article 8 and the 
clearance and settlement of securities are difficult subjects requiring 
a fair amount of expertise in order to evaluate, expertise that con-
sumer groups do not normally possess.484 In addition, the control 
creditor and collusion provisions of most concern to individual inves-
tors were not included in the drafts of Revised Article 8 until early 
                                                                                                                      
Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures and the Question of Filing, 79 MINN. L. REV. 787 
(1995); Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 
80 VA. L. REV. 2273 (1994) (appearing in a symposium on the revision of Article 9); Paul M. 
Shupack, Cashiers Checks, Certified Checks, and True Cash Equivalence, 6 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 467 (1985) (discussing UCC Articles 3 and 4). 
 In contrast, Professor Fantos writings are focused on securities law but not issues in-
volving commercial law or Article 8 of the UCC in particular. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, The 
Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corpo-
rate Governance, 17 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 119 (1996); James A. Fanto, The Transforma-
tion of French Corporate Governance and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. 
J. INTL L. 1 (1995); James A. Fanto, Justice Blackmun and Securities Arbitration: McMa-
hon  Revisited, 71 N.D. L. REV. 145 (1995). Finally, there were four members of the Com-
mittee on Uniform State Laws that contributed significantly to the Article 8 Bar Report: 
Margaret N. Kniffin, Karen S. Boxer, William T. Collins, III and Rick Antonoff. See 
ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 n.2. Messrs. Antonoff and Collins were lawyers 
with major New York City corporate firms, respectively Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
Garrison, see 12 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY NYC 1004B (1997), and Thacher 
Proffitt & Ward, see id. at NYC 1577B. Ms. Boxer was the deputy general counsel of the 
Health & Hospitals Corp. See id. at NYC 62P. 
 482. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1545 n.166 (emphasis added). As Professor Rogers does 
not list any of these groups, it is impossible to evaluate their orientation and why they may 
not have responded to this invitation. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Professor Rogers hints at one reason for this lack of expertise when he writes that 
Revised Article 8 is not the sort of legislation that raises . . . the sort of issues that are 
within the traditional province of consumer protection law. Id. That statement does not 
support, of course, the conclusion that individual investors should not be concerned by cer-
tain provisions of Revised Article 8. 
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1993485 and the watering down of a securities intermediarys obliga-
tion to obtain securities to meet its obligation to its entitlement hold-
ers did not occur until spring 1994,486 all subsequent, presumably, to 
the invitations extended to groups representing individual investors. 
 Professor Rubin describes the substantial funding and time con-
straints that restricted meaningful consumer participation in the re-
visions of Articles 3 and 4.487 The only way to overcome such resource 
constraints would be to fund adequate legal representation for con-
sumer groups. Although one can always argue about what is ade-
quate, certainly more than the one overburdened consumer attorney 
described by Professor Rubin would be necessary. Each revision pro-
ject should have a budget for consumer representation and the size of 
the budget and the extent and nature of the representation should be 
part of the discussion leading up to the undertaking of a revision. 
Certain revision projects, such as the one for letters of credit under 
Article 5, might be judged of minimal concern to consumers and, 
therefore, would require a low level of funding. Others, such as the 
one for Article 2, might require a higher level of funding. 
 In light of the significant resources devoted to Revised Article 8 by 
major American law firms and the significance of the collusion and 
control lender issues, significant resources should have been devoted 
to hiring representation for individual investors. At a minimum, a 
group should have been formed consisting of an experienced practic-
ing lawyer, a legal academic and an economist. The two lawyers 
should have had, or been willing to develop, an expertise in commer-
cial law, particularly issues of negotiability and security interests; 
and the economist should have had, or been willing to develop, an 
expertise in systemic risk in the financial markets. All three should 
have had practical or theoretical experience with the clearance and 
settlement of securities. In addition, there was a need for expertise in 
evaluating the federal regulatory regimes and SIPA, which might 
have required additional members for the individual investor group. 
Although the amount of work would have ebbed and flowed over a 
period of years, each member of such a group would have had to in-
vest a significant portion of his or her working time on such a project. 
No reputational gain would have necessarily accrued to any member 
of the group representing individual investors. Only monetary com-
                                                                                                                      
 485. See infra text accompanying notes 505-15. 
 486. See infra text accompanying notes 499-504. 
 487. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 13, at 761-62. Gail Hillebrand of Con-
sumers Union was invited to attend meetings of the ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Payment 
Systems. See id. at 761. She had no funding, however, and could attend only those meet-
ings held near her home in the San Francisco area. Id. In addition, she had responsibility 
for all UCC revisions as well as a number of other statutory requirements affecting con-
sumers. See id. This is a load that would have strained Wonder Woman. 
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pensation would have secured the necessary level of expertise and 
involvement.488 
 Even such measures as this article advocates may not be suffi-
cient to protect consumers. Financial institutions and other major 
businesses not only dominate the national uniform laws revisions 
process but also the process by which the revisions are adopted at the 
state level. When financial institutions have found their interests 
adversely affected by the UCC, they have lobbied vigorously on the 
state level and proposed nonuniform amendments. When the UCC 
was first adopted by NCCUSL and the ALI in 1951, New York spent 
ten years studying this new creation, holding hearings all over the 
state, commissioning a series of reports that remain essential back-
                                                                                                                      
 488. The revision of Articles 2 and 9, which have historically been identified as articles 
of concern to consumers, have benefited from much more formal and informal input from 
consumer advocates than has Revised Article 8. In the Article 9 context, for example, a 
special task force was created to evaluate the recommendations [of the Study Group ap-
pointed by the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC] from the consumer-protection per-
spective and to identify additional consumer protection issues related to secured credit. 
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE U.C.C., PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE ART. 9 REPORT 3 n.9 (Dec. 1992). With regard to Article 2, whether to incorporate 
special provisions to protect consumers (versus merchants) and the content of such provi-
sions has been a matter of extensive commentary prior to adoption of the revision by the 
ALI and NCCUSL. See, e.g., Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process, 
supra note 12; Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2 
Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593 (1994); Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 
2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and Merchant/Consumers Through 
Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39 (1996). The debate over the procedural and 
substantive issues as they effect consumers is ongoing. See e.g., Jean Brauacher, Foreward: 
Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1997). 
 In contrast, there was only a single dedicated issue of the Cardozo Law Review in 1990 
that focused on the problems in 1962 and 1977 Articles 8 and proposed solutions. 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990). The most influential article, see Mooney, supra note 114, did not 
even consider any issues relevant to individual investors, relying upon the protection af-
forded by SIPA to justify a focus on the rights and claims of market participants who are 
not eligible for, or whose claims exceed, such protection rather than smaller, probably less 
sophisticated investors. Id. at 313 n.8, 380-81. Most subsequent publications concerning 
Revised Article 8 have been technical, continuing legal education publications that have 
taken the policy choices of Revised Article 8 for granted. See, e.g., SECTION OF BUSINESS 
LAW, ABA, COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, THE JOY OF INVESTMENT 
SECURITIES: REVISED ARTICLES 8 AND 9 OF THE UCC (Mar. 23, 1995); MASSACHUSETTS 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, INVESTMENT SECURITIESTHE NEW UCC ARTICLE 8 
(1994). A handful of articles have been concerned with policy involving individual inves-
tors. See Guttman, supra note 201; Egon Guttman, Investment Securities Law: New Fed-
eral and State Developments and Their Effect on Article 8, 24 UCC L.J. 307 (1992); Egon 
Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive Le Roi, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 625 (1993); 
Rogers, supra note 7; Schroeder, supra note 31; David A. Kessler, Note, Investor Casualties 
in the War for Market Efficiency, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1307 (1996) (a student of Professor 
Guttman). The few additional academic pieces that have appeared have not addressed the 
policy issues concerning individual investors raised by Revised Article 8. See Darmstadter, 
supra note 254; Douglas R. Heidenreich, Article EightArticle Eight?, 22 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 985 (1996); Robert D. Hillman, Other Peoples Money: Problems in Attaching Secu-
rities Under Three Versions of U.C.C. Article 8, 16 J. L. & COM. 89 (1996); Mark G. Lake & 
Henry Bregstein, Fraudulent Pledge of Securities of Nonpublic Corporations: The Inade-
quacy of UCC Article 8, 112 BANKING L.J. 958 (1995). 
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ground material on the UCC to this day489 and suggesting a series of 
changes that were incorporated in the 1956 version of the UCC490 and 
in the version of the UCC enacted in New York State in 1962.491 All of 
this activity emanated from opposition by an in-house counsel of 
Chase National Bank.492 
 This same type of activity by major business enterprises occurred 
more recently in the revision of Article 4A, where the issue of how to 
treat fraudulent wire transfers generated a great deal of concern 
among members of the National Corporate Cash Managers Associa-
tion (NCCMA). Corporate attorneys who were members of NCCMA 
in 1988 joined the ABA subcommittee considering Article 4A and 
threatened to oppose adoption of the entire Article 4A in the legisla-
tures of all fifty states.493 This threat led to the attorneys who repre-
sented banks agreeing to a compromise with the attorneys represent-
ing major corporations.494 
 Without involvement by consumer representatives in the revision 
process for uniform laws, we may expect the results to reflect the in-
terests of the organized interest groups that participate in this proc-
ess. Academic commentators have suggested various theories to ex-
plain this result. Professors Schwartz and Scott have applied struc-
tured-induced equilibrium theory to conclude that interest groups 
have more power in [private legislatures] than in ordinary legisla-
tures (when there is only one active group).495 Professor Patchel has 
used interest group theory to argue that smaller groups are those 
most likely to form an effective coalition to advance their collective 
interests.496 Professor Rubin has focused on the inability of attorneys 
                                                                                                                      
 489. For descriptions of the legislative history of the original UCC in New York State, 
see Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. 
L. REV. 798 (1958) [hereinafter Braucher, Legislative History]; Robert Braucher, The 1956 
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILLANOVA L. REV. 3 (1956); Norman Penney, 
New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 992 (1962). 
 490. Braucher, Legislative History, supra note 489, at 802-04. 
 491. Penney, supra note 489, at 992-94. 
 492. Patchel, supra note 11, at 105-06. The New York City bankers acted through their 
trade organization, the New York Clearing House Association, in advocating revisions to 
both the 1951 and 1956 versions of the UCC. Penney, supra note 489, at 992-94. 
 493. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 13, at 764. 
 494. Id. at 764-65. 
 495. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 11, at 597, 632. For a more informal development 
and application of this approach, see Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 1783 (1994). 
 496. Patchel, supra note 11, at 127 (citation omitted). Consumers is a broad category 
of individualsalmost as broad as the public itself. Id. Professor Patchel contrasts con-
sumers to business interests, which are much smaller groups. See id. Such a comparison 
is particularly apropos to Revised Article 8, when one bears in mind the fact that there are 
millions of individual investors in contrast to a few thousand broker-dealers and potential 
control lenders. 
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to check at the door . . . their conceptual framework,497 which led at-
torneys representing banks in the Articles 3 and 4 revision process to 
instinctively view banks as reputable, well-run institutions and 
consumers as tend[ing] to be careless, mistaken or dishonest.498 
This world view combined with the dominance of the common-law 
model of legal thought to produce an approach to drafting these re-
visions focused on moral judgment[s] and indifferent to empirical 
research.499 Professor Clayton P. Gillette has emphasized the differ-
ences between rent-seeking in a public and a private legislature in 
concluding that there are reasons based in legislative theory to be-
lieve that consumer interests would systematically fare poorly in pri-
vate legislatures.500 
 The drafting history of Revised Article 8 shows the considerable 
influence that a cohesive interest group can have. The development 
of revised sections 8-504 and 8-511, two sections of Revised Article 8 
that are crucial to individual investors, and the concept of collusion 
show the progressive watering down during the drafting process of 
protections granted to individual investors. As this Author did not 
participate in the drafting process, he cannot provide a full explana-
tion for why this watering down occurred.501 All he can do is analyze 
the results. 
                                                                                                                      
 497. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 13, at 749. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at 768-70. 
 500. Gillette, supra note 18, at 197. He points out that law offices devoted to consumer 
interests have limited financial resources and consumer groups have few opportunities to 
offer rent to corporate attorneys and academics who populate private law-making commit-
tees as such groups can do little to offer a client base to the former or publicity (in the 
form of outlets for scholarship or the venting of policy positions) to the latter. Id. at 197-98 
(footnote omitted). In addition, logrolling by consumer advocates is structurally difficult 
both between revision projects, because there are few repeat players, and within revision 
projects [i]f the majority of a drafting group is already in agreement and that agreement 
stands in opposition to or is indifferent to consumer interests. Id. at 198-99. 
 501. The ALI and NCCUSL archives maintained by the Biddle Law Library at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law currently contain some materials on the drafting 
of Revised Article 8 donated by Professors Fred H. Miller and Curtis Reitz. See Letter from 
Melissa Backes to Professor Facciolo (Feb. 23, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Backes Letter]. In addition, Professor Miller at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, 
who is also Executive Director of NCCUSL, has a large quantity of unpublished letters and 
memoranda concerning the revision process leading up to Revised Article 8 in his posses-
sion. See Letter from Fred Miller to Jay Facciolo (Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Miller Letter of Jan. 20]. Eventually these materials will be donated to the ALI and 
NCCUSL archives. See Letter from Fred Miller to Francis Facciolo (Dec. 16, 1997) (on file 
with author). The amount of material in Professor Millers possession greatly exceeds that 
deposited at the Biddle Law Library. Compare Backes Letter, supra, with Miller Letter, 
supra. There must also be considerable additional quantities of unpublished material in 
the possession of other members of the Drafting Committee for Revised Article 8 and other 
interested parties that are not yet on deposit with the Biddle Law Library. 
 At this time, this Author could not obtain access to the materials in Professor Millers 
possession without allowing Professor Miller to set forth his views in footnotes in this arti-
cle. See Letter from Fred Miller to Jay Facciolo (via electronic mail) (Feb. 9, 1998) (on file 
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 Revised Section 8-504 provides a qualified obligation of a securi-
ties intermediary to promptly obtain and thereafter maintain suffi-
cient financial asset[s] to satisfy all security entitlements of its 
entitlement holders.502 This obligation is met by the exercise[ ] [of] 
due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards even 
if the securities intermediary does not have the requisite financial 
assets.503 The only exception to this obligation contemplated by the 
initial draft of the predecessor to revised section 8-504 was for the 
physical loss or destruction of a security.504 Even this exception dis-
appeared in a subsequent draft.505 This approach continued in the 
drafts for about one year.506 In April 1994, revised section 8-504 took 
substantially its present form.507 Why revised section 8-504 moved 
from an unqualified obligation to obtain the necessary financial as-
sets to one where reasonable commercial standards met this obliga-
tion is not explained in any of the drafts or in other publicly available 
materials. Whatever the subjective reasons for this change, it is one 
that objectively favors securities intermediaries over individual in-
vestors. 
                                                                                                                      
with author). For examples of this approach in action, see Uniform State Laws: A Discus-
sion Focused on Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 257, 
278 n.10, 281 n.14 (1997) (contrasting the views of Professors Albert J. Rosenthal, the 
moderator for the discussion, and Miller). 
 This Author plans to write further on the revision process leading to Revised Article 8 
when and if the Biddle Law Library has on file a sufficiently extensive set of unpublished 
materials to properly flesh out the outline of the story told by the drafts. In this connection, 
this Author encourages the various participants in the drafting process to forward all ma-
terials in their possession to the archives. 
 502. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-504(a). 
 503. Id. § 8-504(c)(2). See the discussion at supra text accompanying notes 449-50 for a 
discussion of revised section 8-504. 
 504. See Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, § 8-502(a), Investments Securi-
ties (with Conforming Amendments to Article 9) with Prefatory Note and Comments (Oct. 
6, 1992 Draft) [hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Oct. 1992 Draft]. In the February 16, 1993, 
draft the predecessor section to revised section 8-504 was redrafted to move the exception 
for the securities intermediarys obligations into a new proposed section 8-510. See UCC 
Revised Article 8, § 8-510, Investment Securities With Comments (Feb. 16, 1993 Draft) 
[hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Feb. 1993 Draft]. The exception continued, however, to 
cover only physical loss and destruction. Id. § 8-510 cmt. 
 505. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, § 8-504, Securities and Securities 
Entitlements (with Conforming and Miscellaneous Amendments to Articles 1 and 9) with 
Prefatory Note and Comments (Apr. 1, 1993 Draft) [hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Apr. 
1993 Draft]. Section 8-510 had disappeared from this draft and no similar provision had 
replaced it. 
 506. See, e.g., Uniform Commerical Code Revised Article 8, § 8-504, Investment Securi-
ties (with Conforming and Miscellaneous Amendments to Articles 1 and 9) (July 30-Aug. 6, 
1993 Draft) [hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Summer 1993 Draft]; UCC Revised Article 8. 
Investment Securities With Prefatory Note and Comments (Jan. 1994 Draft), § 8-504 
[hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Jan. 1994 Draft]. 
 507. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, Investment Securities, § 8-504 (with 
Amendments to Article 9. Secured Transactions) (Proposed Final Draft, April 5, 1994) 
[hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Apr. 1994 Draft].  
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 The drafting history of revised section 8-511 is another tale of a 
crucial statutory provision being changed to favor financial institu-
tions, in this case securities intermediaries and control lenders, over 
individual investors. As with revised section 8-504, the drafts of Re-
vised Article 8 are the only materials with which to examine this 
process. By the third draft in May 1992, the predecessor section to 
revised section 8-511 provided that the claim of a secured party 
that had control was to be satisfied before the claims of account 
holders.508 By October 1992, the predecessor section to revised sec-
tion 8-511 no longer favored secured parties, providing instead that 
all financial assets and securities of a financial intermediary were 
to be divided pro rata among all account holders.509 By January 
1993 there were two competing versions of what was to become re-
vised section 8-511. One, favored by Professor Rogers, stayed, with-
out qualification, with the pro rata distribution scheme to entitle-
ment holders and the other provided that a secured party has prior-
ity over claims of the securities intermediarys entitlement holders if: 
(1) the secured party has control over the security or securities enti-
tlement; or (2) the entitlement holders claims are for securities car-
ried in a margin account.510 This latter alternative is, of course, a di-
rect predecessor of revised section 8-511(b). A month later, only one 
provision modeled on the latter alternative remained.511 
 The history of the development of collusion concept in the drafts of 
Revised Article 8 is perhaps the most disheartening story from the 
individual investors perspective. Collusion was first introduced as a 
means of protecting a securities intermediary against claims by an 
entitlement holder that the securities intermediary had executed an 
improper order with respect to the entitlement holders account.512 In 
contrast, a transferee of a securities entitlement acquire[d] the secu-
rities entitlement free of any adverse claim if it was acquired (1) for 
value, (2) in good faith; [sic] and (3) without notice of any adverse 
claim.513 This standard of transferee liability is the section 8-
302(1)(c) standard contained in 1977 Article 8, refined to reflect more 
clearly the operation of the indirect holding system. 
                                                                                                                      
 508. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 8, § 8-509(d), Investment Securities 
(May 1, 1992) [hereinafter Proposed Article 8 May 1992 Draft]. 
 509. Proposed Article 8 Oct. 1992 Draft, supra note 504, § 8-510. 
 510. UCC Revised Article 8, Investment Securities, § 8-512(b) (with Conforming and 
Miscellaneous Amendments to Articles 1 and 9) without Prefatory Note and Comments 
(Jan. 4, 1993 Draft) [hereinafter Proposed Article 8 Jan. 1993 Draft]. 
 511. Proposed Article 8 Feb. 1993 Draft, supra note 504, § 8-513. 
 512. See Proposed Article 8 Jan. 1993 Draft, supra note 510, § 8-510(a)(2). 
 513. Id. § 8-509(a). Subsection (a) also applie[d] to a secured party who has obtained 
control over a securities entitlement pursuant to Section 9-116. Id. at 8-509(b). Early 
drafts used the defined term securities entitlement rather than the final security enti-
tlement. 
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 The next draft in February 1993 generalized the collusion stan-
dard, applying it to transferees as well as to securities intermediar-
ies.514 The November 1993 draft515 bifurcated transferees, treating 
transferees from securities intermediaries and from entitlement 
holders differently. Notice became the standard for a purchase of a 
securities entitlement from an entitlement holder,516 while collusion 
became the standard for a purchase from the securities intermedi-
ary of investment property.517 This bifurcation carried through to the 
final version of Revised Article 8518 and does provide a modicum of 
comfort to individual investors. But in the indirect holding system, a 
securities intermediary is the most likely transferor of a financial as-
set; therefore, the standard that applies to a securities intermediary 
is the most significant one. 
 There is no consideration in the drafts of whether different poli-
cies for transferees as compared to those for securities intermediaries 
should lead to two different standards. In discussing securities in-
termediaries, Professor Rogers pointed out that they were agents or 
bailees and that many legal rules protect agents and bailees from li-
ability as innocent converters.519 Professor Rogers explanation for 
these legal rules is that a securities intermediary is obligated by its 
contract to act on the instructions of the entitlement holder and that 
it seems unfair to put the [securities intermediary] in a position 
where it acts at its peril in complying with its contractual obliga-
tions520 when the securities intermediary only had notice or knowl-
edge that another person asserts a claim to the securities.521 What 
unfairness there would be in subjecting transferees to this risk is not 
explained. In fact, Professor Rogers distinguishes between an inno-
cent agent or bailee that would not be liable for conversion and the 
recipient of the property, that could be so liable.522 
                                                                                                                      
 514. Proposed Article 8 Feb. 1993 Draft, supra note 504, § 8-511. 
 515. UCC Article 8, ALI Council Draft No. 2 (Nov. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Proposed Ar-
ticle 8 Nov. 1993 Draft]. 
 516. Id. § 8-510(c). 
 517. Id. § 8-512(a)(1). 
 518. See 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, §§ 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a) (final versions 
of proposed draft sections 8-510(c) and 8-512(a)(1) of Proposed Article 8 Nov. 1993 draft). 
The Official Comments attempt to resolve the evident contradiction between the notice 
language of revised section 8-502 and the collusion language of revised section 8-503(a) in 
favor of collusion. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34. 
 519. Id. § 8-310 rptr. note 2. Draft section 8-310 is relevant because the draft Official 
Comments state that draft section [8-512] implements for the indirect holding system the 
same protections against conversion liability that Revised Section 8-310 provides to bro-
kers, securities intermediaries, or other agents for bailees who deal with securities held di-
rectly by their customers. The basic policy rationale is discussed in the Reporters Note to 
that Section. Id. § 8-512 rptr. note 2.  
 520. Id. § 8-310 rptr. note 2.  
 521. Id. § 8-310 rptr. note 4. 
 522. Id. § 8-310 rptr. note 2. 
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 There is nothing in the drafts of Revised Article 8 that explains 
why the collusion standard was generalized in this fashion. In a 
memorandum to the Council of the ALI, Professor Rogers provides 
the following justification for this generalization: 
The collusion standard here is used for reasons similar to the ra-
tionale for the rules on conduits and transfer agents. The function 
of intermediaries is to transfer securities on behalf of their cus-
tomers. Rules imposing a risk of liability on parties dealing with 
the intermediary would impair their willingness to deal with in-
termediaries, and hence impair the interests of investors in having 
their intermediaries perform their central function.523 
 Fairness is not the policy that unites protecting all transferees of 
securities intermediaries and protecting securities intermediaries 
from being caught between an order from an entitlement holder and 
an adverse claimant. Rather, finality and the protection of securities 
intermediaries under all possible circumstances are the policies that 
unite the use of collusion in these two factually distinct situations. 
 The final version of Revised Article 8 has a single section protect-
ing a securities intermediary transferring a financial asset in either 
the direct or the indirect holding system from any liability to a per-
son having an adverse claim to the financial asset except if the secu-
rities intermediary has been enjoined from so transferring or if the 
securities intermediary acted in collusion with the wrongdoer in vio-
lating the rights of the adverse claimant.524 In addition, an entitle-
ment holder may not bring an action with respect to a particular fi-
nancial asset . . . , whether framed in conversion, replevin, construc-
tive trust, equitable lien, or other theory against a purchaser who 
gives value, obtains control, and does not act in collusion with the se-
curities intermediary that transfers the financial asset.525 As this 
Article discusses in Part VI.A.2,526 collusion is a standard that se-
verely undermines protections formerly available to individual inves-
tors. 
 In explaining why representatives of individual investors were not 
involved in the drafting Revised Article 8, it may not be irrelevant 
that the provisions that disfavored individual investors did not ap-
pear in the earliest drafts of Revised Article 8. Any individual inves-
tor advocate reviewing, for example, the ABA Report that provided 
the impetus for the Article 8 revision process would have found noth-
ing that presaged revised sections 8-504 or the collusion standard 
                                                                                                                      
 523. Memorandum from James S. Rogers, Reporter, Drafting Committee to Revise the 
UCC Article 8, to the Council of the American Law Institute Memorandum (Nov. 22, 1993) 
(on file with author). 
 524. 1994 OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 2, § 8-115. 
 525. Id. § 8-503(e). 
 526. See supra text accompanying notes 211-42.  
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that renders control lenders functionally immune from challenge, al-
though there was a full discussion of the priorities issue to which re-
vised section 8-511(b) is addressed.527 Even the resolution of this pri-
orities issue in favor of secured parties did not appear in the first two 
drafts of Revised Article 8, only appearing in the May 1, 1992 draft 
and disappearing in the October 6, 1992 draft. 
 The history of Revised Article 8s adoption in New York State also 
illustrates how a small, well-organized interest group consisting of 
attorneys that represent financial institutions can triumph over the 
relatively disorganized advocates for individual investors. In New 
York, the primary pre-enactment study of Revised Article 8 was done 
by a joint subcommittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York.528 The Associations Committee on Consumer Affairs re-
viewed the report and had no objection to its release by the Associa-
tion, in part because the Report provides guidance regarding the 
operation of Sections 8-503 through 8-508, particularly with respect 
to the collusion standard . . . , which should diminish potential diffi-
culties for individual investors.529 The initial bill introduced in New 
York had a preamble that defined collusion in a manner consistent 
with the Article 8 Bar Report. The final bill, a year later, had a con-
siderably narrower gloss on collusion in its preamble.530 Any initial 
gains made by the Committee on Consumer Affairs on the collusion 
issue were largely lost in the enacted legislation. The advocates of 
the individual investor had been neatly out-maneuvered by the advo-
cates of the financial institutions.531 As an empirical matter, this re-
sult can hardly be surprising. As a matter of policy, this result sug-
gests that more structured measures of the type advocated by this 
Article to encourage consumer involvement in the revision process of 
uniform laws are necessary. 
XI.   CONCLUSION 
 Revised Article 8 represents a major revision of the law governing 
securities transfers. It is an elegant piece of work, one that shows the 
hand of a master draftsman. And it is based on a powerful reconcep-
                                                                                                                      
 527. 1991 ABA Report, supra note 5, at 4, 35-40. Even this discussion of priorities as-
sumed that bona fide purchaser rules would be in place and that bona fide purchasers 
should prevail over non-bona fide purchasers. Id. at 36. The concept of collusion in Re-
vised Article 8 has obviated bona fide purchaser concepts and in practice has put control 
lenders in an unchallengable position. See supra text accompanying notes 216-21 for a dis-
cussion of this point.  
 528. See ARTICLE 8 BAR REPORT, supra note 6. 
 529. Id. at 1 n.2. 
 530. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6 for a discussion of these two different bills.  
 531. The current debate over the proper meaning of control, which is described supra 
in the text accompanying notes 248-52, is another example of financial institutions taking 
a second bite at an apple to gain the maximum advantage for themselves. 
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tualization of the appropriate means of describing the ways in which 
securities are held, providing the first comprehensive statutory 
treatment of the indirect holding system. This combination of ele-
gance and intellectual insight is a heady brew. One is tempted to 
suspend ones critical facilities, especially in the face of statements 
that Article 8 is one of the more recondite branches of commercial 
law.532 
 Professor Rogers argument that Revised Article 8 reflects signifi-
cant input from individual investors is unconvincing. The almost 
random input of generalist lawyers does not substitute for the consis-
tent input of lawyers who represent individual investors and who are 
well versed in the many areas of expertise necessary to evaluate Re-
vised Article 8. 
 Insofar as Revised Article 8 rests on unproven assumptions about 
systemic risk, the very real changes to the bona fide purchaser rules 
of 1977 Article 8 should give us pause. In the direct holding system, 
the protection afforded beneficial owners against bad actors has been 
significantly weakened. In the indirect holding system, the protection 
afforded a beneficial owner against bad actors is essentially meaning-
less. The only meaningful protection is the priority established by re-
vised section 8-511(a) for entitlement holders. But a growth of control 
lending, which may be likely in the immediate future, combined with 
the proposed amendment to the Official Comments control defini-
tion,533 would mean that the protections of revised section 8-511(a) 
also would be illusory, at least with respect to control creditors. 
 Two possible types of amendments to Revised Article 8 could pro-
vide appropriate protections for individual investors. The first would 
be to restore meaningful restrictions on bad action by protected pur-
chasers and favored purchasers by returning to the bona fide pur-
chaser concepts contained in 1977 Article 8.534 Two problems would 
arise from this approach. First, a number of amendments to Revised 
Article 8 would be required and the ability to maintain uniformity 
might be negatively affected. Second, and more importantly, the in-
ability under Revised Article 8 for courts to use tracing arguments 
would render these amendments largely nugatory. More effective, 
                                                                                                                      
 532. Rogers, supra note 7, at 1432. 
 533. See supra text accompanying notes 278-81 for a discussion of this point. 
 534. The Consumer Affairs Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York initially considered a similar approach in the deliberations leading up to the final Ar-
ticle 8 Bar Report. RECOMMENDATION OF THE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REGARDING 
THE ABCNY TASK FORCE REPORT RECOMMENDING ADOPTION IN NEW YORK OF REVISED 
ARTICLE 8 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-6 (Nov. 20, 1995 draft). The Consumer 
Affairs Committee considered proposing leaving the collusion standard of revised section 8-
503(e) in place for institutional investors but replacing it with a notice standard of an ad-
verse claim for natural persons with less than $1 million in a securities account. Id. at 6-7 
(emphasis added). 
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and more in keeping with the concepts underlying Revised Article 8, 
would be to directly address the control lender provisions of revised 
section 8-511(b) by limiting its operation or by deleting it in its en-
tirety. 
 The most limited version of this second type of amendment would 
be to create an individual investor carve-out to revised section 8-
511(b).535 Such a carve-out would provide that control lenders would 
have priority over entitlement holders except for entitlement holders 
who had a claim on financial assets of less than a specified amount 
through their securities entitlements and/or who have total assets or 
individual income of less than a stated amount.536 Those entitlement 
holders with claims above this line would be presumed to be sophisti-
cated enough, either individually or through the quality of the advice 
they could afford, to evaluate the risks of participating in the indirect 
holding system. 
 Any such sophistication distinction ignores, however, the fact that 
all investors in securities, sophisticated and unsophisticated, as a 
practical matter have to participate in the indirect holding system. In 
addition, most financial advisors believe that investments in equities 
are an essential part of any investment strategy that seeks returns 
consistently higher than inflation. Finally, no other investment op-
portunities in America offer the liquidity and ease of entry of Amer-
icas securities markets. Investment strategies that omitted securi-
ties entirely would have to focus on such illiquid and normally ex-
                                                                                                                      
 535. This idea first surfaced in conversations with Professor Margaret N. Kniffin. Simi-
lar ideas are being explored in connection with the current revision of Article 9. There is a 
debate concerning whether restrictions should be placed on the assets that secured credi-
tors can encumber under Article 9. Professor Elizabeth Warren has proposed a set aside for 
unsecured judgment lien creditors of up to 20 percent of the value of a debtors assets 
without regard to outstanding security interests. Elizabeth Warren, Article 9 Set Aside for 
Unsecured Creditors, UCC BULL., Oct. 1996, at 1. See generally James J. White, The Slip-
pery Slope to Bankruptcy: Should Some Claimants Get a Carve-Out from Secured Credit? 
No: Its a Populist Craving for a Petit Bourgeois Valhalla, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1998, 
at 33; William J. Woodward, Jr., The Slippery Slope to Bankruptcy: Should Some Claim-
ants Get a Carve-out from Secured Credit? Yes: Reserve a Cushion of Free Assets for Unse-
cured Creditors, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 32 (both discussing Professor War-
rens proposal). Professor Warrens proposal as it now is drafted, even if adopted, would not 
help individual investors under Revised Article 8. Her proposal involves amending section 
9-301, Warren, supra, at 3, while investment property such as securities and securities ac-
counts is governed by revised section 9-115. 
 536. One possible source for these standards could be the definition of accredited inves-
tor in Regulation D under the 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1998). With respect to 
many entities, Rule 501(a) under Regulation D uses total assets in excess of $5,000,000 
in its definition of an accredited investor. Id. at §§ 230.501(a)(1), (3), (7). With respect to 
natural persons, Rule 501(a) uses (i) net worth in excess of $1,000,000 or (ii) individual 
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that 
persons spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and a reasonable expectation 
of reaching the same income level in the current year in its definition of an accredited in-
vestor. Id. at §§230.501(a)(5), (6). 
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pensive investments as real estate or on such low earning vehicles as 
certificates of deposit. 
 The above argues for deleting revised section 8-511(b) in its en-
tirety. Otherwise, investors will face a Hobsons choice: investing in 
securities through participation in the indirect holding system and 
running the risk of bad action by any one of a number of securities 
intermediaries that can lead to a shortfall in the pertinent financial 
assets; or investing by, metaphorically, putting money under their 
mattresses and risking low rates of return. 
 No legislative body, including the United States Congress, has 
undertaken the necessary empirical research to establish the exis-
tence of the systemic risks that Revised Article 8 is intended to alle-
viate.537 In New York, the total legislative hearings on Revised Arti-
cle 8 consisted of a single afternoon roundtable of approximately two 
hours on May 31, 1996, convened by Assemblywoman Helene Wein-
stein. Approximately twenty academics, practicing lawyers and secu-
rities industry personnel discussed Revised Article 8 for about three 
hours.538 One clear example of the reliance on higher authority 
created by this lack of inquiry is the Article 8 Bar Report:  
The judgment calls that form the basis for Revised Article 8s fun-
damental structure depend, in significant part, on predicting how 
legal rules affect the behavior of participants in the securities 
market. Our committee does not have the capacity to find out facts 
that would answer those on which the drafters of Article 8 relied. 
Without those facts, our committee ought to be asking the question 
of whether, within the frame of its assumptions, Article 8 does a 
good job.539 
                                                                                                                      
 537. See supra text accompanying notes 260-63 for a discussion of this point. 
 538. This Author was one of the participants. Even this limited roundtable is more ef-
fort than many states devote to considering new revisions of the UCC. Professor Steven L. 
Schwarcz, for example, reports: 
Donald Rapson . . . and Neil Cohen, a professor of commercial law at Brooklyn 
Law School and the reporter for the Restatement of Guarantees and Surety-
ship, told the Author that Professor Cohen was teaching a course in Article 9 
when a student asked whether New Jersey had adopted the 1972 amendments. 
Cohen replied that it had not. The student called his father, a senior member of 
the New Jersey legislature, and asked why the 1972 amendments had not been 
adopted. The father then asked the legislatures drafting office to present the 
amendments to his committee for possible legislative adoption, and Rapson was 
asked to testify in support of the amendments at a legislative hearing. When 
Rapson arrived, he was directed to read verbatim the amendments for the re-
cord, starting with the definitions section. Droning on while the committee en-
acted other business, he had not even completed the definitions before he was 
thanked, asked to stop, and informed that the amendments would be adopted 
without modification. 
See Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 981 n.253.  
 539. Shupack Memorandum, supra note 62, at 8 (emphasis added). 
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 Although this Author does not believe that the study of Revised 
Article 8 needed to extend over a ten-year period such as the one de-
voted to the original UCC from 1952 to 1962, a substantial commit-
ment of resources and period of study should have been devoted to it 
other than the self serving efforts of the financial communitys law-
yers and the efforts of a handful of unself-interested participants 
such as Professor Rogers. Congress has left the area of securities 
transfers, an area that is traditionally one of state law, to the states 
and it remains to the states to balance the competing interests of in-
vestors and control creditors. As the states in turn have abdicated 
their traditional role by not fully examining Revised Article 8, we are 
left relying on the policy arguments of the supporters of Revised Ar-
ticle 8. As the factual grounding of these arguments has not been 
tested either by a rigorous legislative process or by substantial aca-
demic work, we are relying on the judgment of these supporters 
without any independent means of checking the factual predicates. 
Ultimately, we are hoping that father knows best. 
